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Number 92 Summer 1992

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Capitalism in Poland

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Zygmunt Bauman: The Polish Predicament
Janine R. Wedel: Western Aid to Post-Communist Europe
Kazimierz Kloc: Polish Labor in Transition (1990-1992)
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Introduction

Recent events have placed federalism and regionalism once again on the political agenda — both as promises and threats. This is because, as G. L. Ulmen documents in his extensive review of recent German literature on the subject, these notions have not received the kind of careful scrutiny they deserve and, consequently, they remain confused and self-contradictory. From the viewpoint of a post-WWII liberalism committed, notwithstanding its perfunctory emphasis on democracy, to bureaucratic centralism and the rule of experts as the agents of reason, regionalism is not usually associated with local autonomy, accountability and self-government but with particularism, racism and xenophobia. It is allegedly the last refuge of irrationality which, as such, requires "federal" supervision from an allegedly impartial central bureaucratic apparatus. But this liberal notion of federalism identified *tout court* with Washington as a transcendental center of universal reason overseeing fallible lower-level jurisdictions and legislatures is also one-sided and historically inaccurate. This is why it is necessary to designate as "integral federalism" that original *ante bellum* model of federation theorized by the late Proudhon and some of the wiser Founding Fathers in the US as predicated on limited, constitutionally defined and revokable powers.

Clearly, liberal conventional wisdom has not yet learned the lesson of the collapse of communism. It was not primarily the result of the loss of the Cold War or of the dissent of a handful of particularly vocal intellectuals who, at any rate, had long since given up any hope of succeeding and were merely interested in renegotiating their *modus vivendi* with the various regimes in terms of a morally self-rightous "anti-politics." Rather, it was the result of the internal collapse of bureacratic centralism — a more extreme version of the same liberal ideology which for years has been posited misleadingly as its antithesis. This is why recent efforts to rationalize markets and international relations through various modes of transnational integration like the European Community, the North American Free Trade Agreement, etc. are all in deep trouble and unlikely to be implemented in the immediate future in their present bureaucratic centralist form.

Liberalism as a universalist ideology has turned out to be yet another particularistic world-view — the ideology of Enlightenment intellectuals (Gouldner's and Konrad/Szelenyi's New Class). This ideology has not only been theoretically indefensible at least since Hegel's devastating critique, but it is increasingly

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proving unable to deliver on its promises of rationality, efficiency and justice. One need only examine the dismal record of the US bureaucratic apparatus, no longer shielded from scrutiny by the cloak of Cold War secrecy, to realize the extent to which even the most allegedly hyper-efficient industrial, governmental and military organizations have always been paradigms of waste, irrationality and counterproductivity. This has been even more true in the East, where the lack of external control mechanisms — an independent press or opposition parties — has resulted in ecological, economic and social catastrophes of unprecedented magnitude.

Along with the various contributions to the "Special Section on Poland," these shortcomings of liberalism help explain why, after spectacular initial successes, liberals and their neo-liberal economic programs are increasingly on the defensive all over Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union, where ex-communists and their "new and improved" political organizations are making a strong comeback. Apparently, capitalist relations presuppose social conditions such as a viable legal system, institutional stability and social trust, which "really existing socialism" has either destroyed or severely eroded. As David Ost shows, in a context where the market and entrepreneurship have not taken hold anywhere close to liberal projections, the neoliberal state finds itself forced to rely precisely on those institutional remnants of the old regime that it is attempting to destroy. Understandably, the heirs of those labor organizations (whose former leaders have taken over the Polish government) are now beginning to respond to their populist constituencies by calling for a slowdown of the reforms while re-evaluating precisely those industries previously deemed terminally statist and, therefore, doomed to extinction.

What this reveals is an astounding lack of imagination in that most of the new Polish opposition (as well as that of all former communist countries caught in the same predicament) ends up proposing as the post-communist wave of the future precisely that Fordist social-democratic model that is rapidly being discarded in the more advanced parts of the West. Along with integral federalism and regionalism, post-Fordism hardly appears in discussions of alternative models of social organization still trapped between the statist centralization and the neo-liberal market. The kind of knowledge-intensive, socially-conscious and ecologically-sound models of post-industrial reorganization proposed, e.g., by various regionalist groups attempting to break the economic stranglehold of transnational capital, remain unexamined in the sterile debates between a Left attempting to rationalize the same old bankrupt plan "democratically" and a Right bent on privatizing all within the old nation-state.

This is why it is important to re-examine, as does Russell Berman, how and why nation-states came to be constituted. Far from being the result of a natural teleology or "manifest destiny," as these narratives are usually constructed, the nation-state came into being for specific historical reasons in the interest of particular social groups. As Gianfranco Miglio has pointed out, the nation-state is to the New Class what capital is for the capitalists. Historically, both have

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been articulated as modernist means of social domination. A similar case is made for South Africa by Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley. They convincingly show how both the New Class ideologists of the Afrikaner National Party and of the African National Congress agree on the traditional model of the nation-state, which promises to marginalize large sectors of the population and reintroduce new and more sophisticated relations of domination.

The still far from complete collapse of the liberal version of bureaucratic centralism in the West has already been felt at the theoretical level as the collapse of modernism and the rise of post-modernity. As in Eastern Europe, however, the post-modern reaction to the one-dimensional ideology of modernism has resulted in the attempt to introduce the theoretical equivalent of the free market, and with similar dismal results: a free-wheeling relativism which tries to legitimate all positions as equally valid while, again as in the case of Eastern Europe, remaining parasitic on precisely those old modernist structures it seeks to dismantle. While a modernist Husserl, presumably still mired in a transcendental idealism where everything is dependent on an ego rigorously constituting the world univocally along phenomenological lines, has come to be contraposed to a post-modern Heidegger spinning out a myriad of equally valid narratives after having transcended Western metaphysics and returned to a primordial Being, Guido D. Neri proposes a possible reconciliation through a close reading of one of Husserl's late manuscripts on "The Spatiality of Nature."

According to Neri, in the attempt to refute a scientistic reading of the results of Copernican astronomy and its aftermath, Husserl's own research propelled him beyond the limitations of his own framework, to the unveiling of an ontological dimension presupposed by the transcendental ego which is what Merleau-Ponty later attempted to develop in terms of the notion of corporality — a new stratum of Being. This acknowledgment of the groundedness of the ego does not relegitimate any kind of vulgar materialism, naturalism or objectivism (which Husserl so violently opposed throughout his life), but historicizes phenomenology, particularizes the universality of the *eidos*, and paves the way for an anthropology privileging the *doxa* as embodied in *nomoi* constituting organic communities. The transcendental ego remains central, but embodied in its particular socio-historical context and impervious to any bureaucratic homogenization. Universality is no longer pre-given, but a *telos* to be negotiated within a contractually constituted federation of these particularistic communities which do not thereby forfeit their particularity other than in the process of their normal evolution.

Thus it is not a question of either ontologically irreducible particularities, all equally valid within a relativistic universe where no universal standards exist (as in post-modern multiculturalism), or of pathological social aggregates to be nurtured through socio-scientific intervention back to a mythological universal health. Rather, it is a matter of the gradual internalization of new collectively constituted *nomoi* to eventually achieve a true universality manifesting itself as immediately given rather than bureaucratically imposed by New

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Class "experts" who, in externally mediating its implementation, would inevitably particularize it in terms of their own interests. Prior to its successful internalization in new forms of consciousness and its objectification in collectively shared *nomoi*, this universality can only obtain as a religious horizon vulnerable to mundane reductions and aberrant transfigurations.

This is why it is neither possible nor desirable to universalize "human rights" beyond their particular historical context, i.e., as means to challenge authoritarian regimes that systematically violate them. In radically different contexts, the same rights can easily become tools of domination empowering a distant and insensitive bureaucracy to destroy particular communities under the pretext of rationalization and civilization. Thus Aviezer Tucker is right in praising Jan Patocka's moral stance as "heroic" within the "really existing socialism" of the Husak regime. Yet the same stance can become irrelevant or quixotic under different circumstances — as has in fact happened to many dissident intellectuals in the post-communist context. A concrete alternative to Heidegger's a-morality cannot be the hypostatization of human rights to the level of universally valid mandates, but it will have to vindicate universality as an horizon *from within these very same particular cultures*. Pending the reconciliation of these often conflicting cultures, integral-federal arrangements are necessary to guarantee internal order and external peace.

Paul Piccone

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Piedmont as Prussia: The Italian Model and German Unification

Russell A. Berman

If contemporary cultural theory has a keen eye for the artificiality of national identities, treated as nothing more than rhetorical inventions, the underlying fact — the construction of the national state as a political unit — remains much more impervious to criticism. A strange omission indeed, as states all around crumble, reunify, and redraw their borders. Is only identity up for grabs or is a scrutiny of the large territorial state itself also overdue? Far from being a natural or necessary frame for politics, the national state was a byproduct of 19th century economy and culture; its persistence today represents the reification of the political imagination, impeding the emergence of more supple, communitarian and democratic forms of social life. Only the fixation on the "naturalness" of nationhood eclipses other political options. To strip the national state of its appearance of organicity, reexaminations of its historical origins are called for, and no example is more instructive than one which links the production of the two new nation-states of 19th century Europe: Germany and Italy. Standard accounts present the establishment of these two nations as the obvious and long-expected outcomes of organic teleologies. Nothing could be further from the truth. The contradictory impulses within nationalization become particularly evident when one discourse is refracted through another: the German account of Italian nationhood.

No staple of German culture is more stereotypical and persistent than the image of Italy as a treasure trove of art and ruins. A landscape strewn with remnants of erstwhile grandeur, monuments and museums of exquisite form, a people understood as devotees of sensuous appearance

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and therefore irreversibly superficial — this is what the German traveller has found, at least since the 18th century, again and again during the obligatory *Bildungsreise* through Italy. Of course, this is precisely what the German traveller expected to find, as the underlying structure of Kantian philosophy was projected across the map of Western Europe: pure reason in France, practical reason in England, and Italy as the place of aesthetic judgment devoid of political substance. Italy as the locus of art has meant, within canonic German culture, the plausibility of a place without politics. The apparent privileging of Italy is a particularly compelling instance of the "unpolitical German," to use Thomas Mann's phrase, as well as the *Sonderweg*, the peculiarity of German modernization, with its relatively underdeveloped political public sphere.

The German aestheticization of Italy is itself an extremely complex phenomenon, combining both a conservative escapism as well as a utopian search for an alternative to domestic disappointments: conservative as a vehicle to deny the political challenges of the moment; utopian as a vision of a qualitatively better mode of existence. Hence the ambivalence in Jakob Burkhardt's letter to his friend Hermann Schauenburg dated February 28, 1846, announcing his impending trip to the south. Unlike others who vocally oppose the age, Burckhardt boasts: "I, in contrast, oppose it silently, but totally and therefore flee into the beautiful, languid south, which is dead to history and, like a miraculous tombstone, will rejuvenate me, so tired of modernity, with its ancient mysteries. Yes, I want to escape them all: the radicals, communists, industrialists, academics, chic, the reflecters, the abstract, the absolutes, the philosophers, the sophists, the statists, the idealists [. . .]. On the other side of the mountains, I must find new ties to life and poesy, if I am to survive."[1] Deeply disappointed with contemporary society and politics, Burckhardt chooses to flee, to run away from communists, industrialists and all other species he imagines are absent in Italy. There he expects to regain a deeper tie to the vital currents of poetry and art — an unmistakeably modern and romantic gesture, precisely when it is presented as an alternative to modernity. Modern political life is the precondition for the desire for a place where no politics exist, which the Germans try to find south of the Alps.

The internal complexity of this image of Italy was subject to a critical

1. Cited in Theodor Schieder, "Das Italienbild der deutschen Einheitsbewegung," in *Studien zur deutsch-italienischen Geistesgeschichte*, ed. by Istituto Italiano di Cultura and the Petrarca-Institut of the University of Cologne (Cologne and Graz: Böhlau Verlag, 1959), p. 141.

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exploration in the third of Heinrich Heine's 1828 travelogues: on his journey from Munich to Genoa. Participating parodically in the genre of the voyage to Italy, the text reserves some especially poignant references to Goethe's paradigmatically aesthetic account. Yet much more is at stake than Heine's competition with Weimar's gray eminence. The left-Hegelian critique of classical autonomy aesthetics led to a growing interest in genres marginal to the emerging bourgeois canon of high art. The travelogue (and other potentially "operative" modes of writing) could allow for a degree of politicization, no matter how mitigated by censorship, that the classic-romantic work of art tended to preclude. Among the descriptive and informational elements expected in a travelogue, Heine's journey from Munich to Genoa intersperses a barely submerged reflection on politics — from the derogatory references to the Prussian state, through the ubiquity of Austrian military presence, to the decoding of signs of Italian resistance to foreign occupation. Yet very much in line with the established conventions of the genre, this resistance is located within the aesthetic dimension itself.

Heine's alternative to Goethe's Italy of art is not a politicized Italy, i.e., Italy as a sovereign political subject, but an Italy of politicized art, and this politicization, projected onto Italy, is at least in part a function of *querelles allemandes*. Heine's praise of "a genuine piece of Italian music, from some popular Opera buffa," fully in the manner of Rossini, leads into a denunciation of established German music criticism's hostility to this popular form and popular art in general;[2] the same high culture/low culture tension that grounds the formal parody of Heine's literary text is now thematized in the commentary on musical taste: "The opponents of Italian music, who approach this style as judgmentally as they do others, will someday face their well deserved punishment in hell and may be damned to hear nothing in all eternity except Sebastian Bach's fugues."[3] According to Heine, German high culture's inability to comprehend Italian popular form is a consequence of its ignorance of the Italian people and their history, which find expression in their music. The work of art is the displaced voice of the oppressed nation: "Poor, enslaved Italy is prohibited from speaking, and it can express the feelings of its heart only through music. All its hatred for foreign rule, its enthusiasm for freedom, its rage over the feeling of powerlessness, its melancholic recollection of former glory, its attentiveness and thirst for help:

2. Heinrich Heine, *Reise von München nach Genua in Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 7/1, ed. by Alfred Opito (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1986), p. 48.
3. *Ibid.*

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all of this is hidden in those melodies that slide from a grotesque intoxication with life to elegiac whispers, and in those pantomimes that leap from flattering caresses to threatening anger."[4]

If popular form is, on the one hand, an expression of popular desire, it is, on the other, also a consequence of repression: Heine plays out the "esoteric meaning of the opera buffa" against the presence of the "exoteric gendarme" who is always on guard against any "revolutionary collaraturas."[5] This is certainly a far cry from the safe haven for poetry and life Burckhardt would envision less than twenty years later. Yet while Heine constructs Italy as a place of politics (or rather, of politics displaced into aesthetic form), the politics are not in any way specifically Italian, i.e., the question of foreign occupation does not lead directly to a thematization of Italian nationalism. To be sure, Heine has a keen eye for indications of patriotism, but the patrimony of the patriots offended by the Austrian presence is not self-evidently the unified nation. Heine can identify hostility to foreign domination and the Metternichian order in general, but he presents no evidence of a counter-program involving the pursuit of a specifically Italian national liberation. On the contrary, the same philosophical idealism that leads the left-Hegelian Heine to his politicization of art, pushes his thinking away from such national particularisms and toward a universalist vision: "there are no nations any more in Europe, but only parties," indeed only two parties — the party of oppression and the party of emancipation — and this opposition takes on a global character. "What is the duty of our age? Emancipation. Not only the emancipation of the Irish, the Greeks, the Frankfurt Jews, the West Indian Blacks and other such oppressed people, but rather the emancipation of the whole world. . ."[6]

Heine is staking out a position that draws dialectically both on Napoleonic heroism and the emancipatory rhetoric of the anti-Napoleonic wars. It is a position which would be inherited by left-liberalism and socialist internationalism. Yet in its internationalism it bypasses the question of nationhood — the Italian question. At this level, then, Heine's left-wing account shares with the conservative Burckhardt and Goethe a reluctance to understand "Italy" as a term of political contestation. Metternich's quip that "Italy" is only a geographical concept has as its corollary for Heine (as well as most other German travellers) the suggestion

4. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

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that "Italy" is only a cultural term. The circulation of "Italy" as a designation of potential political valency — not only of aestheticized politics — does not commence until much later in the historical unravelling of the 1815 treaties and the emergence of new and almost simultaneous political structures in Italy and Germany.

The early 19th-century German blindness to a political Italy is evidenced, perhaps most dramatically, in the position of the 1848 revolutionaries: whether moderate or radical in their political agendas north of the Alps, they tended to side with the Austrians against the Italian revolutionaries (just as they tended to oppose the national aspirations of other groups in Central Europe).[7] It was therefore not at all the European revolution that undermined the allegiance to the borders of 1815, but the tectonic shift initiated a decade later by the Crimean War, including the reemergence of France as a continental power and one which began to challenge Austrian hegemony in northern Italy. The site of this shift was Piedmont, and the metamorphosis of the German perception of Italian politics between 1859 and 1871 testifies to several reinventions of the concept of Italy — as functions both of the political process being played out on the peninsula and the simultaneous process of German national unification. In addition, the several versions of the articulation of "Italy" simultaneously entail widely disparate cultural-theoretical implications with regard to the substance of national identity.

Austrian forces engaged Piedmont, which received massive support from France, during the War of 1859. At the Peace of Villafranca, Austria was compelled to cede control of Lombardy. Piedmont emerged as the strong force around which a unified Italy would soon crystallize. German perception of the war depended on several complexities. As a member of the German Confederation, Austria could expect support from other German states, in particular from Prussia, the key military force in Central Europe. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of such a claim was mitigated by arguments to the effect that the Austrian Lombard campaign derived from imperial Hapsburg concerns and not from the specific needs of Austria as a German (rather than an imperial) power. If these formal legal waters were muddied, it was of course a result of the on-going political conflict between Austria and Prussia and the competition between *grossdeutsch* and *kleindeutsch* models of German unification. Hence considerable maneuvering: to force Prussia into the role of

7. For the Frankfurt parliament's claim on northern Italy and German attitudes to the Risorgimento, cf. Robert Michels, *Italien von Heute: Politische und wirtschaftliche Kulturgeschichte von 1860 bis 1930* (Zürich and Leipzig: Orell Füssli Verlag, 1930), pp. 13-19.

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subsidiary ally or to highlight Austria as a dynastic power not at all congruent with German national interests. Finally, a cultural dimension pertains to the ability to articulate and mobilize "national" interests: within the public sphere, the debate on the "Italian War" marked a subtle shift in the vicissitudes of German national identity. Yet this shift takes place, interestingly enough, with barely any perception of Italy at all. Instead, Lombardy becomes a field which attracts German attention primarily with regard to conflicting loyalties to Austria or Prussia, and secondarily as a function of the evaluation of France and, especially, Bonaparte.

At the outbreak of the war, German public opinion was largely pro-Austrian, which is to say, hostile to France, to Piedmont, and to any claims for a unified Italy. This was especially true in southern Germany (where the ties to Austria were historically stronger), but it was true as well in Prussia, if to a somewhat lesser degree. The associated rhetoric, which included exhortations to greater German military assistance to Austria, was particularly successful "because it continuously appealed to elementary popular sentiments, a vague notion of 'Germanness,' and to the need to unite Germanic forces against the Gallic enemy. In a period of growing national consciousness, it could employ key slogans and vigorously invoked the memory of 1806 and 1813, superficially overcoming profound differences."[8] As may often be the case, a current war can provide the opportunity to fight a previous one; in this case, the belligerent rhetoric of 1859 mobilized the patriotic backdrop of the anti-Napoleonic wars of a half-century earlier, including the images of 1806 — Prussia's defeat — and 1813 — the Wars of Liberation and Austrian supremacy. Thus Lombary provided the German public an opportunity to imagine a unified German nation in which the tensions between Berlin and Vienna were subsumed within the greater cause of the people gathered together in a national cause. The fight for the Austrian possessions in Italy therefore represented a fight for German interests against the same enemy and a leader of the same name, as in 1813.

The imagery was powerful and seductive, leading at first to considerable public sympathy for Austria and hostility toward the Prussian government for its reluctance to enter the war. What was the nature of the

8. Annie Mittelstaedt, *Der Krieg von 1859: Bismarck und die öffentliche Meinung in Deutschland* (Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1904), p. 21; cf. Rudolf Margraff, *Vor und nach dem Frieden von Villafranca: Studien zur Geschichte und Kritik der politischen Entwicklung des letzten Zeitdramas* (Leipzig: Adolph Lehmann, 1860) and especially Ernst Portner, *Die Einigung Italiens im Urteil liberaler deutscher Zeitgenossen: Studien zur inneren Geschichte des kleindeutschen Liberalismus*. Bonner Historische Forschungen, Nr. 13 (Bonn: Ludwig Röhrscheid Verlag, 1959).

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reluctance? We know that Bismarck, for one, recommended a diametrically opposite course of action: to seize on the hostilities between France and Austria (Piedmont is still regarded only as the incidental issue, not as a full political subject) in order to resolve finally and conclusively the intra-German competition by annexing the southern states, unifying Germany, and excluding Austria. Bismarck, however, was in Petersburg and did not prevail on the Prussian leadership. Yet his emphatically anti-Austrian calculation represents what, in a more moderate form, came to circulate in Berlin: apprehension regarding ceding leadership to Austria and legalistic doubts pertaining to obligations outside the strictly German sphere of the confederation. The result was a policy that waivered between neutrality and only minimal support for Austria — a moderation which Bismarck regarded as a lost opportunity for a *kleindeutsch* resolution and which the southern German advocates of a *grossdeutsch* program denounced as a betrayal of a German confederate.

Surveying the alternative positions in the German debates on the War of 1859 (and these positions of course existed in a full range of nuances), one ought to take note of important similarities and differences. None of the significant participants on either side of the issue seems to have regarded Piedmont or Italy as the crux of the matter. For the *grossdeutsch* camp, it was a war in Italy between French and German interests; hence the appeals to Prussia to expand the war by attacking France on the Rhine. Since a Bonaparte was attempting to revise the order of 1815 and the subaltern status of France, the German press could hoist the nationalist flag of anti-Napoleonic heroism. For the *kleindeutsch* camp, the war in Italy was not between French and German interests, but between France and Austria, and Austria's defeat was hardly unwelcome.

Certainly, the outcome of the war had, among its political implications, a weakening of the pro-Austrian camp within Germany. Yet while the supporters of Austria and Prussia shared, despite their otherwise divergent evaluations, a blindspot for Italy, their constructions of "Germany" differed sharply, and not only with regard to the obvious difference as to the geographical scope of the imagined nation. In addition, the two positions presented rather different constellations of state, nation, and people. While the *grossdeutsch* camp mobilizied patriotic images of national history and appealed to pan-German sentiment, the Prussian discussion in 1859 remained much less popular and much more conservative in the sense that it focused solely on the issues of state power and political interest. In other words, despite a disregard for any putative Italian national aspirations, the *grossdeutsch* publicists appealed

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directly to German nationalism as a vessel of cultural and historical identity, while the *kleindeutsch* accounts are more "realistic" in their politics and therefore more cautious and less popular in their claims. Thus for the commentator of the *Preussische Jahrbucher*, Theodor von Bernhardi, the whole notion of an "Italian Question" is discounted as a fabrication of Napoleon, despite his own otherwise primarily anti-Austrian stance.[9] Italian nationality is treated as an invention of the French emperor as well as a consequence of the Austrian emperor's manipulation of nationalist policies in order to undermine Magyar ascendancy. Bernhardi provides what might be termed a discourse-theoretical account of national identity — an invention designed to consolidate established power and therefore in no way an expression of the experience of the members of the putative grouping and certainly not a consequence of some prior "essence."

Neither side recognizes a legitimate Italian national interest (although one might argue that Prussia's implicit reluctance *vis-à-vis* Austria was, *de facto*, supportive of Piedmont and, hence, of Italy). Yet the Austrian side, with a romantic and popular account of national interest — German national interest — clearly occupied a stronger symbolic and rhetorical position within the German debate, while the Prussian realists could only understand power vested in the state. Therefore the efforts to define a difference between Austrian and German national interest, which would have greatly benefitted the *kleindeutsch* cause, lacked the same sort of cultural symbolism the other camp wielded so well. Consider Bernhardi's analysis of the conclusion of the war: "However, the real reason behind the conclusion of the peace agreement was, as the Austrian government press admitted with admirable naiveté, that Prussia was arming to attack France: not however as a blindly obedient vassal of Austria, but independently, to counteract French supremacy in defense of all truly German interests. That is what Vienna wanted to prevent. The point was not the defense of Germany but of Austria's system! If Prussia had entered the war at this point, it naturally would have taken over the leadership Austria had either lost in battle or could not claim, lacking an army to send to the Rhine. Austria sued for peace not because of a threat to Germany but of a threat to Austria's position within Germany, which was, as the Austrian press put it, 'worth more than Lombardy' — at least from

9. Theodor von Bernhardi, "Frankreich, Österreich und der Krieg in Italien," in *Vermischte Schriften* (Berlin: G. Reimer Verlag, 1879), II, 236-37. Reprinted from *Preussische Jahrbucher* (1859).

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the standpoint of Austria's special interests."[10]

Obviously, Bernhardi is repeating the Prussian defense that the conflict in northern Italy was an Austrian matter, outside the area of responsibility of the German confederation; this allows him to treat Austrian policy as outside and indeed inimical to a genuine German interest. Furthermore, he is suggesting that Austria accepted the Peace of Villafranca less as a result of French military force across the Alps than of the imminence of Prussian entry into the war. Whatever the accuracy of the claim, Bernhardi's calculation remains solely on the level of state diplomacy and lacks any reflection on national as opposed to state interests. This is indicative of the relative weakness of his discourse-theoretical articulation of national identity; he seems nearly as blind to a German nation as he is to an Italian one: the key players are always only the states and their diplomatic representatives; public opinion is only the product of a manipulative press. There is no exploration of the popular pro-war sentiment as possibly the expression of a collective national identity, as if the nation had no identity except as an expression of the state. His efforts to relocate Austria outside German national interest therefore seem painfully shallow and ineffective, just as his announcement of a Prussian attack on France rings hollow, since his substantive hostility is aimed at Vienna. If, as Bismarck suggested, 1859 was a missed opportunity, it may have been so not only due to the vacillation of the Prussian court, i.e., the inadequacy of leadership, but also to an underdeveloped notion of nationhood and the requisite symbolism. The point is that the rhetorical capacity of the *kleindeutsch* advocates of a Prussian-led unified German nation appears to have been considerably weaker than that of their opponents, particularly in terms of a relative inability to manipulate cultural symbols.

During the stages of German and Italian unification in the following decade, richer and more powerful accounts of nationhood developed and the revisions of "Germany" drew repeatedly on the model of Piedmont and Italy. In effect, two separate stories intertwine: on the one hand, the new nation-states, Italy and Germany, took shape; on the other, a significant adjustment took place in the relation between politics and culture. Challenging the legitimate, dynastic authority, and doing so in a historical context where the mobilization of public opinion has taken on new importance, the new political order derived its legitimacy from cultural claims; and culture in turn found its erstwhile

10. *Ibid.*, p. 349.

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apolitical status — the aestheticized Italy of the unpolitical Germans — growing increasingly untenable.

Seven years later, in 1866, the conflict between Prussia and Austria came to a head; Prussia's rapid victory in the hostilities led to its undisputed ascendancy within Germany and the final exclusion of Austria from German matters. It led indirectly to Austria's loss of Venice and the emergence of a unified Italy. The literary and cultural significance of this turn is marked in Hermann Baumgarten's classic essay on German liberalism, the key text which redefined the relation of the liberal public to Bismarck's leadership and his specific formula for national unification. Liberal reticence *vis-à-vis* Bismarck is treated as an expression of a political inability that has long hampered Germany's role in Europe. In order to convince his readership of the viability of a reinvention of the terms of German nationhood, Baumgarten has recourse on several occasions to the lessons of the Italian model. If, in 1859, the Italian War was the site of intra-German conflicts, by 1866 it became an example to emulate and an enabling metaphor for German unification.

This profound shift entailed a revision of the evaluation of Bonapartist France. Previously viewed either as the anti-German (qua anti-Austrian) aggressor or (by Bernhardi) as the conspiratorial manipulator of an "Italian Question," Napoleon suddenly became a heroic figure avenging the French nation on the Holy Alliance, shattering "the grand solidarity of conservative interests" that had prevailed since 1815, enabling Cavour to promote Italian independence.[11] Before examining the treatment of Cavour more closely, one should note that Baumgarten even went so far as to invoke Napoleon's own Italian background. Napoleon is not depicted as the imperial aggressor but as the admirable patriot who promotes Piedmont against Vienna, encoded as freedom against reaction. The competition among states, which had structured the German discourse of 1859, is now filled with resonant values: Napoleon's battle against conservative legitimism, Napoleon against the ancient regime, Napoleon and Cavour against the "hierarchical-Catholic" powers supported by Austria.

It is against this background that Baumgarten censures the German, especially southern German liberals so severely. Fearing Prussia, they had supported Austria in 1859, but at what cost? "How could it have been possible that liberalism felt obliged to defend Austrian despotism

11. Hermann Baumgarten, "Der deutsche Liberalismus: Eine Selbstkritik," in *Preussische Jahrbücher* 18 (1866), p. 485.

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in Italy, to side with the papal state against free Sardinia, and to ally with the clerical and feudal parties against liberal Europe?"[12] One more expression of German backwardness, one more failure to play a historical role. The misjudgment of 1859 is the point at which the "self-criticism" of liberalism sets in, and Italy provides the counter-example: "The single, grand, glowing victory of liberalism in this century was won in Italy. However, in Italy I believe the many aided the one leader in obedient subordination, and the one who was truly victorious was an aristocrat."[13] From a merely incidental backdrop in 1859, Italy has become the grand model for liberal politics and the blueprint for German unification. More precisely, however, Baumgarten indicates that the liberal fear of Bismarck is misplaced, insofar as Piedmont too had its towering aristocratic leader. Cavour is implicitly the corollary to Bismarck, in Baumgarten's account, which is to say, at this crucial juncture in the history of German liberalism, the point at which the alliance with Bismarck is forged and more radical, left-liberal directions are abandoned. It is the Italian model of Cavour's leadership that facilitates the transition: Prussianized Germany as an imitation of Piedmontese Italy.

The terms of the metaphor are complex. Baumgarten proceeds from an assumption of a history of German failure: disunity, political ineffectiveness, cultural escapism; and he has a very particular reading of Italy. Italy's distinction is its political class: "Next door to us, Italy awoke, but Italy did not bend like we did. Italy had a man, who combined great courage with greater wisdom, and it had a king with a truly royal sensibility."[14] Presumably, Germany lacked both: a political leader and a responsible monarch. Moreover, while German culture was trapped in a philosophical idealism that militated against political action, Italian sentiment was revolutionary and prepared for substantive deeds. "Italy was not rotten with eccentric dogmatisms, and Italy did not benefit from that equanimity (or should we say spiritual breadth?) which can tolerate the most miserable condition of the fatherland, drawing compensation from a well-kept house and profound immersions in ideas and fantasies. Italy had the healthy resentment of a people mistreated for three centuries, and directed it toward its tormentors. It gave this resentment over to a wise mind, more interested in political success than in mere opinions."[15] Here Baumgarten articulates a sort of political corollary

12. *Ibid.*, p. 489.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 600.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 482.
15. *Ibid.*

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to literary realism, the privileging of the fact over the ideal. Indeed, the opposition of "success" and "opinion" is obviously reminiscent of Bismarck's own notorious contrast of blood and iron to parliamentary speeches and decrees. This realism, however, is a far cry from the discourse-theoretical power analysis of 1859 in Bernhardi's essay.

For all Baumgarten's evident interest in state formation and the establishment of power, it is clear that his account is structurally dependent on extensive cultural claims and references to historical experience. State power and national experience have become two independent variables, both of which are indispensible for a comprehensive analysis. The passage is furthermore a breathtaking inversion of the traditional coding of aesthetic Italy. In 1846, Burckhardt fled the politicized north for the rejuvenating return to the poetic sources in Italy. Here, twenty years later, Baumgarten looks to Italy as the site of the model revolution, where a politicized people found a politically effective leadership. In retrospect, the flight from politics to Italy turns out to have had little to do with Italy; it was, on the contrary, a specifically German fantasy, as Baumgarten complains. Germany, and German liberals in particular, have fled responsibility and feared the consequential deed. Their culture of profundity has only been a cozy escape from political exigency, the expression of the comforts of provincialism. Instead of intellectual escapism, insensitive to the real needs of the "fatherland," it is action that Germany requires.

Measured against Bernhardi, Baumgarten certainly expands the analysis to include national identity, historical experience, and cultural substance. But the crux of the matter is not at all autonomous aesthetic culture. It is, rather, the capacity for political leadership, the leadership of the aristocracy, and Cavour as the aristocratic individual *par excellence*: "These sentiments and aspirations of the Italian people were shared with equal passion by the aristocracy, both in diplomacy and in the army; everywhere the aristocracy played a leading role in the national battle. While the continent groaned under a reaction that stretched from Prussia to Spain, small Sardinia dared to be constitutional, and with its modern economy, prepared a thrust which would fundamentally change the situation of Europe."[16] Bernhardi was concerned with the interests of the Prussian state; Baumgarten's considerations are directed at transforming the continent, economic modernization, and a revolution of the established order. His politics are, however, aristocratic

16. *Ibid.*

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insofar as he suggests that it is precisely the aristocrat who can best carry out the revolution: "The truly decisive impulses did not come from the Italian people, and not from any Italian party, but from Cavour. He engaged Italy in the Crimean War, he formed the alliance with France, and he invoked the determining war. These sorts of turns can only be prepared by a single individual, and these sorts of individuals alone are able to give the powerful urges of a people the necessary strength to reach a goal."[17] The ultimate source of national identity, the genuine inventor, is therefore the great individual: not the state, not the people, not history. Just as Cavour made Italy, so Baumgarten suggests, liberals should give up their pointless opposition and allow Bismarck to make Germany.

This is also the defining moment of Baumgarten's liberalism. His broader political vision includes a fundamentally enlightenment promotion of cultural modernization, as expressed in his critique of the liberals' siding with Austria in 1859. Instead of choosing, as Germans, to support Austria against Piedmont, they should have chosen, as moderns, to support liberal Piedmont against the Austria of cultural reaction. If this orientation toward individual rights stakes out Baumgarten's difference with conservatives to his Right, its culmination in the heroization of the great individual also draws a line against a democratic Left: "To be sure, our time is to a large extent ruled by democratic tendencies, but precisely this democratic character makes outstanding individuals all the more indispensable. For democracy needs a leader. Only aristocracies can permit the mass of the electorate to carry out a collective action."[18] The ostensible point of Baumgarten's argument is to urge liberals toward the Center (or toward the Right) so as to become capable of governing in an alliance with Bismarck. The theoretical import is the articulation of a model of nationhood that combines the competing rhetorical modalities of 1859: the popular nationalism of the *grossdeutsch* camp with the conservative realism of the *kleindeutsch* essayists, thereby modifying both. It is the nation, not the state, which is at stake; but without the political leadership of the elite the nation remains mute and inactive. At this point, however, Baumgarten blurs the difference between the political class, for him coincidental with the aristocracy, and the single political leader: Cavour or Bismarck. Hence the mixed ramifications of the argument. On the one hand, he appropriates Italy as a model for emulation by German liberalism in alliance with the Prussian Minister, the constellation which indeed prevailed

17. *Ibid.*, p. 600.
18. *Ibid.*

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during the liberal *Gründerjahre* of the 1870s; on the other, to the extent that he "misreads" Cavour and overemphasizes his individual role, he appears to be setting the stage for the authoritarianism (or Bonapartism?) that would come to characterize the political culture of Bismarckian Germany and gravely mitigate any liberal potential.

A third reading of Italy emerged in 1871. This one again reversed the relation between Italy and Germany and had deep-seated consequences for German political and literary culture. Between 1859 and 1866, Italy had moved from invisibility within the German political discussion to exemplary status. In 1871, in the heat of German nationalism, it was demoted. Still related to unified Germany, unified Italy increasingly took on the hallmarks of the inferior state, while simultaneously the interconnection of the two states became a source for the articulation a new identity for the German Empire. The nuances of this redefinition are particularly evident in Wilhelm Lang's essay on German and Italian unity, which opens with an admiring reference to "the curious parallel in the history of unification in the two countries."[19] Yet as much as Lang applauds the two unifications and as much as he is prepared to discuss their similarities, he refers repeatedly to the secondary status of Italian unification, judged a mere byproduct of German history: "Once again the Italians reap their profit from the battles that Germans won. Just as Königgrätz brought them Venice, so did Sedan bring them the Capitol."[20] Baumgarten's admiration for the Italians' political prowess, contrasted with German enervation, has given way to a patronizing reduction of Italy to a sideshow: "And is not the Italian uprising (no matter how independnt its motives and development, no matter how grounded in the history of that people) in its decisive moments actually only an episode within the German uprising?"[21]

Italy is secondary in a further sense, however. As much as the two unified states resemble each other, their modes of unification, the internal substance of the nation-state, are fundamentally different — the centralized Italian state and the federal complexity of the German *Reich*. Lang compounds the difference with the aesthetic metaphors of classical lines as contrasted with "Gothic" ponderousness, and with suggestions of different velocities. The Italians moved much more quickly toward a more modern form, but the German solution, for all of

19. Wilhelm Lang, "Deutsche and italienische Einheit," in *Preussische Jahrbücher* 27 (1871), p. 208.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 220-221.

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its intricacy, may be more respectful of history and therefore ultimately more stable.[22] While both processes are characterized as uprisings — national uprisings to achieve independence and unification, presumably against a foreign power — Lang associates the Italian path with more emphatically revolutionary imagery, as opposed to Germany's more conservative trajectory. Even more important, however, is that this revolutionary surplus in Italy is linked now, for the first time, to an ethnic characteristic: "radical uniformity, of the sort that runs in the blood of romance peoples."[23] Note the connections: the centralized state is likely to produce greater homogenization and levelling than the gothic *Reich*, while propensities to both radicalism and conformism are treated as congenital features of romance cultures. Leaving aside the interesting connection of radicalism and conformism — the barely hidden suggestion is that democracy equalizes — one should note the sudden invention of Italy as one of the "romance peoples," which in effect reduces the country to a subsidiary of France; in 1871, in the context of the Franco-Prussian War and the Paris Commune, hardly a neutral linkage. Thus Lang proceeds from the assertion of a mirroring relation between Germany and Italy to a blurring of the difference between Italy and France, and then to an emphatic contrast between the conservatism of German nationhood and the mercurial adventurism of the French. "Even given the pressure, which the idea of unification drew from the collective and victorious war of defense [the Franco-Prussian War], the German people resisted the temptation, to which the French periodically succumb, to trust in improvised solutions. The power of conservatism was as large as the urge to unite, and the equilibrium of the two forces determined the compromise to the imperial constitution, the best aspect of which is that it does not appear forced on to any side. For it lacked any force or enthusiasm, that most pleasant form of terrorism."[24]

Baumgarten had limited the status of democratic tendencies within his account of political theory by insisting on the need for an aristocracy and the leadership only great individuals could provide. Lang faced a similar quandry: the establishment of the nation-state represents a revolutionary reconstruction of the political order, due in particular to its dependence on mass mobilization. Where Baumgarten put a brake on the revolutionary potential through the invocation of the leader — Cavour

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 210-11.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 212.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 215.

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or Bismarck — Lang introduced national character and appealed to French and Italian developments as counter-examples to the healthy historicism of the German path. The Reich is a compromise, and therefore not radical; it is organic and therefore not forced or artificial; and, it is not violent, since it took shape without "enthusiasm" (a negatively coded term) and therefore without the terrorism, presumably of the commune in Paris and, by implication, a potential in Italy as well.

Lang placed Italy in a liminal position. As a relative of France, Italy showed signs of succumbing to excessive democracy and conformism, while as a mirror of Germany its national unification was a key step in the modernization of Europe. Since he treated the finalization of Italian territorial integrity as an "episode" in German history, the culmination of nationhood, the occupation of Rome, was integrated even more emphatically in the German national narrative. The establishment of a secular Italian state is represented as the completion of the Reformation and even of a longer German history with roots in the Middle Ages: "The overthrow of the worldly papacy completes the historical atonement, carried out by German strength: just as, three centuries ago, German spirit first shook the omnipotence of Rome. From the heights of the captured Capitol we can oversee the deep relations of German and Italian history, as they have interacted until today. Is it not as if an ancient guilt were being avenged? Who did not think, during these September days, of the decline of the German Kaisers, the end of Conrad, destroyed by papist and gallic wiles? Out of the victory over France, the new Reich arises, just as the national Kingdom of the Italians claims the city of Peter."[25] The Italian national state and the German Reich, whereby the latter is self-evidently superior to the former, are nevertheless on the same side in their victory over the papist and frankish alliance. On the same side, where they had belonged since 1859, unified Germany and Italy have transformed the conservative order, but at this point the rhetoric of German unification and its incorporation of Italian identity hardly sound progressive. On the contrary, "Italy" now becomes evidence within the German *Kulturkampf* — the state's attack on the Catholic Church — a cornerstone of the illiberal culture of the Reich and certainly proof that centralization and homogenization could operate within the "gothic" form of the nation-state as well as elsewhere.[26]

25. *Ibid.*, p. 217.

26. On the importance of anti-Catholicism for German literary discourse and popular representations of national identity, see Günther Hirschmann, *Kulturkampf im historischen Roman der Gründerzeit 1859-1878* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1978).

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The two processes, the political formation of the nation-states and the aestheticization of the political discourse, have interacted to produce a curious result. In order to legimate the new political subjects and, at the same time, to put a limit on democratizing tendencies within the potentially revolutionary situation, cultural identity is invented and invoked. Which identity? Which invention? In 1859, the memory of 1813, the anti-Napoleonic liberation, was invoked; in 1866, Baumgarten appealed to Napoleonic revolutionism as the facilitator of Cavour and, *mutatis mutandis*, Bismarck as well; in 1871, however, it is the distant history of the Reformation and the medieval conflict of Kaiser and Pope. The success of the secular Italian state in occupying Rome is integrated into the anti-Catholic rhetoric of a Protestant Germany in a way that will lend itself to justifying the state's claims against the Church: Prussia as Piedmont against Rome. At this point, the conservative criticism Lang directed toward the excessive uniformity of the Italian model could be redirected against Lang himself and the German model as well, i.e., that any national unification tends toward authoritarian solutions. It is, furthermore, a line of thought that can flush out a further implication of the metaphoric connection. If, as Baumgarten and other liberals would soon have to concede, Bismarck's solution and the "Prussianization" of Germany entailed a degree of illiberalism and central control inimical to their own ideals, if Piedmont and Prussia, Cavour and Bismarck, stand in some mirroring relation to one another, we face a general problem of unified nation-states rather than solely a German question. One might begin to explore the possibility of a critique of the nation-state and the historical processs of national unification which, however, would not be a conservative critique in the sense of a defense of the political order established at the Congress of Vienna. There ought to be an alternative to the centralizing aspects of the nation-states' political culture without appealing to Metternich; whatever may have been wrong with the politics of Bismarck, Cavour, and Napoleon III, it is certainly not that they dismantled the Holy Alliance.

Socialist internationalism may have attempted to transcend the principle of the nation-state, but it never opposed national unification, which it inherited from the politics of enlightened liberalism. It is rather in the anarchist tradition that one finds the most emphatic rejections of the national models, coupled with a preference for decentralized, local power. Thus Proudhon: "They appeal to the principle of nationalities, but the first thing they do is swallow them up: Neapolitans, Romagnols, Tuscans, Lombards are worth less in Italy than Hungarians, Bohemians

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and Croats in Austria!"[27] Power, so he suggests, is most appropriately vested in the regional and historical unit, rather than in the centralizing invention of the nation-state. Proudhon does indeed end up defending the legitimacy of the 1815 treaties, not because of any loyalty to Metternich or legimate dynasties, but because he views the Bonapartist — and Bismarckian — revisionism as part of authoritarian agendas for the establishment of strong states hostile to democracy. An investigation of Proudhon's extended polemics against the unification of Italy would go far beyond the scope of this essay. The point, however, is that the process of national unification — in the context of the internal resonances between unified Germany and Italy — was neither natural nor somehow self-evidently desirable.[28] The centralized state bureaucracy of the kingdom of Italy was perhaps not the only possible alternative to the Austrian occupation of the north. Nor was the authoritarianism of Wilhelmine Germany an unavoidable political-cultural destiny. The nation is not natural. As far away as the details of 19th-century European history may seem today, the issues have, if anything, become overriding again, in the context of German unification, the regionalism of the Northern League in Italy, and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Lang's contrast between the German and Italian models takes on renewed interest in light of regionalist tendencies and the resurgence of a discussion about federalism. In retrospect, the 19th-century nation-state appears to have been the result of processes of centralization, wrapped in the cultural flags of national or linguistic character. The reasons to examine possible decentralized models — regionalist? communitarian? grass-roots? — make the fictionality of those nationalist claims all the more evident. As Europe unifies, the future of the nation-state is ambiguous to say the least; dismantling the mythologies of the 19th century may be the first step toward participatory democracy on a local level.

27. "La Fédération et l'Unité en Italie," in Proudhon, *Oeuvres Complètes* (Paris: Marcel Rivière, 1959), Vol. XVIII, p. 105.

28. Cf. Max Nettlau, *Der Anarchismus: Von Proudhon zu Kropotkin. Seine historische Entwicklung in den Jahren 1859-1880* (Berlin: Verlag Der Syndikalist, 1927), pp. 5-34.

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The End of Apartheid: The Federalization of South Africa?

Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley

On March 17, 1992, a surprising 68.7% of South Africa's whites supported a referendum calling for a negotiated abolition of their minority rule. Such rational foresight in a seemingly irrational racial atmosphere has been universally hailed as unprecedented. The same Afrikaner National Party (NP) that a few years ago presided over the implementation of Apartheid in defiance of the world now acts as a democratic reformer with the support of two thirds of their constituency. Faced with the choice of a siege economy, the ruling group opted for sharing political power with its main opposition, the African National Congress (ANC). In the process it redefined itself as an inclusive ideological party that in the future may even gain substantial support among like-minded black conservatives. Thereby the dwindling white minority did not set itself up as a resented target (as whites did with guaranteed racial group representation in Zimbabwe) but as a potentially even more powerful and legitimate force in a broad coalition government of national unity. Contrary to media reports, whites did not vote "to transfer power" to blacks but only to democratize a system in which they will remain major stakeholders.

With the ANC strong only in symbolic support (and weak in bureaucratic resources, military capacity and economic control) substantial power will remain in the hands of today's establishment, Mandela as president notwithstanding. The South African civil service and the army, let alone the economy, will have to rely on white skills, capital and goodwill, regardless of the government in power for a long time to come. Unlike Gorbachev, de Klerk will not be swept aside by the liberalization

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he unleashed. De Klerk differs from Gorbachev in that he (1) presides over a reasonably functioning, depressed but potentially buoyant industrial economy, (2) is not confronted by powerful secessionist forces, except a weakened right-wing, and (3) has a democratic mandate to implement reforms.

The apparent political miracle of a privileged minority voluntarily agreeing to give up exclusive political representation started much earlier than the referendum or even the rise of de Klerk and the release of Mandela two years earlier. Apartheid — the gigantic Verwoerdian dream of social engineering — had increasingly proven a dismal failure despite all the zealous efforts of its advocates in power. Its rising costs, both real and symbolic, led to halting, ambivalent moves to reform since the late 1970's under the hardline Prime Minister Vorster. His successor, P.W. Botha, essentially continued the reluctant liberalization without being able to break with the racial paradigm and blind anti-communism. It was the end of the cold war that paved the way for negotiations and compromise between ideological foes. Unlike the Middle East or Northern Ireland, no religious values impede bargaining over power and privilege in South Africa.[1]

The abolition of formal Apartheid in South Africa turned out to be almost a non-event. In contrast to what has been universally described as the "dramatic" turnaround on February 1990, the new reality of legally unregulated race relations went nearly unnoticed. There are several reasons for this remarkable transition. Many Apartheid laws were already unenforced and largely ignored. Integration in some city housing, English-language universities and private schools, and above all the workplace had rendered the laws obsolete long before they were formally abolished. No influx control measures, for example, could stem the flow of rural migrants into the cities in search of jobs and better living conditions. Repealing contrary laws simply verified social trends that had outpaced ossified regulations. Therefore, little or nothing changed with the formal abolition of Apartheid.

Without the disenfranchised's formal political power the dominant minority remained unthreatened. Many whites wondered why they had

1. This has been argued in Heribert Adam, *Modernizing Racial Domination* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971) and Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, *South Africa Without Apartheid* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). A chorus of abusive criticism lashed out against this distraction from revolutionary activism by the prospects of negotiated transformation. Cf. also Heribert Adam, "Israel and South Africa: Conflict Resolution in Ethnic States," in *Telos* 82 (Winter 1989-1990), pp. 27-46; and "Transition to Democracy: South Africa and Eastern Europe," in *Telos* 85 (Ffall 1990), pp. 33-55.

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not supported the policy change earlier, since immediate benefits far outweighed potential dangers. With the abolition of Apartheid, South African whites were rehabilitated and re-admitted to places from which they had been excluded: from participation in the Olympics to freer travel and landing rights for South African Airways. The desired normality had returned without the sky falling. The secret to the growing white approval rate of de Klerk lies in the realization that the dominant minority could continue to dominate at no cost. Few ruling groups in history have ever wriggled themselves out of a deadly predicament more elegantly. In addition, the world praised the change for what should have been normal policies and intergroup relations in the first place.[2] Nationalists made it repeatedly clear that negotiations would not be about surrender but power-sharing.[3]

In February 1990, with the mandate for negotiations only four months old, the government could now move boldly without jeopardizing seats. In any case, since another election under the tricameral constitution was quietly ruled out, the government could stake its long-term chances on the success of negotiations.

Without considering here the complex, multifaceted causes for the shift in strategy, the self-explanation is interesting. The National Party mouthpiece invoked historical character traits — "the Afrikaner's desire for freedom" — as lying "at the root" of this switch: "The knowledge that their own desire for freedom may not involve the permanent subservience of others compels the continent's first freedom fighters now — only 80 years after Union — to take the lead in the quest for the joint freedom of all in the country."[4] There was no perception of defeat or coercion by outside pressure or admission that the new policy had to be adopted in order to regain entry into the world economy. On the contrary, supreme self-confidence reigned among Afrikaner policy planners who congratulated themselves for grasping a unique opportunity to exploit the end of the Cold War. Sanctions were

2. For an account of how the conservative de Klerk himself underwent the metamorphosis to an anti-Apartheid policy, see the biography by his brother, Willem de Klerk, *F. W. de Klerk. The Man in his Time* (Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 1991).

3. F. W. de Klerk insisted that "those who arrogantly equate the concept of a new SA to a takeover of power, the message needs to be transmitted loudly and clearly that the new SA will not fall prey to a section of the population at the expense of the rest." He emphasised that "we will not accept a dispensation in which the quality of existing liberties and rights are dismantled." His constituency, de Klerk asserted, was "not prepared to bow out apologetically from the stage of history" and predicted that whites would still play a "key role." Cf. *Cape Times* (April 13, 1990).

4. *Die Burger* (February 5, 1990).

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hardly mentioned as the trigger for change. This view points to the increased self-confidence after the scare in mid-1989 when the country's reserves apparently were down to three days of obligations. "What was crucial in the Cabinet's calculation was not the threat of sanctions but the government's belief that the economy would beat them and would survive risky political experiments which the unbanning of the ANC undoubtedly is."[5] Presented as a moral shift and verified by the long stalled Namibian independence, the dramatic change caught the opposition and international anti-apartheid forces by surprise. Normally well-informed analysts totally misjudged the dynamics of white politics and de Klerk's determination to introduce a universal franchise with the growing support of the white electorate.[6]

The Perception of Conflict

South Africa can be seen as exhibiting a unique feature: not only a conflict between divided segments as in other plural societies, but what has been called a "metaconflict."[7] In reality there are only three irreconcilable positions on the present conflict. First: the extreme right-wing position of secession in a racial white homeland. While the disruptive power of armed ideologues must not be underestimated, the secessionist project has little chance of gaining establishment support because it runs counter to business interests in an integrated economy. Since South African business, including Afrikaner capital, needs to be part of the global economy and is dependent on the willing cooperation of black labor, it would also be hostile to a military takeover. This distinguishes South Africa from Latin American regimes. Second: the Africanist/socialist position of no negotiation until the regime is defeated and ready to transfer power. This would be a threat only if current negotiations were to fail. Third: the emerging National Party-ANC alliance. The ANC leadership, including its Communist Party members, have moved close to a social-democratic economic compromise.

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5. Hermann Gilliomee, *Weekend Argus* (February 24, 1990).

6. George M. Fredrickson was typical with his false prediction in Fall 1990: "In the unlikely event that de Klerk agrees to move directly to one person-one-vote, it is almost certain that he will lose the support of most whites and that the right-wing Conservative party will come to power and attempt to reestablish full-fledged Apartheid, thus making a racial civil war virtually inevitable. This might happen even if he concedes less than that." See his "The Making of Mandela," *New York Review of Books* (September 27, 1990), pp. 20-28.

7. Donald Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). Horowitz, however, overemphasizes the cleavages in South African society.

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The simultaneous opening of state-controlled television to a more objective reporting has benefited the New Nats in several ways. It has demonstrated to their constituency the power of organized black opposition by having whites exposed to normal politics. Showing blacks not only in the traditional service roles or as destructive rioters but acting as citizens with reasonable leaders acclimatized a skeptical master race to the need to negotiate as equals. Furthermore, the publicity given to black demands as well as to extremist right-wing rejection of these demands has allowed the government to position itself in the center as the reasonable middle ground holding the country together. Conservative Party leader Treurnicht's ranting against the white sellout not only confirmed the new-found objectivity of the broadcast service but also helped convince the huge black audience that the negotiation project was not a neo-Apartheid trick to perpetuate white rule.

The process of conflict resolution can be broken down into four separate stages: (1) the begrudging acceptance of the adversary as an unavoidable fact; (2) mutual recognition within a legal context; (3) interaction with the other as equal; and (4) partnership in a common post-conflict environment in which defined roles are shared.[8] In 1992, South Africa has moved into the third phase with a likely "semi-permanent, interim" coalition constituting the fourth phase. Both antagonists see themselves no longer as victims but as "creators of new realities." A cluster of fearful attitudes has shifted to a syndrome of hope among those participating in negotiations. If those clinging to the *status quo* can have their fear/hate cluster reduced as well by the process, they may wish to join at a later stage rather than being marginalized.

The historic compromise increasingly takes on more concrete features. Economically the ANC is likely to settle for black board representation, progressive taxation, equalization payments, equity ownership and joint ventures rather than nationalization. It is only worth capturing the "commanding heights of the economy" if the heights have not been flattened by economic decline. Anything more than a social democratic compromise towards drastic redistribution would flounder on the current power of the establishment to withhold the economic benefits from socialist political winners. All evidence points to the gradual embourgeoisification of the black middle-strata. The ANC leadership acts as their reluctant, posturing but ultimately complying representative

8. Stephen Philip Cohen, "Conflict Resolution: Principles in Practice," Paper presented at the Institute for the Study and Resolution of Conflict, University of Port Elizabeth, July 29,1991.

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because the spoils of entry into hitherto closed realms are real. The strong left wing within the opposition will try to block such neo-colonial accommodation, but is unable to prevent it. It will split from the old Congress alliance and form the new opposition.

This new alignment implies the already self-evident fact that some of the former victims of racial discrimination increasingly join the realms of power in perpetuating class domination. In this sense, South Africa has become normalized like other Western societies where exploitation is color-blind. Instead of waiting for racial capitalism to change into non-racial socialism, a new multiracial nomenclature is likely to share relative privilege at the expense of an increasingly marginalized underclass. This has been referred to as the 50% solution, since half of the population is short-changed in political representation. Thus the National Party constitutional proposal envisages a double vote for people owning or renting property. In the ANC executive and voting constituency migrant workers and unemployed are equally underrepresented. South Africa is heading toward a corporatist state where business, state bureaucrats and unionized labor in the form of the ANC/SACP (South African Communist Party)/COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unioins) alliance agree among themselves about the basics of an unwritten contract at the expense of the unorganized and weaker sections of the population. Electorally that may well be expressed in the substitution for elections of a series of appropriately worded and pre-tested referenda. This legitimizes the stake of the major players without risking unpredictable outcomes that could lead to civil war.

The ANC has been far more open to compromise than its detractors had ever expected. Mandela bluntly invokes special historical circumstances to woo his opponents: "We have to address the fears of whites and we should go beyond the mere rhetorical assurance in order to address structural guarantees which would ensure that this principle will not lead to the domination of whites by blacks."[9] While reaffirming that the political party with the most votes should form the government, Mandela assured his Stellenbosch audience, in Afrikaans, that all principles, democratic or otherwise, can be bent. "Having regard to our background it may not be enough to work purely on one person, one vote because every national group would like to see that the people of their flesh and blood are in the government."

This principle dovetails with the National Party notion of mandatory, constitutionally-entrenched participation of minority parties at all

9. *Sunday Tribune* (May 19, 1991).

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levels of political decision-making, including a statutory, collective presidency. It does not amount to majority rule in the traditional sense, but rather a notion of democracy that rests on a wider, compulsory participation by major interest groups. Whether it will paralyze decision-making and thereby preserve the *status quo* remains to be seen. Presently a power-sharing arrangement, not the rule by the majority party alone, will be the only achievable outcome short of civil war. The ANC could only become the sole government if it were able to defeat its opponent. Pretoria is under little pressure to surrender. Neither has the ANC any further intentions to declare war and, by its own admission, the capacity to inflict defeat.

Corporatism is not a static concept; it changes from country to country.[10] The semi-fascist version in Latin America differs vastly from a "corporatist" social-democratic accord in many Western European states. The role of the state in particular depends on the country's history. South Africa's main interest groups may well negotiate a unique "democratic corporatism" in both the economic and political spheres.[11] At any rate, South Africa's historic compromise is proceeding remarkably well in both the economic and political arenas.[12] In August 1990 the Minister of Constitutional Development, Gerrit Vilioen, even designated the government as part of the traditional opposition: "But the government is no longer an Apartheid regime, it is part of the anti-Apartheid movement"[13] Indeed, Pretoria's new flexibility has deprived the ANC of its reliance on its opponent's intransigence against which to mobilize.[14] More politically romantic and sensitive ANC members are bewildered: "Most people in the ANC don't seem to have any enemies any more. The other day a friend from the national executive committee of the ANC proudly introduced me to a National Party MP, as though he was some kind of friend. I was absolutely horrified."[15]

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10. Guillermo O'Donnell, *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

11. As Denis Beckett has said: The country has no successful models to follow, "only failures to avoid." See *Frontline* (May, 1991).

12. As a free market advocate put it, "the space between Mr. Ramaphosa's views and those of Finance Minister Barend du Plessis . . . was less than the space between Neil Kinnock and Margaret Thatcher." See Ken Owen, *Sunday Times*, No. 3, 1991.

13. *Monitor* (August 1990), p. 31.

14. As Simon Barber mused: "An opponent who asks so little in return for relinquishing his monopoly of power is almost too easy. How, if you are the ANC or its formations, can you mobilize against an enemy that suddenly turns out to be so reasonable that he is willing to treat all your demands as negotiable?" See *Cape Times* (April 3, 1990).

15. See Breyten Breytenbach in *Weekend Mail* (September 14, 1990).

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One of the watersheds towards a corporate state was COSATU's 1990 decision to join the National Manpower Commission. Although later temporarily suspended, this participation resulted from successful negotiations of unions, employers and manpower officials over the controversial Labor Relations Act. The accord reached, and subsequently enshrined in law provided a model of a social-democratic compromise. Since the state and the employers need unions to ensure stability, the union threat of withdrawal from the National Manpower Commission acts as a powerful bargaining tool against unilateral dictates by state bureaucrats in drafting labor laws. Certainly, there are great obstacles to be overcome and lessons to be learned on both sides. For example, the ANC/COSATU opposition has challenged with increasing success the government's right to determine economic policy unilaterally. The two-day national strike over the introduction of a new value-added tax in November 1991 was not called because the unions disagreed with the tax in principle but because they had no say in introducing it. The mass actions were aimed at further undermining the legitimacy of the government by proving that it can no longer rule alone, based on a white vote only. Since Pretoria itself admitted that its Apartheid constitution is wrong and needs to be renegotiated, it has also contributed to its own caretaker status.

South African business is learning the corporate contract mentality the hard way. Nonetheless, it is reluctantly embracing necessity. The more sophisticated companies have also discovered new allies. The ANC/SACP (South Afric Communist Party) is willing to contribute its share to the compromise.

How much the ANC/SACP alliance wishes to achieve an accord and marginalize opposing groups outside its own disciplining structure was demonstrated in what has been labelled "the most high-profile dispute of the year."[16] In a bitter strike of workers against their union's policy of centralized bargaining at the Mercedes plant in Port Elizabeth in 1990, the ANC, SACP and NUMSA lined up with management in opposition to the strikers' demand for factory-based bargaining. The Mercedes labor aristocracy was rejected as "industrial tribalism," with a grateful company rewarding the assistance of the "socialist" mediators. Mercedes is now engaged in abolishing "racial Fordism" in order to involve its workers in more autonomous decision-making on the factory floor as well as in the boardroom.

16. Cf. the *South African Labor Bulletin* (November, 1990).

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In early 1991 Thabo Mbeki indicated virtual consensus on the future constitution between the two adversaries: "Now that we have arrived at more or less common positions on the basic constitutional issues, there is no reason why the process should take a long time."[17] On the devolution of power, the ANC and the government differ only on whether the local/regional units should have authority in their own right or whether the federal rights be delegated by the central government. There is consensus on a Bill of Rights, a two chamber parliament and a constitutional court and, most importantly, on the voting system. ANC constitutional experts have increasingly embraced proportional representation.[18] However, this newly-found preference stems not only from concern for minority representation but leadership control over the process. Unlike the constituency-based Westminster system, where candidates are selected by and accountable to the local electorate, proportional representation minimizes grassroots control over candidates in favor of the party leadership that largely decides who is placed on the nation-wide list and in which ranking. It was this enhanced central control that made proportional representation attractive for the ANC/SACP constitutional planners.

In reviewing the origins of Apartheid legislation, Giliomee has isolated two interlinked motivations: "Without a privileged position the Afrikaners could not survive as a separate people: without safeguarding the racial separateness of the people, a privileged position could not be maintained."[19] The ANC opposition needs neither separateness nor privilege.

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17. Thabo Mbeki, "Interview, The Watershed Years,"(Leadership Publication, 1991), p. 62.

18. Thus, like Mandela, Kader Asmal argues that "there must be recognition that the cultural, social and economic diversity of South Africa requires the adoption of an electoral system at all levels which will enable sectoral groups and political tendencies to be adequately represented in decision-making." A member of the ANC Constitutional Committee, Asmal praises the "virtues of proportional representation" with the additional advantage that "gerrymandering" will be prevented by voting according to party lists. "The winner-takes-all majoritarian electoral system may have served its purpose in ensuring stability among the whites, but it is a form of stability which a democratic South Africa must reconsider." See Kader Asmal, "Constitutional Issues for a Free South Africa," in *Transformation*, No. 13 (1991). One independent African commentator remarked wryly about the ANC Constitutional draft: "I have no problems with it whatsoever. It looks like it has been faxed straight from London. It lacks any peculiar South African idiosyncrasies, such as the quaint tricameral parliament displayed" (Personal Interview, July 27, 1991). In contrast, the National Party constitutional blueprint with a collective rotating presidency and decision-making by consensus looks more "African."

19. Hermann Giliomee, "The Leader and the Citizenry," in *MS* (1991).

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Free of the insecurities of a small disadvantaged people, the majority does not have to mobilize on exclusivist nationalist grounds but can trust democratic equality to have its interests secured.

The striking feature of South African negotiation is the lack of outside intervention, mediation or arbitration with the adversaries' consensus. Compared with the decolonization of Namibia or Zimbabwe, South Africa poses the problem of being a sovereign state. Neither Namibia (before 1990) nor Rhodesia were ever sovereign, internationally recognized states, but were legally colonies under the authority of Britain in the case of Rhodesia, and the UN and South Africa in the case of Namibia. Once internal agreement had been reached under the tutelage of the metropolitan power, the foreign legal authority ceased its role by recognizing the new sovereign state. In the South African case the only legal body that can enact a new constitution is the present parliament. If there is to be legal continuity rather than interference by a third party, the present regime would have to legalize its own transformation. This is clearly recognized by the government agenda which sees precisely such a process unfolding. However, the opposition argues that the government cannot be simultaneously player and referee. Therefore it proposes a mutually acceptable interim government and an elected constituent assembly that could transform itself into the first parliament once a constitution has been agreed upon. From Pretoria's perspective, holding general elections before a new constitution has been agreed upon would amount to surrender — an abdication of power rather than negotiation about a new order. Pretoria also insists that lawful government and administration must not be jeopardized during the drafting of the constitution.

In adopting these legalistic positions, the government constantly confuses sovereignty with legitimacy. Sovereignty Pretoria has, legitimacy it lacks. Also, it falsely equates liberalization with democratization. Since de Klerk's rise to power, the South African state has clearly liberalized itself, but in 1992 it still has to institutionalize meaningful democratic participation for all citizens. Liberalization extends rights and opens new political space. It reduces the costs of individual expression. Democratization aims at equality of citizens and an improvement of life-chances for everyone. It is the latter that will be problematic, and not the transitional arrangement or the constitutional accords.

An interim government of national unity has to avoid two main dangers. (1) It can easily trigger more violence from the right and plunge the country into a real civil war if the interim government is perceived

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as a surrender in these circles. Constitutional continuity and the legitimacy of any transitional arrangement among the majority of whites is crucial. Holding a last racial referendum among whites about a new non-racial constitution, as de Klerk had repeatedly promised, seemed the most feasible way to prevent right-wing rebellion. An ANC veto of such a referendum risked substituting for the lesser evil of a one-time racial concession the real possibility of mass violence with private armies pitted against each other. The danger also points to the need for a constitutional accord to precede an interim government rather than emerge from it in dragged-out negotiations.

(2) For the ANC, the danger of an interim government lies in assuming responsibility without having power. While there would be a measure of control, especially over the security forces, it is doubtful that this new limited power would be sufficient to stop all the atrocities that would now be committed in the name of the ANC as well. The ANC would carry the burden of a declining economy, but would also be constrained to implement radical restructuring. Disappointed expectations and disillusionment with the ANC are likely to flow from a situation of responsibility without power. The more astute ANC leaders view with alarm the perception of being coopted and wisely maintain a distance between themselves and Pretoria. "We are adversaries — the government and the ANC. The government sometimes acts as if we are part of that government, and yet we are not part of that government."[20] Hani expresses the usefulness of being a symbol of radicalism and militancy. Rather than being concerned with the content of a radical policy, he admits to its manipulative function: "I don't want the ANC to lose that image because once it loses that image, it will lose the support of young people." How the inevitable ANC participation in government is to be reconciled with its aura of militancy remains to be seen. Nevertheless, when the ANC sets deadlines and declares that "our patience with this regime is running out," everyone knows that the tough talk merely camouflages the even deeper involvement of the two antagonists with each other.

In April 1991 and June 1992 the ANC issued an ill-considered ultimatum to the government to meet certain demands (sacking of two ministers) or it would withdraw from negotiations. Since Pretoria could not afford to be seen to heed ultimatums, and the ANC could not afford to pull out, the ultimatum necessarily backfired on the ANC, which was locally and internationally criticized for a serious error of

20. Chris Hani, "Interview," *Monitor* (December 1990).

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judgement.[21] Along with real concern for the escalating violence, the ANC public relations exercise revealed the advantage of the government in having a relatively supportive constituency. It shed its right-wing, while the ANC constantly has to reconcile conflicting demands from its heterogeneous support base. At this stage, the negotiating leadership must retain its radical wing in its ranks and does this mainly through strident posturing.

White South Africa has failed to recognize the need for ANC symbolic victories. The more the ANC is drawn into constitutional politics, the more it loses its moral status as a liberation movement. Vulnerable as a fallible political actor within a more powerful establishment, it must show its supporters either that it can deliver on their inflated expectations or that nothing has changed in the adversary's intransigence and, therefore, it cannot be blamed. Both choices are detrimental to achieving a compromise. The less leverage the ANC can exercise within the narrow constraints of constitutional negotiations, the more the emphasis shifts to socio-economic issues. Against the establishment's attempt to restructure the economy through preemptive privatization and constitutional guarantees stands the ANC's need to guard against disappointing the economic expectations of its constituency.

The rise or fall of the future South African democracy depends on an economic upturn. Only an expanding economy would allow both antagonists to satisfy their supporters and thereby ease the necessary compromises. The less economic leverage there is, the more the ANC will fall back on street mobilizations to guard its flanks and the more the establishment will view the necessary long-term redistribution as a zero-sum strategy. It would want to sabotage such attempts with all its leverage, including refusals to reinvest in South Africa. In turn, the ANC loses its incentives for entering negotiations if they produce neither economic gains nor symbolic political victories. Yet the ultimate paradox remains that an economic recovery depends on a creditable political settlement. Therefore negotiations cannot wait for an economic turnaround when conditions may be more conducive to a democratic compromise.

It is sometimes uncritically assumed that if "negotiations stall or break off, then South Africa could find itself back on the path to insurrection . . . ."[22] Yet with the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the major outside

21. As John MacLennan has commented: "It is difficult to believe that the ANC was willing to use such powerful and irreplaceable ammunition, threatening to end the talks, when it really didn't need to." See *Sunday Times* (April 14, 1991).

22. Robert T. Price, *The Apartheid State in Crisis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

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sponsor of the previous insurrectionist strategy would have to be replaced. While Libya, China or smaller Stalinist relics like Cuba or North Korea could presumably step in, renewed exile or repression for South African activists is not an inviting prospect. The current ANC leadership would rather bend over to reach a compromise than repeat a failed historical experience. For the Afrikaner Nationalists, too, there is no option of going back to the repressive era because they are too weak and divided. A renewed consensus on racial repression is simply inconceivable. It would also be suicidal for the minority.

Assessing the Pessimistic Scenario: Lebanon or Peru?

Against the optimistic scenario of a social-democratic compact with renewed high economic growth stand many well-documented pessimistic predictions of likely social disintegration. Authors in this school do not doubt the goodwill of the leadership on all sides to reach an accord quickly, but question their ability to enforce it against overwhelming objective odds. In addition, some distrust the democratic motives of the major parties who are said to be interested in a non-racial oligarchy at best. Editors like Ken Owen dwell on the theme of Africa reverting to the bush in the "heart of darkness," while Barber warns the white establishment about "sliding into functional cahoots with the ANC and its totalitarian project."[23] The National Party is inclined to adopt this route, it is argued, because it strives for external recognition and that can only be won with ANC connivance. Both the National Party and ANC want order above the law. A future division of control with the National Party holding the right-wing in check, and the ANC disciplining the townships under an authoritarian leadership is expected. Negotiations would mainly be about zones of influence. The National Party must only ensure that the relinquished share of power does not threaten its own privileges. In Barber's nightmare this means: "A one-party state condoned by a specially protected white nomenclature." If right-wing anxiety about "a sellout to blacks" represents one side of white consciousness, the vision of an authoritarian unholy alliance constitutes the liberal other side. Both deplore the moral decay of the ruling group. In Barber's phrase: "The establishment lacks either the guts or the basic humanity." The scenarios waver between de Klerk as the South African Gorbachev who loses control over the process he initiated, or de Klerk and Mandela as joint dictators.

23. *Cape Times* (April 24, 1990).

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In this vein, Pierre du Toit and Willie Esterhuyse argue that both the National Party and the ANC employ hegemonic models of bargaining. In this view, democratic, inclusive rhetoric only masks the desire for total control. Negotiations aim at cooptation or defeat of the adversary by other means, as well as exclusion of those on the right or left who reject the new alignment.[24] This assessment may be somewhat exaggerated. There is little evidence that both antagonists would abandon a negotiated contest, although they lack a democratic tradition and have illiberal hardliners in their midst. Even on the assumption that the pessimists are correct and the "regime models" of both camps — "technocratic liberation" versus "people's power" — allow at best a non-racial oligarchy, the question remains whether the objective constellation of power would not constrain the anti-democratic interests. South African social forces are so diverse and multifaceted that political legitimacy and economic stability simply cannot be reached by a new coercive alignment, even if it comprises a numerical majority. The resulting unrest and instability would defeat the main purpose of the new pact. Sooner or later a more inclusive and pluralist order would have to establish wider legitimacy of a polity in which all disruptive forces are accommodated.

Much more serious economic trends, however, may jeopardize the democratic recovery of South Africa and lead to social disintegration beyond the control of politicians. It has become a well-worn cliché to stress that South Africa sits on a time-bomb of economic frustrations. Only 125 of the estimated 1,000 people who come on the job market daily can be accommodated in the formal economy. The capacity of the South African economy to absorb new job seekers declined from 73.6% of the new entrants in 1970 to 12.5% in 1989. The time-bomb analogy, however, falsely suggests an impending explosion. The real consequences of the rejected underclass lie in the more invisible, slow social disintegration: crime, political violence, family dissolution and a breakdown of the social fabric and value system under the weight of general misery. An ANC government is likely to suffer the consequences of its advocacy of sanctions and ungovernability even more than the sheltered white sector which has many more options.

Theo Hanf's comparison with Lebanon during its 15 year long civil war (1975-1990) illustrates the unique South African dilemmas.[25] For

24. Pierre du Toit and Willie Esterhuyse, eds., *The Mythmakers: The Elusive Bargain for South Africa's Future* (Johannesburg: Southern Books, 1990).

25. Theo Hanf, *Koexistenz im Krieg: Staatszerfall und Entstehung einer Nation im Libanon* (Munich: Nomos Verlag, 1990).

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South Africans, an understanding of the Lebanese example is both encouraging and frightening. Lebanon was destroyed primarily by outside forces: the Israelis, the Syrians, the Palestinians, the Iraqis and the Americans. All tried to impose their solution at one time or another on a weak central state. Unlike Lebanon, South Africa is relatively free from direct outside interference and sponsorship of competing factions. What has kept Lebanon together, however, is the persistence throughout the war of a surprising popular consensus on the unity of the nation, despite the progressive disintegration of the state. "It is not fanatical masses that prevent a new consensus," Hanf concludes, "but short-sighted and power-hungry elites." In South Africa, the opposite holds true. Compromising leaders on all sides are constrained by militant and alienated constituencies.

Lebanese society disintegrated at the top while life below continued with remarkable normality. Children continued to go to school, water and electricity supplies were not cut off, the courts and the police, hospitals and fire brigades, banks and garbage trucks all continued more or less to provide their usual services under the most unusual conditions. Within their groups even the political gangsters were relatively safe from attacks by opponents. The militia on the payroll of feuding warlords behaved like private armies everywhere: ruthless against enemies from other communities, keen to enrich themselves through extortion, theft and drug-smuggling but also protective of the communities they came from. The civilian population on all sides of the barricades suffered from intermittent shellings and devastating car bombs, but they were not massively debilitated. People across the communal divisions hated and feared the disruptions of routine (as they demonstrated in several mass protests) but kept up a remarkable pretence of normality. Despair expressed itself mainly through emigration.

Everyday life in South Africa's black townships is qualitatively different. Although far more weapons are available in Beirut than in Soweto or Khayelitsha, lives are much more at risk in South Africa than in Lebanon. Not only do crime and simmering political feuds make physical danger more pervasive, the psychological impoverishment, hopelessness and alienation seem worse. If the well-worn sociological concept of anomie can be applied anywhere, it is in Sebokeng or Edendale. With people dreading to sleep in their own homes for fear of unprovoked attacks, with 39 mourners blown apart at a funeral by a revenge-seeking gang, with passengers in commuter trains scrambling out of windows at the cry "the Zulus are coming," with groups of girls abducted from a Salvation

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Army home and raped, and with the annual murder rate in Cape Town climbing to 65 per 100,000, as compared to four in Toronto, South Africa would seem to represent the epitome of normlessness. Random violence is less bearable than more brutal but predictable atrocities.

South African criminologists note the worrying change that previously non-violent house-breaking and theft have become increasingly violent. Statistics for rapes and serious assaults climb every year. The violence indicates new levels of aggression and frustration heightened by unfulfilled fantasies. The general lack of regard for human life reflects a reaction to disappointed expectations: the long-awaited breakdown of Apartheid has not changed material conditions. With the increase of political insecurity and factional violence among competing black parties the life of many township- and squatter-dwellers has deteriorated. Symbolic gratification, provided for a while by the legalization of political parties and the release of Mandela, turned into real bitterness and blame of the leaders who promised but could not deliver.

With the freeing from political shackles, common criminal activity also found more space. Weapons from sources in Renamo and Umkhonto entered South Africa more freely. Weapons traffic was facilitated by the influx of refugees from Mozambique and other strife-torn areas who thus began to destabilize the initial destabilizers. For the increasing number of school dropouts and unemployed youth there opened a new field of making a living by trafficking in mandrax tablets, just as the underclass of North American cities survives on the sale of drugs. Car hijacking emerged as a lucrative endeavor. When the banks hardened their security, armed robbers shifted to softer targets such as retail outlets or private homes. Breeders of bull terriers and Rottweilers cannot cope with the demand. The booming private security industry fails to deter crime just as the over-politicized policing proves ineffective in prevention. Not only is the "community" inaccessible for a police force that is distrusted as the enemy, but the alienated community makes self-administered community policing itself a source of strife.

The 1990 annual Institute of Race Relations Survey points out that the common murder rate is four times higher per capita in South Africa than in the US, that 8,000 people were killed in political violence between September 1984 and 1990 and about 850 of those were "necklaced." Despite the ANC disavowal of necklacing after first condoning it under the rubric of "people's resistance," this barbaric method of dealing with political opponents remains in force, though at a lower rate. In the meantime, the incidence of political violence attributable

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to extremist right-wing organizations has also increased to about 7% of all cases, complementing the legalized police brutality referred to in township jargon as "system terror." The Minister of Law and Order has called his country "a nation of gangsters." He does not mention that it was chiefly his Party's Apartheid policies which brutalized the impoverished young. The illegitimacy of Apartheid institutions made all other social institutions illegitimate.

In the matter of social decay and the life-chances of the majority, South Africa resembles the former Soviet Union more than Lebanon. The powerful Afrikaner institutions of the center still hold society together, but conceal the rot at the bottom. As in the repressive era of the Soviet Union, the South African state thinks that it can best combat crime through more police deterrence without seriously addressing the underlying causes of alienation. The most telling indicators of decay are the schools. Black schools hold classes but often no teaching goes on there. Either pupils or teachers have other priorities. In the rigid and outdated centrally-administered matriculation tests in 1991, only 39% of black candidates passed, as opposed to approximately 95% in other communities. The low pass rate does not result primarily from differential expenditures, facilities or teacher qualifications. Several equally poor black homeland and mission schools achieved or exceeded the rate of the more privileged minorities. As the ANC-aligned National Education Crisis Committee self-critically stated, "schools have been allowed to become battlefields and students were compelled to find themselves in the forefront of this political violence."

While the pass rates of matriculants of non-African population groups scored unprecedentedly high grades, the rate for black pupils dropped to an all-time low in 1990. Stemming from this educational cementing of the *status quo* are claims to entitlement which run contrary to the meritocratic route to equality.[26] In as much as Afrikaner state patronage has secured privileged group advances in the past, so African collective claims understandably advocate restitution and redistribution in the future. In such an ethnic division of spoils, with differential access to scarce occupational opportunities, two unequal contenders are inextricably locked into different justifications of claims. The insistence on individual ability and achievement on the basis of existing

26. According to the *Sunday Times* (January 6, 1991), "The implications of a massive black failure rate are unrelievedly grim. It will aggravate youthful rage, incite racial envy, clog educational facilities and, ultimately, worsen South Africa's real Achilles heel: our desperate shortage of skills."

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privilege is countered by the hope that the new political system will deliver the valued goods and services. This dissension concerning the legitimacy of claims bodes ill for accommodation.

A praxis of free entitlement to state-services has already spread and normal administration has broken down. Rents are boycotted, electricity is cut, taxes remain uncollected, emergency calls go unheeded. Because Apartheid laws and regulations were primarily designed to suppress and control, they have lost all legitimacy even where they benefit the people. In a state of anomie, paralyzed by the daily struggle to survive, most people wait to be saved. A new black law and order party, not connected to Apartheid institutions, could make substantial inroads in the townships at the expense of the ANC. It is only a matter of time for a black *Terre Blanche* to emerge. Even the acclaimed ANC leadership is increasingly viewed with suspicion and skepticism. The more it presses on with negotiations and confidential understandings, the louder the whispers about sell-outs and the shouts about opportunistic behavior. At best, many activists see negotiations as war by other means, designed to culminate in a "transfer of power." The ANC leadership and returning exiles make heroic efforts to coax the grassroots into line, but even the credibility of the SACP is strained by its advocacy of "guarantees for the bourgeoisie."

The three-decade-long (1960-1990) ban on liberation movements reduced the complexities of "the struggle" to ill-understood slogans. Opposition to collaboration was interpreted as "making the country ungovernable." Resistance to the government's "Bantu Education" was intended as "education for liberation" but became the counter-productive "liberation before education" and ended in the slogan "pass one, pass all." Schools were proclaimed as "sites of struggles," although efforts are underway to restore proper schooling. Where resistance created counter-institutions to the discredited Apartheid authorities, it often merely compounded anomie. The unelected "people's courts" and "young lions" street committees often exceeded the Apartheid courts' terror. Detention in Pretoria is preferable to being necklaced in Soweto.

Petty criminals continue to terrorize, traditionalist warlords attempt to extend their turf, and brutalized comrades retaliate. The political leadership preaches discipline and unity but few heed the calls for reconciliation. South Africa needs to build legitimacy at the top by means of a constitutional accord, but is in danger of reaching a settlement by elites on a hollow base. Unlike Lebanon, South Africa needs a "recovery movement," a collective therapy and moral revival that cannot be decreed

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from above. In Lebanon, an accord by the feuding elites on foreign military presence was sufficient to end the strife. In South Africa, an agreement of this kind is crucial, but it will not remedy the underlying social decay. And even if more houses are built and jobs created in an expanding post-apartheid economy, that will not be enough without some sort of moral renewal. In the absence of strong religious communities, this renewal can best be built around the notion of a non-racial democracy. Rather than stressing the need for unity or allowing the "will of the people" — as if the people had only one will — the opposition movements should speak up more loudly for the idea of respect for political opponents. Intimidation of antagonists — and worse — has a long history on a continent where the practice of "loyal opposition" hardly exists. Were the ANC to fragment into warring factions, there would be little hope for such fledgling notions as individual autonomy, freedom of choice and pluralistic empowerment.

A functioning democracy requires autonomous citizens, civic organizations and a host of disciplining grassroots institutions, from apolitical sports clubs to dedicated parents and committed teachers. The democratic state cannot create the foundations of its survival: it can only facilitate their emergence. Dozens of earnest Afrikaner and ANC think-tanks must watch that they do not build their sophisticated accords on shifting sands. Neither side has sufficiently prepared its constituency for the remarkable speed of the accommodations which its leadership has been prepared to make. The militant rhetoric is meant to camouflage all this moderation, but raises expectations which may prove counter-productive when it comes to selling the inevitably disappointing compromise.

With a further decline of the South African economy, an impoverished township society could conceivably produce a Peruvian scenario. Here Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path or, for the faithful, simply the Communist Party), under a shadowy leader Abimael Guzman, directs a violent campaign not only against the country's establishment but against foreign-aid workers, the clergy, and even the urban poor engaged in self-help relief efforts and cooperative industrial activity. The Maoist movement, with about 5,000 guerrilla followers, views any improvement in the lot of the poor as counter-productive to the revolution. Organized relief is not to be tolerated since it pacifies the masses. The brainwashing of Shining Path followers guarantees blind loyalty in an escalating war to overthrow capitalism and turn Peru into a peasant-worker state.

Shining Path tactics are opposed by the rival Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) of Cuban-style Marxists who prefer to use

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violence without civilian casualties to bring about a redistribution of resources. They condemn the massacres of Sendero Luminoso, very much as the SACP kept the lid on indiscriminate violence in South Africa. In both Peru and South Africa, an alienated and unemployed youth accounts for the appeal of radical movements. The difference in South Africa is that this frustration was successfully channelled into a national resistance organization that could legitimately claim to have the support of the entire world. By actively championing the cause of the excluded, foreign governments have preempted the rise of ultra-radical, irrational protest. With Canadian NGOs among the sponsors of the ANC, even if that meant turning a blind eye to the ideological antics of the SACP, foreign intervention has so far prevented the isolated irrational protest that characterizes Peru.

Given the interpenetration of reformist and revolutionary political cultures in South Africa, at present it seems unlikely that the Peruvian scenario would repeat itself. However, with little improvement in the life chances of half of the South African population under 20, even an ANC government could not rest for good on its past record, particularly if the radical SACP ally were to lose its appeal. When has a post-apartheid order been achieved? The move away from racial domination does not necessarily ensure democracy. The process of dismantling domination strongly influences its outcome: it can create a culture of violence or it can lay the moral foundation for the lasting consensus about legitimate rules. Even a constitutional settlement must not be confused with the end of the conflict.

The White Right Wing: The Option of Secession

Ideologically, black and white ethnic fundamentalists mirror each other in their intransigence to compromise, their advocacy of confrontation and their single-mindedness. The difference lies in the relative strength and military capacity of each camp. While only a small proportion of blacks currently support fundamentalist views, 30-40% of the white electorate would vote for parties on the right of the ruling Nationalists. Moreover, the white right-wing is overrepresented in the police and security establishment. This segment is well trained and armed. It is able to cause serious violence and disruptions of the ongoing accommodation as numerous bombings and shootings have proven. Individuals on the white right wing have also tended towards "representative violence," the random targeting of outgroup members which has been rare among black political activists. However, the white ultra-right

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is unlikely to provoke a military takeover under present conditions. Even if such a seizure of power were to take place during a civil war, the right wing alone could not govern the country. This distinguishes South Africa from Latin American states where military juntas could count on domestic financial endorsement and influential international support. In the South African case they could count on determined opposition. The hope of the ultra-right, despite its martial rhetoric, lies not in a takeover but in secession from an increasingly integrated, non-racial state.

A minority of conservatives are drawn to the vision of an independent Boerestaat for reasons of ideological commitment to Afrikaner self-determination, while the majority of whites who have joined the right-wing did so out of anxiety about an uncertain future. The economic recession has swelled this segment. The tangible rewards of a booming non-racial state, if only it could be allowed to boom, would substantially reduce this fear. It is generally recognized that the white right-wing represents the downwardly mobile sections of the group: white mine workers, farmers deprived of previous state subsidies, and the lower echelons of the Afrikaner civil service, who are very concerned about Africanization. Although political attitudes and identities cannot in general be crudely reduced to material considerations, a strong correlation between socio-economic conditions and political outlook remains most striking in South Africa.

The white segment is internally more stratified than is commonly realized. Although the white working class has consistently shrunk, due to state patronage, about 20% of urban adult whites still have a net worth of under R10,000 ($4,000). Over half the white population owns net assets of under R100,000 ($40,000), 6% over RS00,000 ($200,000) and 1.7% are considered rand millionaires.[27]

There are different versions of a white homeland on which their respective supporters cannot agree. It is this disagreement which not only has split the right wing but paralysed the concept politically. In the late 1970s the son of Hendrik Verwoerd set up the "Orange Werkers

27. The figures seem to support the argument that even if this private wealth of 13% of the population were to be equally shared among the total population, it would still be insufficient to make any significant material difference in the living standards of the impoverished 30 million. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that South Africa has one of the most skewed income distributions in the world (Gini coefficient 0.68). Stellenbosch economist Servaas van den Bergh (EPSG Occasional Paper No. 3) has pointed out that if the recorded income were distributed as it is in the US "the income of the poorest 15 million people in South Africa (40% of the population) would be about 70% higher than it is."

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Unie" in search of a white homeland. His choice of Morgenzon, a nondescript hamlet in Eastern Transvaal, proved unattractive to all but 20 families who moved and bought land in the town. These odd inhabitants, surrounded by 6,000 blacks, insist that they will not employ black labor and become dependent on "outsiders."

Robert van Tonder's *Boerestaat* Party strives to revive the traditional *Boerrepublics* in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, but rejects the notion of a white homeland as racist. Just as Zionists asked for the ancient Jewish state to be reinstated without excluding all Arab inhabitants, according to van Tonder the *Boerestaat* will coexist with a black majority. But by dividing these blacks into different nations, the Afrikaners will remain in the majority. This definition of the ruling group excludes even Cape Afrikaners who did not go on the Great Trek, as well as English-speaking whites. According to Piet 'Skiet' Rudolph, the Free State, Transvaal and Northern Natal are still part and parcel of the *Boerevolk*. He equates the Boer claim for land with the dispossessed black community's demands for land restitution. The Boer homelands then would form a loose federation for economic cooperation with the rest of South Africa.[28]

Carel Boshoff, the head of the *Afrikanervolkswag*, presents the more sophisticated and pragmatic version of the nationalist territorial dream. He considers it unrealistic to move or dominate millions of people against their will. Instead, he looks for an area with low population density as well as great development potential, "where a new settlement can be developed, and where new high technology can be placed, and where a country, a republic, a state can develop in time." Boshoff's most recent map identifies an area along the Orange river in the North Eastern Cape and Southern Nambia as the future *Boerestaat*.

The Conservative Party itself has also begun drawing up boundaries for a white state. It has informally dropped its former position that the whole of Apartheid-South Africa should be restored to white rule. For the Conservative Party, a minimal homeland would include the Western Transvaal, including Pretoria, the Orange Free State Province and the Northern Cape Province. Since this conservative heartland is interspersed with "black spots," influential white conservatives seek an alliance with the black conservative Mangope of the Bophutatswana Bantustan who is equally opposed to the ANC hegemony. This secessionist

28. Due to his weapon thefts, subsequent underground activities and imprisonment, for a while the militant Rudolph assumed almost a Mandela-like mythic role among sectors of the far right.

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coalition in the name of national self-determination may well include Buthelezi's Kwa Zulu territory. The Conservative Party is deeply split on whether such a plan should be negotiated with other parties and whether the conservatives should, therefore, participate in the ongoing all-party talks. It is in danger of being marginalized by its boycott politics. Its hope to gain power through another white-only election is increasingly exposed as a fiction, despite a string of electoral victories. In the meantime, the militarization on its fringes continues.

The militants of neo-fascist groups, like the AWB, accuse the Conservative Party of "giving our country away" for a parliamentary salary. The CP members of parliament rejected calls to resign and thereby force country-wide by-elections that would have demonstrated the decline of white support for the government. In *Terre Blanche*'s view this would be "the last chance" before "Tambo's communists start the black revolution." Others in this group now openly declare: "The time for voting politics is over — it is now time for bullet politics"[29] However, after first announcing a boycott of the 1992 referendum, all right-wing groups participated in the campaign and formed an alliance.

The Conservative Party deplores the AWB's violence and likes to project an image of respectability. However it also emphasizes its ideological affinity with it.[30] Despite the contempt that the leaders of each faction express for the other's style, the AWB can be considered the armed wing of the CP. What the one party tries to achieve through legal and institutional means, the other complements through extra-parliamentary threats and military mobilization for the coming "*volks* war."

A future ANC/NP government faces the prospects of either a) accommodating right-wing separatists, at least symbolically in some more or less autonomous territory, or b) repressing a substantial section of a hostile group and thereby becoming itself undemocratic, or c) being destabilized by an uncooperative civil service and suffering sabotage in still strategically crucial sectors such as agriculture and mining. Therefore, it would seem wise to make all possible efforts to draw at least some sectors of conservatives into the ongoing negotiations, although the ANC will have great difficulty in accepting the legitimacy of secessionist claims.

The English-language press' and the foreign media's demonization

29. *Cape Times* (March 1, 1990).

30. Thus the Conservative Party leader Treurnicht declared: "What we have in common with the AWB is that we belong to the same people, speak the same language, have the same opponents and enemies and the same ideals to have our own fatherland governed by our own people." See *Cape Times* (August 1 1991).

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of all political activity on the right of the NP needs to be corrected with a much more nuanced view of conservative motivations and behavior. Not all right-wingers are the swastika-waving fascists who form what is really a vociferous minority among many more honorable ideologues and plainly fearful voters in feudal rural settings or declining mining towns.[31] Neither South African liberals nor the ANC, let alone Western policymakers, have yet engaged these anxiety-ridden ideologues.

As the moderate middle ground (the ANC and the NP) explore their common interests and draw closer together, the extremes on the white right and black left step up their rhetoric or even their physical attacks. Horowitz views this dynamic of pressure from the flanks as the best guarantee for the fragile center to hold. Yet the possibility of a growing right-wing renewing a civil war cannot be ruled out. They may not win a war, but they could certainly start one. In a less frightening but still alarming scenario, even if the ultra conservatives are unsuccessful in preventing a settlement between the ANC and the NP, they can prolong the uncertainty and mutual recrimination. Already the government is using the symbolic existence of MK as an excuse that it cannot ban private armies and disarm the right-wing. Thus the right wing can also succeed by causing friction at the center and undermining negotiations, just as settlements have been prevented in Northern Ireland and Israel.

In practical terms, the white right-wing can only be controlled by the white center, ultra-conservative Afrikaners by more reformist Afrikaners. If this is to be a relatively nonviolent process, the center's legitimacy is crucial for carrying the right wing along. As long as the transition is managed with white majority electoral support and constitutional legality is maintained, the right-wing insurrectionists place themselves outside the "law and order" that they themselves fetishize. Therefore, the ANC has to allow the NP forces their posture of legal respectability, including a separate voters count in a universal franchise referendum, rather than pushing the party into a perception of surrender. Indeed, if an NP-ANC solution were to be foisted on a defiant white majority, the ground would have been laid for a costly long-term IRA-type destabilization. The paradox of the South African power equation is that both

31. Denis Becket has described the conservative spectrum: "Yet for every rightist who breaks up a black picnic, ten anguish over their role in Africa. For every barfly telling Kaffir-jokes, there's a pious householder praying for guidance. For every *Terre Blanche* rattling sabers there's a Boshoff seeking good neighbours through good fences. For every CP farmer who donders his labourers, twenty deliver their babies." See "Leading the Right to Reason," *Die Suid-Afrikaan* (October/November 1991).

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sides can prevent the other from exercising power. Therefore, neither side can rule alone peacefully without taking the vital interests of the antagonists seriously. The alternative is violence without victory, which only the most rigid ideologues prefer over accommodation. Similar considerations apply to a much maligned black antagonist of an NP-ANC alliance, M.G. Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party.

Clientelism as Secessionism

Leader-follower relations among the majority of Zulu supporters of Inkatha are hardly based on ideological identifications but on reciprocal instrumental advantages and ethnic symbolic gratifications. Inkatha's poor and illiterate constituency depends on patronage, handed out by strong leaders and local power-brokers in return for loyalty, regardless of the leaders' ideological outlook or ethical behavior. Past political powerlessness reinforced the importance of African auxiliaries to whom the impoverished could turn for protection and favors. When the South African state decentralized control by letting trusted African clients police themselves and administer their own poverty, their status and actual importance were further strengthened. Thus emerged a classical system of clientelism and patrimony.

It remains to be seen whether equality before the law and new life-chances for the formerly disenfranchised will pre-empt clientelism and the quest for ethnic separateness. It may be easier to achieve with regard to Inkatha's constituency than with regard to the separatism of the white right-wing. Observers remain skeptical, even with Inkatha.[32] Buthelezi too has threatened that the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique could pale in comparison with the future destructive upheavals in South Africa. The ANC, on the other hand, is not inclined to heed such predictions and would rather risk a repetition of Biafra than compromise on the relative centralization of political power or bend towards recognition of Zulu claims. This sets the New South Africa on a collision course not only with Inkatha but the *Boerestaat* advocates as well.

There are two common objections to such a policy of reconciliation with regard to Inkatha: (1) Inkatha support is so low that the movement

32. Lawrence Schlemmer, "Negotiation Dilemmas After the Sound and Fury," *Indicator SA* Vol. 8, No. 3, (1991), pp. 7-10.

33. Ken Owen has pointed out that a relatively autonomous Natal in a federal structure might be a cooperative partner in a greater South Africa "while a Kwazulu forcibly incorporated in a structure controlled by its bitterest enemies, might become as indigestible as the IRA in Britain, or the Turks in Cypress, or the Basques." See the *Sunday Times* (September 8, 1991).

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can be ignored, pre-empted or even eliminated, (2) that Buthelezi's price for incorporation is too high and, therefore, continued exclusion is preferable. Against the first argument Lawrence Schlemmer has pointed out that conflict resolution has to take not only size and scope but also *intensity* of interests into account.[33] From a moral viewpoint, this position can be interpreted as yielding to violence. From a pragmatic perspective, however, there is little choice if greater damage is to be avoided. Weighing the costs of continued confrontation against the potential benefit of peaceful competition through compromise amounts to a political calculation that separates ideologues from pragmatists.

In order to avoid such possible civil war scenarios, it may be worthwhile to consider Allen Buchanan's argument for the moral right to secede by any group in any state. Such a right could be constitutionally recognized and specified (referendum, qualified majority support, treatment of minorities). A constitutionally entrenched right to secede under regulated conditions and international arbitration would spare any country the civil disorder in the wake of a political divorce or the forceful retention of an unwilling partner. Buchanan, who considers even the discussion of the constitutional right to secede too divisive in the present South African climate, nonetheless concludes: "If non-Zulus are unwilling to adopt constitutional measures that would add further power to the numerical superiority that Zulus already enjoy, the only possibility for a peaceful solution may be Zulu secession."[34] However, Buchanan overlooks the fact that there would be strong opposition from a large section of Zulu-speakers themselves. This is one of the differences between the repressed independence movements in Eastern Europe and Apartheid-encouraged Bantustan sovereignties.

Although it has hardly been discussed in South Africa, it may be timely to consider a secession clause in the new South African constitution in light of recent experiences in Eastern Europe. A serious discussion of the right to secede would also constitute the necessary incentive to bring the potential secessionist parties into the constitutional negotiations.

34. Allen Buchanan, *Secession. The Morality of Political Divorce From Fort Sumpter to Lithuania and Quebec* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991).

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The Crisis in Criminology

Abraham N. Tennenbaum

The Predicament

In 1973, Marshall B. Clinard decided to find out why, compared to other Western countries, crime in Switzerland was so low. He moved to Switzerland for a year and studied all available data. His findings, published in 1978,[1] explain Switzerland's low crime rate in terms of conditions such as the following: a) there are no big metropolitan areas in Switzerland, so there are no slums or sub-cultures of poverty; b) the federal government is very weak and most of the social programs are based on local community operations, which educates people in self-help and social responsibility; c) most social activities involve both youth and adults, thus preventing the development of a youth sub-culture conducive to crime; d) the Swiss Army requires almost every citizen to keep firearms at home, but violent crimes are rare. From this Clinard concluded that in non-violent societies the availability of firearms is not relevant to crime rates. His book is full of recommendations about crime applicable to all Western countries.

Clinard's study would have been much more impressive were it not contradicted by the official explanations for comparable low crime rates in Japan. In an official report,[2] Japanese authorities explain their low crime rate in terms of the following conditions: a) Japan is a highly

1. Marshall B. Clinard, *Cities with Little Crime: The Case of Switzerland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

2. Gideon Fishman and Simon Dinitz, "Japan: A Country with Safe Streets," in William Laufer and Freda Adler, eds., *Advances in Criminological Theory*, Vol. 1 (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1989).

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centralized country with a strong government involved with all aspects of life; b) Japanese society is very homogeneous; c) WWII destroyed all remaining feudal classes and post-war affluence opened up opportunities for all and prevented class conflicts. d) gun control laws are very strict and firearms are unavailable. Obviously, attempts to explain why particular people engage in crime while others do not, or different crime rates in different populations, quickly run into contradictory evidence. Sometimes it is even impossible to agree about how to interpret the evidence, or whether there is any evidence at all. The question is: what is really known? After a century of studying crime, what can professional criminologists say about it?

To realize the extent of the crisis, one need only scan the writings of leading criminologists. Leon Radzinowicz, an expert in the history of English criminal law, asks: "Why should it be that a century of theorizing and research should have made little or no apparent impact either upon the trends of crime in our society or upon our ability to modify criminal tendencies in individuals?"[3] Jock Young, a leftist criminologist,[4] readily acknowledges that: "All of the factors which should have led to a drop in delinquency, if mainstream criminology were even half-correct, were being ameliorated and yet precisely the opposite effect was occurring."[5] John Braithwaite, a mainstream liberal criminologist, similarly wrote that "The present state of criminology is one of abject failure in its own terms. We can't say anything convincing to the community about the causes of crime; we can't prescribe policies that will work to reduce crime; we can't in all honesty say that societies spending more on criminological research get better criminal justice policies than those that spend little or nothing. Certainly we can say some important things about justice, but philosophers and jurisprudents were making

3. Leon Radzinowicz and Joan King, *The Growth of Crime: The International Experience* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 93.

4. Ian Taylor, Paul Walton and Jock Young, *The New Criminology* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973). In this book, which became a cornerstone of the literature, the writers claimed they were paving the way for new directions in criminology: "The task is to create a society in which the facts of human diversity, whether personal, organic or social, are not subject to the power to criminalize." (p. 28) However, even the title was not new. It had already been used on a 1928 textbook based on the "new approach" at the time: crime is due to emotional disturbance growing out of hormonal imbalance. See Max G. Schlapp and Edward H. Smith, *The New Criminology* (New York: Boni & Liveright, 1928).

5. Jock Young, "The Failure of Criminology: The Need for a Radical Realism," in Jock Young and Roger Matthews, eds., *Confronting Crime* (London: Sage Publication, 1986), p. 5.

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a good fist of those points before ever a criminological research establishment was created."[6]

The interesting thing is that, within the present climate of budgetary constraints, criminology departments around the country have been cut considerably less than other disciplines in the social sciences. Of all the new social science Ph.D. graduates, criminologists have the best chances of finding work. The number of professional criminologists has increased significantly in recent years. In no time in history have so many scholars literally lived on crime. The latest crime epidemic has helped to bolster criminology. This is because politicians and the general public are not aware of the profound crisis in criminology. They still assume that funding criminologists will result in important new knowledge useful in devising new ways to combat crime. Of course, criminologists are the last ones to oppose this "blessed" trend. But dissatisfaction with the state of criminology today is so widespread that some criminologists claim that the history of the field is nothing more than a primitive reflection of predominant attitudes towards crime and society — attitudes that are not based on solid evidence, but on emotions and prejudices.[7] This can be seen by examining the development of the biological approach, or the idea that crime is a result of natural traits.

Cesare Lombroso, an Italian military and prison doctor, is regarded as "the father of criminology." He was so influenced by Darwin's theory of evolution that he developed a theory about the "atavistic criminal." The logic is clear. If human beings are the outgrowth of a long period of development from inferior to superior species, why not assume that some people have regressed to an earlier stage? Eliminate the criminals from society and crime will disappear. Lombroso also listed many criminal features: large jaws, thick lips, asymmetry in brain structure, etc.[8] To be fair to Lombroso, it should be pointed out that later he softened his position and claimed that only one third of all criminals belong to this degenerate race. The scientific basis for Lombroso's theory was ridiculous and wrong. So why has he been called the "father of criminology"? The typical answer is that he was

6. John Braithwaite, "The State of Criminology: Theoretical Decay or Renaissance," in William Laufer and Freda Adler, eds., *Advances in Criminological Theory*, Vol. 2 (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1990), p. 155.

7. See Ysabel Rennie, *The Search for Criminal Man* (Lexington, Mass: Heath, 1973). For a more extensive discussion, see George B. Vold and Thomas J. Bernard, *Theoretical Criminology*, Third edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 6.

8. Cesare Lombroso, *Crime: Its Cause and Remedies* [1912] (Montclair NJ: Patterson Smith, 1968).

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the first to use "scientific methods": measuring, estimating, statistical techniques, comparing, controlling, etc.

Almost a century later, James Q. Wilson and Richard Herrnstein reiterated Lombroso's ideas in a more fashionable form.[9] According to them, criminals are different from non-criminals in body types, I.Q. and other qualities. Along with Lombroso, they claimed "science" as the basis for their conclusions. Their work was strongly criticized. Thus, based on surveys of prison inmates, they concluded that the criminals' average I.Q. score is 8 to 10% lower than the population's average I.Q. Leaving aside the question of whether I.Q. tests measure intellectual ability rather than environmental influence, it is reasonable to assume that stupid criminals are much more likely to be apprehended than smart ones. Thus criminals in prison are not a representative sample of the general criminal population. Notwithstanding this and other equally serious shortcomings, Wilson's and Herrnstein's book is regarded as an important contribution to criminology in the last decade. The sad fact is that all advances in criminological theory in the last hundred years concerning the biological approach have not gone much beyond Lombroso.

Possible Explanations

The most popular explanation for this state of affairs is lack of adequate data and resources. The assumption is that, if unlimited funds were available, results would improve. According to Charles Wellford, there is nothing wrong with the scientific method: it has only been misused. This method needs first and foremost reliable data, without which every conclusion is partial and inaccurate. Criminology however, does not have access to such a data base. Consider murder. Unlike other crimes, most murders are reported to the police. Yet no one knows for certain how many murders occurred in the US last year or at any time. There are several sources for crime statistics and, in the case of murders, two major ones. The first is "The Supplementary Homicide Report," issued by the F.B.I as part of its general information service — the so-called Uniform Crime Report. It is based on voluntary data police departments nationwide supply to the F.B.I. The second source is death certificates reported to the National Center for Health Statistics, mainly for medical purposes. Both are inconsistent. Since they are voluntarily

9. James Q. Wilson and Richard Herrnstein, *Crime and Human Nature* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985).

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supplied for different purposes, it is unlikely that this inconsistency will disappear any time soon. If this is the situation concerning murder, asks Wellford, what can be said about other crimes such as rape or burglary? These are crimes of which an unknown percentage is not even reported to the police. What about white collar crimes, concerning which no one has much information? The task, therefore, is to learn much more about crime before something valuable can be inferred.

Joan Petersilia develops a similar argument.[10] If the funding of criminal justice is compared to that of any other area, such as education, transportation and, of course, health, it turns out that only a small amount of resources is invested in justice research. According to the National Science Foundation, for every US citizen federal funds spent were $32 on health research, $19.32 on space research, but only $0.13 on justice research. Petersilia's implication is clear: fund criminology research as well as other fields and there will be positive results. But the lack of data and funds alone cannot account for the crisis. The problem with this explanation is that other disciplines did not receive any support until they showed some success. No matter what one may think of modern medicine, there is little doubt as to its ability to save lives. Such is not the case with criminology.

Consider the widespread belief that in recent years crime has increased. In 1985 Kevin N. Wright argued that the claim "crime is becoming quantitatively and qualitatively worse" is a myth.[11] No one from the criminological community can reject Wright's claim. While criminology has not been funded as heavily as medicine, what does it have to show for what has been spent on criminology research so for? If, after all this investment, it still cannot determine whether crime has increased or decreased, what has it accomplished? The point is that there are no definitions of what constitutes "success" which could help determine what has been achieved and when, if more resources are invested.

Partial responsibility for the crisis in criminology has been ascribed to the structure of US higher education. Criminology as a science failed not because of internal defects, but because of the framework within which this research is carried out. For the purpose of tenure and promotion within the university system, scholars are usually evaluated in terms

10. Joan Petersilia, "Policy Relevance and the Future of Criminology — The American Society of Criminology. 1990 Presidential Address," in *Criminology*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (1991), pp. 1-15.

11. Kevin N. Wright, *The Great American Crime Myth* (Westport, Conn: Greenhaven Press, 1985).

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of their productivity. Since "academic productivity," according to the number of publications and the number of times their works are cited in the literature. Special indexes have been created listing what has been published, who cited whom, where, and how many times. Recently the system has become even more complicated; the journal, the number of authors, the place in the list of authors, have all become important issues in academic life.

This strange system has had unforeseen consequences. For example, it has become obvious in the academic world that, from a "productivity" viewpoint, the best kind of articles to publish are provocative ones since they are likely to be attacked, thus considerably improving their authors' "citation index." Another consequence is the sharp increase in the number of new academic journals. Their stated purpose is to increase knowledge, but their latent aim is to provide new possibilities for publications to young researchers.[12] Conventional wisdom today is that, in order to publish in respectable journals, one needs to provide empirical data elaborated by fancy statistical methods. As such, the substance of what is said becomes less important. It is not surprising, therefore, that much criminological literature today consists of mathematical analyses of small data sets neglecting any theoretical implications. After all, secondary analysis of data sets is easy and can generate many articles. On the contrary, very few new things can be said about theory. Many people have already written about crime and punishment.

Three other consequences are crucial. First, criminologists rarely have first-hand knowledge of criminals. Criminologists can live and die without ever hearing, seeing, or smelling a criminal. They only study criminals from a distance as sterile subjects. Second, there is a lack of cooperation between academic criminologists and law-enforcement agencies. Professors do not usually need the agencies for their promotion and vice versa. Even if they have some knowledge that can help the agencies, chances are they do not have the time and the desire to share it. The opposite is also true. Even if the agencies have important data that may contribute to criminology, they have no interest in sharing them with academia. Thirdly, there is the problem of "theoretical poverty" and stagnation in criminology.[13] A good example of this is the

12. See, e.g., Peter Berger, *Invitation to Sociology* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 9-11.

13. It has been claimed that no real advances in criminological theory have occurred since WWII. See Marvin E. Wolfgang, "Special Introduction," in William Laufer

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last "popular hit" in criminological theory: Travis Hirschi's and Michael Gottfredson's *General Theory of Crime*.[14] Their conclusion is that people became criminals because they were not educated well when they were young children! The conclusion from all this is that the structure of academia is responsible for bad results. Ergo: change the system (even though the alternatives are not clear) and results will improve. This explanation, however, is not convincing. After all, the same methods of evaluation exist in other academic disciplines and, e.g., mathematics or economics have had no difficulty in establishing themselves as practical and respectable sciences.

There are others point to the ethical and political limitations inherent in criminology as the causes of the crisis. One of the most important ways to increase scientific knowledge is through experiments, which are next to impossible in criminology. The death penalty issue is a good example. Opponents claim that the death penalty does not deter future criminals, while supporters claim that it does. From a scientific viewpoint, there is a simple way to decide this issue. Pick similar states randomly and abolish the death penalty in half of them. In the other half, the death penalty would be implemented swiftly and with no mercy or exception. After several years, draw the appropriate conclusions. For obvious reasons, however, this kind of experiment cannot be conducted.

Even if some effective methods for reducing crime were known, there would still be serious problems in implementing them. Consider Switzerland and Japan once again. It is often claimed that one of the reasons for low crime rates in these countries is strong state control over individuals, i.e., the low crime rate is a result of reducing individual freedoms. In Switzerland, all citizens are required to report their address changes to the government. Failure to do so is an offense. In Japan, the situation is worse. One of the formal functions of the local police is to visit each house in the community twice a year to see if the people in the household are those said to be living there. Regulations of this kind are politically unacceptable in the US.

Reactions to the Crisis

One of the attempts to remedy the theoretical poverty and the lack of answers in criminology is to focus on specific subjects. Those who do so,

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and Freda Adler, eds., *Advances in Criminological Theory*, Vol.1 (New Brunswik: Transaction Publishers, 1989).

14. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).

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however, forfeit any hope of developing a comprehensive theory of crime. They recognize that a grand theory which eliminates crime or even reduces it significantly just does not exist. Thus, according to Sherman, although the crime problem cannot be completely solved by improving police performance, it would be a major achievement if the 20,000 or so homicides each year in the US were reduced by, say, 10%. Similarly, it would be useful to find ways to improve police productivity without necessarily increasing the number of officers or other costs.

Following this logic, in 1984, with the cooperation of the Minneapolis police department, Sherman conducted the first random experiment about police discretion in domestic violence cases. In that experiment, police officers who were summoned for misdemeanor cases of domestic violence chose one of three options randomly. They could arrest the suspect, ask him to leave the house for a short period, or try to mediate between the sides. An experienced team followed the three groups for one year and sought to establish which tactic would reduce future violence. The results were clear: no matter what the suspect's occupation, social status or age, arrest reduces future violence of the suspect much better than mediation or separation.[15]

These results have been widely published and many feminist groups have used them to convince local politicians to enact mandatory arrest laws against battering spouses. The National Institute of Justice, a branch of the Justice Department and the largest federal agency to support criminological research in the US, invested millions of dollars in replicating this experiment in other cities. The results were not encouraging. In one city (Omaha), there was no difference between arresting the violent spouse or not. In other cities, husbands arrested increased their violence against their wives in the period following the arrest.

Sherman and others are studying the reasons for this disparity. It is clear, however, that the consequences of police behavior in cases of domestic violence are much more complicated than initially assumed.[16] A similar lack of clear-cut results occurred in Philadelphia in a study of burglars' rationale. How do they decide to choose one particular house and not another? Does a high fence around the house deter or attract burglars? The results were inconclusive. Well, said one of the burglars, I prefer houses with a high fence, because after

15. Lawrence W. Sherman and Richard A. Berk, "The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault," in *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 49 (1984), pp. 261-272.

16. For details about domestic violence and experiments in policing, see Lawrence W. Sherman, *Policing Domestic Violence* (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

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I am in no one can see me. A high fence deters me, said another criminal, because if someone sees me climbing he will surely call the police. If these are the results with simple issues, is it surprising that there has been no success in answering major, serious questions such as who becomes a criminal and why?

A similar approach, concentrating on details instead of grand theories, is the situational perspective on crime. Crime does not happen only because some people have crimogenic motivation, but also because of the environmental situation. If the physical environment is changed, crime will be reduced. A good example of this is the research on suicides by gas in Britain. The gas system used in Britain was carbon monoxide. A popular way to commit suicide was to close the windows and open the gas tap. The gradual elimination of carbon monoxide from domestic gas eliminated this option. The gas suicide rate went down and, surprisingly, suicides by other means did not increase. From this Roland Clark and Pat Mayhew inferred that suicide is not only the result of individual personality, but also of the specific situation. He also claimed that these results could be generalized.[17] In fact, these results could not be generalized elsewhere. In the Netherlands, Australia, and Switzerland, where the system was similar to Britain, changing the gas system did not reduce the total number of suicides.[18]

These problems do not deter criminologists. According to some estimations, half a million treatments have been tried against cancer, but only forty have been proved effective and approximately ten are now in use. If the same efforts where devoted to crime research, they claim, today things would be different. In opposition to the approach emphasizing details, a more extremist and provocative solution to the current crisis in criminology is advocated by the "abolition" movement. This school of thought sprouted in Western Europe in the 1980s and remains popular today. Since most of the literature is not in English, it has been ignored in the US and is unlikely to gain broad support on this side of the Atlantic. The central point is to destroy the criminal justice system, i.e., to demolish criminal law, to eliminate the police, to

17. Ronald V. Clarke and Pat Mayhew, "The British Gas Suicide Story and its Criminological Implications," in *Crime and Justice*, Vol. 10 (1988), pp. 79-116.

18. P. W. Burvill, "Changing Patterns of Suicide in Australia, 1910-1977," in *Acta Psychiatr Scand* Vol. 62 (1980), pp. 258-68. Philip J. Cook, "The Technology of Personal Violence," in *Crime and Justice*, Vol. 14 (1991), p. 26. John Henry Sloan, Frederick P. Rivara, Donald T. Reay, et al. "Firearm Regulations and Rates of Suicide: A Comparison of Two Metropolitan Areas," in *New England Journal of Medicine* Vo. 6, No. 366 (Feb. 1990), p. 371; S. Stengel, *Suicide and Attempted Suicide* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1964), pp. 34-35.

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shut down prisons and to close correctional institutions. The entire system has to disappear.[19]

The obvious question is what abolition supporters propose to substitute for the current criminal justice system. Here they stubbornly refuse to provide alternatives. They say, first abolish the system; then alternatives will develop. As an example of the "danger" of offering alternatives to bad situations, they cite the invention of the guillotine, which was invented by a French doctor in order to reduce the suffering and inhumanity of previous execution methods such as strangulation, burning, hanging, drowning etc. According to abolition supporters, the new machine merely increased the number of executions. Instead of contributing to efforts to abolish the death penalty, it made it more acceptable to the public. That is the trap abolition supporters want to avoid. The criminal justice system is beyond repair and needs replacement by a spontaneous way of dealing with social problems. The system is itself a social problem.[20]

But the record does not support their claims. In 1944, German authorities in occupied Denmark decided to arrest all Jewish residents and send them to concentration camps. The Danish underground learned about these plans and, in cooperation with the Danish police, helped all Jews to escape to Sweden. In retaliation, the Germans put all police officers in jail for nine months and civilians had to run the police stations. The results were clear. While expressive crimes such as spontaneous assault did not increase significantly, property crimes such as robbery, burglary and larceny multiplied tenfold during this period. This increase came despite the fact that crime in Denmark is usually lower than average and despite the fact that the German army functioned as a kind of substitute police force.

In the US the occasional absence of police has tended to result in desperate situations. When the Boston police department went on strike in 1914, rioting and looting broke out so fast that Governor Calvin Coolidge had to mobilize the state militia.[21] During the blackout in

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19. For a description of "abolitionism," see *Contemporary Crisis*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1986). For a critique of abolitionism, see W. Haan De, *The Politics of Redress: Crime, Punishment and Penal Abolition* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990).

20. They compare the criminal justice system to slavery. As Sebastian Scheerer argues, it was possible to claim that the abolition of slavery was not realistic. Who would then work in the fields? How could the black population manage itself? How can we afford such a change in society? The point is that slavery was bad and it had to be abolished. The same is true with the social obstacle called "criminal justice." Cf. Sebastian Scheerer, "Towards Abolitionism," in *Contemporary Crisis*, Vol.10, No. 1 (1986), pp. 5-20.

21. Francis Russell, *A City in Terror* (New York: The Viking Press, 1975).

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New York City, looting and crime immediately broke out. This reaction is not unique to the US. Police strikes in Montreal, Canada, Liverpool, Britain, and Helsinki, Finland had similar consequences.[22]

The Roots of the Crisis

The previously mentioned reasons for the crisis — lack of data and resources, a problematic academic system and internal ethical problems — cannot explain it. A more important reason for the failure of criminology seems to be that criminologists attempt to answer the wrong questions. Isaiah Berlin defined a non-philosophical question as one we know how to answer, even though we cannot always do so. On the contrary, philosophical questions are those we do not know how to answer: e.g., what is good? What is justice? etc. Within this framework it is clear that the scientific method is adequate for seeking better answers to non-philosophical questions, but not to philosophical ones.[23] The history of modern criminology seems to be a pathetic attempt to answer philosophical questions. It is useless to ask who will behave "badly" and who will behave "well" while there is no clear definition of "good" and "bad." Criminologists have tried to answer questions about family and society, justice and morality, mind and personality — even questions about hormones and metabolism.

Whether or not basic philosophical questions about human nature and the social order will be resolved soon, criminologists are not the right people to solve them. Although they do not necessarily know more about crime than other ordinary citizens, and what they often say is common sense anyhow, criminologists do have a place in academia. There are significant differences between professional criminologists and ordinary citizens concerned with crime: a) criminologists have to be systematic, i.e, different parts of their theories have to fit together; b) a good criminological theory must explain as many phenomena as possible; c) criminologists must be critical and resist all intellectual authority, argue every statement and accept particular claims only after all other alternatives have been justifiably rejected; d) the most important difference between amateur and professional criminologists is the

22. For a description of the events in Finland during the strike, see Tuja Makinen and HannuTakala, "The 1976 Police Strike in Finland," in *Scandinavian Studies in Criminology* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), pp. 87-106. For a description of the strike in Liverpool, see A. V. Sellwood, *Police Strike — 1919* (London: Howard & Wyndham Company, 1978).

23. Bryan Magee, *Men of Ideas* (New York: Viking Press, 1979), Chapter 1.

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empirical basis, i.e., the connection with established facts.[24]

Important as they are, these differences are not significant enough to give criminologists any real edge over non-criminologists. What criminologists should have done is to emphasize the important but limited role of the scientific method in criminology: evaluating, monitoring, and collecting information about crime and criminal justice operations. Instead, criminology has pretended to be able to answer fundamental questions of philosophy and sociology — a task no one asked them to undertake.

Criminologists should go back to their original function and place in society — trying to organize the small amount of knowledge we have today in the most efficient way possible. Even if they may not like it, they have to remind the public that they do not necessarily know more about crime than anyone else. They have to keep in mind that they do *not* have solutions to crime and violence, and it is not clear whether they ever will. What they can offer is only an organized and somehow more accurate version of what many non-criminologists already know. Perhaps, *but only perhaps*, they will have more to offer in the future. The way criminology is presently organized, its utility to society is not more than that of astrology.

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24. Jock Young, "Thinking Seriously about Crime: Some Models of Criminology," in M. Fitzgerald, G. McLennon and Jennie Pawson, eds., *Crime and Society* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 250.

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*Earth and Sky: An Analysis of Husserl's 1934 Manuscript on "The Spatiality of Nature"**

Guido D. Neri

In his *Husserl-Chronik*, Karl Schuhmann traces Edmund Husserl's philosophical trajectory and lists a manuscript titled "Reversal of the Copernican Doctrine in the Interpretation of the Current Worldview," dated May 7-9, 1934.[1] He also lists a second manuscript, written shortly thereafter, which Husserl considered a "continuation of the investigation concerning the phenomenological interpretation of the Copernican doctrine."[2] In an introduction to the second manuscript, Alfred Schütz

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* Originally published in *aut aut* 245 (Sept.-Oct. 1991), pp. 19-44. Translated by Marcella Tarozzi Goldsmith.

1. This title comes from a brief summary Husserl scribbled on the folder containing the manuscript. The rest of the sentence reads as follows: "The primordial ark of the earth does not move. Fundamental investigations into the phenomenological *origin of corporality, spatiality and nature* reveals the primary sense of the natural sciences." This manuscript, listed as "Umsturz der kopernikanischen Lehre in der gewöhnlichen weltanschaulichen Interpretation" and registered as "D 17," is in the Husserl Archive in Louvain. It was transcribed by Ludwig Landgrebe in the late 1930s and first published under the title "Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum phänomenologischen Ursprung der Räumlichkeit der Natur" in *Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl*, ed. by Marvin Farber (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1940), pp. 307-325 (reprinted by Greenwood Press in 1968). Cf. also the French translation in Edmund Husserl, *La terre ne se meut pas*, ed. by Didier Franck (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1989). For the English translation by Fred Kersten, see *Husserl: Shorter Works*, ed. by Peter McCormick and Frederick A. Elliston (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 222-233. Hereafter it is referred to as "The Spatiality of Nature" and, whenever necessary, the translation has been altered. Cf. Karl Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik. Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserl* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977).

2. Listed as "Notizen zur Raumkonstitution" and registered as "D 18," this manuscript has been published in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (1940-41), ed. by

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claimed that neither of the two are sketches for future articles, but fragments of the uninterrupted philosophical diary which constitutes most of Husserl's posthumous opus.[3]

The fertility of Husserl's work at the time was a result of his extraordinary will-power and asceticism, which allowed him to control his growing unease. As the *Chronik* shows, this was particularly true in 1933 and 1934. Thus, a few days before drafting the two manuscripts, he wrote: "I must constantly fight for my *tranquillitas animi*, without which I cannot produce anything because every two weeks there are personal changes in my situation."[4] Nazi harassment increased his isolation, which had begun with his break with Heidegger. Notwithstanding his advanced age, at times he even entertained the notion of emigrating to the US. In addition to the personal dangers he confronted, he was disturbed by the changed cultural and political atmosphere in Germany. In 1935 Husserl attempted to confront these matters publicly by going to Vienna and Prague to deliver lectures which eventually developed into *The Crisis of European Sciences*, an analysis of the European situation understood in terms of the clash between a bad objectivistic rationalism and a violent irrational reaction to it. Written one year before *The Crisis*, "The Spatiality of Nature" anticipates its major themes.

As in *The Crisis*, Husserl is concerned with a critique of the concept of reality which became dominant with the development of modern science.

Alfred Schütz, pp. 25-27 and 217-226. A French translation is included in Husserl, *La terre ne se meut pas*, *op. cit.* Although written only a few days after "D 17," "D 18" is not really a "continuation." The affinity obtains only in the meticulous annotations to the kinesthetic conditions relating to the constitution of spatiality. Husserl acknowledged that the text was "conceived in the midst of serious difficulties," and is hard to follow.

3. In order to provide a better appreciation of the nature of this material, Schütz described Husserl's typical workday at the time: "In the morning he used to take long walks with his assistants and with one or two among his closest followers in the beautiful outskirts of Freiburg. He liked to discuss with them the problems absorbing him. Day after day, and with rigorous regularity, he used to spend three hours in the afternoon in a continuous meditation conducted pen in his hand, at his desk, writing what he had been thinking during the morning walk, re-reading and revising old manuscripts. Without letting himself be influenced by his physical and psychological condition, nor by the difficulties inflicted by the external world, he proceeded in his daily philosophical work with admirable conscientiousness and self-discipline. . . . And each time, after having written for half-hour what came to his mind, the right path became clear to him so that he could work in a satisfactory manner. Therefore, some of the manuscripts elaborated in this manner contain both the most significant meditations of a passionate thinker, as well as repetitions of his ideas already developed elsewhere with greater clarity." Cf. Alfred Schütz' "Editor's Preface," *ibid.*, p. 21.

4. Cf. Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, *op. cit.*, p. 446. Cf. also Husserl's notations dated April 13 and 25 and May 19, 1934, quoted on p. 422.

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The historical point of departure in *The Crisis* is Galileo; in "The Spatiality of Nature," it is Copernicus. Neither challenges the procedures and results of physics and cosmology, for which Husserl had great respect; nor do they attempt to revive the naive view that "God had set the earth in its place in the heavens."[5] What he challenged is the philosophical meaning the modern worldview attaches to those results.

Here *homogenization* is the key. In view of the spread of the naturalistic outlook, homogenization best describes what has been described as the erasure of man's self-identity.[6] The Copernican revolution was the first step in this direction, since it displaced the earth from its central position in the universe and, accordingly, reinterpreted it as similar to other bodies in space. Borrowing from Nietzsche, who associated this decentering with the death of God and nihilism, man "falls away from the center" along with the earth. No longer the child of God entrusted with governing the cosmos, man is reduced to one of the animals among which he is distinguished only by his "additional" shrewdness and ability to use tools. The homogenization of human beings and animals prefigures the subsequent homogenization of living bodies and their material components, or rather the reduction of the former to the latter.

From his "Prolegomena" to *Logical Investigations* to his argument in *The Crisis*, Husserl never ceased to emphasize the consequences of this chain of reductions. As with animals, human subjectivity is "naturalized," i. e., it is explained in terms of natural laws operating within material nature.

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5. Edmund Husserl, *Shorter Works*, *op. cit.*, p. 229. In the early 1930s Husserl repeatedly dwelt upon themes that recur in the 1934 Ms. (constitution of an infinite-homegeneous world; the earth as *Lebensboden*, terrestrial ground, sky; world of immanence and transcendence; life's surrounding world, etc.). Cf. *Chronik*, *op. cit.*

6. Freud describes how "the universal narcissism of men, their self-love. . . suffered three severe blows from scientific research." The first, the *cosmological*, associated with Copernicus; and the second, the *biological*, associated with Darwin (according to which "man is nothing more, and nothing better than an animal") correspond to the two levels of homogenization indicated by Husserl. The third, the *psychological*, has to do with the instinctive life of an ego no longer "master in its own house." This requires a different approach, since it concerns the predominance of instinctive forces that seem to confirm man's closeness to animals, i. e., an "equality that is given both in his corporeal structure and in his psychical disposition." See Sigmund Freud, *A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis* (Standard Edition), Vol. 17, pp. 137 and 111 respectively. According to Husserl, neither Copernicus nor Darwin imply the "equation" of man with other natural beings. Neither rule out his uniqueness. The problem of man's animal nature is crucial for philosophy. An analysis of the essential difference between man (who is "conscious of the world") and animals (which are "without world consciousness") has been developed by Heidegger in his 1929-30 seminar. See Martin Heidegger, *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, Vol. 39 of the *Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt a/M: 1983), pp. 261ff. Cf. also Jacques Derrida, *De l'esprit: Heidegger et la question* (Parks: Galilée, 1987), pp. 75-90.

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Human subjectivity is thus a "fact" like any other — the product of blind cosmic necessity. For this reason, the world open to consciousness is simply another "effect." A different "fact" — another casual psychophysiological (and ultimately physical) arrangement — would produce another "image" of the world. Thus there is no sense of truth in relation to reality. There is only a great object — nature — which is the scene of many effects, one of which is the image of the world. By the same token, even this doctrine is "causal" — nothing but a conditioned effect.

All of Husserl's phenomenological investigations can be seen as attempts to provide answers to these "absurdities" and their relativistic consequences. He challenges this homogenizing reductionism with the analysis of corporeality. The fundamental argument of "Spatiality of Nature" is the same, i. e., that the earth cannot be equated with other celestial bodies because of the inextricable link between our bodily existence and the ground which sustains it. Finally (and this is decisive), Husserl contrasts the reduction of the phenomenal sphere — the dimension of appearance to which phenomenology ascribes a distinctive status — and the structure of real things and related natural laws. The radical character of his anti-naturalistic view was evident even earlier, when he grounded the locus of appearance in consciousness proper and distinguished this *toto coelo* from mundane realities.[7] Far from being the product of natural processes, the sphere of what is immanently lived is absolute — the world itself must be relativized and justified in relation to it. In consciousness *nulla "re" indiget existendum*, i. e., no real causality could ever trace the direction of intentional acts that irradiate from consciousness. Even the eventuality of the destruction of the world would not threaten absolute consciousness.

Continuing to stress the priority of the constituting ego, in "The Spatiality of Nature" Husserl returns to the theme of the destruction of the world, seen also as the possibility of cosmic catastrophe and the disappearance of all life in the universe. Notwithstanding his awareness of the paradoxes inherent in this position (which explains why he continually went back to it), he argues in favor of a revitalized idealism along Cartesian lines. While he remained committed to this transcendental idealism, some of his most prominent students rejected the dualism of his theory of constitution and absolute consciousness without succumbing to naturalism, and did so on the basis of his research — especially

7. Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to Phenomenological Philosophy* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), § 49, p. 110

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the phenomenological peculiarity of those "non-objectifiable objects" that in "The Spatiality of Nature" appear as earth and living body.[8]

This text also reveals one of the secrets of Husserl's creativity. Unhampered by restrictions connected with constructing a text for the public, here he pursues the most daring hypotheses and in so doing ventures into the most unusual philosophical speculations. He imagines himself a bird in flight to compare and widen the field of kinesthetic possibilities. He imagines himself in a spaceship to ascertain that the earth is a globe and that it continues to function as a ground of terrestrial life. He imagines the stars themselves as spaceships and hypothesizes a world in which they are invisible and the sun itself is hidden behind the clouds. Unlike Heidegger, who was dismayed by photos of the earth taken from the moon, Husserl was thrilled by speculative wanderings.[9]

The task here will be to locate themes and problems which emerge in Husserl's "Spatiality of Nature." First, we will attempt to find a thread which runs through the juxtaposition of digressions, referrals and repetitions and unites the whole in a way that makes it easier to read.

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8. Cf. Schütz, "Editor's Preface," *op. cit.*, p. 21. Schütz mentions the "raptures of discovery, the freshness and originality of the firm glance cast at previously unknown territories . . . [and] the overabundance of ideas tied to the adventure of grasping thought as it occurs."

9. As Didier Franck has pointed out, Husserl's manuscript is "almost exactly contemporary with Heidegger's essay 'Origin of the Work of Art,' in which the earth is evoked as the location of man." Cf. his introduction to *La terre ne se meut pas*, *op. cit.*, p. 9. The connection between these two "geologies" (aside from any substantial differences) was grasped by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In any case, a comparison between them (if one can still speak of geo-logy in relation to Heidegger) could help clarify these two different paths taken by phenomenology. A creative elaboration of the earth-sky theme in relation to the natural world and "the world as such" can be found in Jan Patocka's work. Following his apprenticeship with Husserl and Heidegger in the 1930s, Patocka returned repeatedly to the problem of the "natural world" as the world of human practice. In relation to our own bodies, earth and sky are the basic reference points of human existence. Their movements are always relative to the immovable ground: "Originally, within primordial *physis* . . . the earth is not a body among others; it cannot be compared to anything else because all the rest, everything that presents *itself* and approaches us, relates to the earth as an always presupposed substratum." However, the meaning of earth and sky is not limited to a practical orientation. They are also a "stimulus to a peculiar vertigo" in which the world manifests itself as one of astoundingly unrelated things. Thus earth and sky no longer represent merely a "natural world" seen from the perspective of man and his needs but the "world as such." They cease to be "things for," reference points for incommensurability — the discovery of an unknown context. See Jan Patocka, *Le monde naturel et le mouvement de l'existence humaine* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1982), *Phaenomenologica* 110, pp. 30 and 8 respectively. Patocka's main inspiration was Heidegger's *Being and Time* (and the later works), but he ascribes to Husserl a greater proximity to nature and corporeality, conceived of as reasons for the loss of self in everyday life (*ibid.*, pp. 47-49).

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Next we will examine the most important variant in the reception of Husserl's manuscript in general and its reception in French phenomenological culture in particular. In the interpretation of scholars such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the earth-sky motif allows a rethinking of phenomenology as a whole and redirects it towards ontology, thus establishing a common bond between Husserl and Heidegger.

Reading Traces

"The Spatiality of Nature" opens with the purely conceptional distinction between the surrounding world and the world of infinity, without any reference to an embodied subject that can make sense of it all. How do these two worlds relate? If the surrounding world is the world of actual experience and the world of infinity that of objective science, how does one go from one to the other? How do the natural sciences constitute reality? These questions can be answered either by clarifying the motivations behind the given world-view or by following the historical evolution, beginning with previous representations of the world. The manuscript takes the first path, i. e., the "genetic" one in Husserl's sense, which does not coincide with "history" as it is usually understood.

The thread of this genetic constitution of the Copernican representation of the world is the constantly resurfacing question: How and when is the earth, first experienced as "ground" and not yet as a "body," transformed into a body similar to other celestial entities? Here one can anticipate the more basic question sustaining the whole thesis: Does the transition from the world of subjective experience to the objective world (which results in the suppression of the former) warrant a shift to a conceptual level of physics seen as the only valid one, such as in a set of irreversible statements whereby the constitutive genesis would be absorbed in the universe of real things?

First grasped as the "ground" beneath our feet, through the progressive synthesis of individual experiences the earth becomes a *total body*, a "large lump" that sustains all other bodies. In this original form the earth is not experienced as a celestial body moving among other similar bodies:[10] "Movement occurs on the earth or in the earth, from the earth or to the earth. The earth itself, in conformity with its original conception, neither moves nor is still. Repose and movement have meaning

10. Husserl, *Shorter Works*, *op. cit.*, p. 223. On the particular meaning of "movement" in relation to the "ground," see also Husserl, "Notizen zur Raumkonstitution," *op. cit.*, p. 27, where he writes: "Taken as a whole, [our own body] has no 'movement,' although every one of [its] organs can move."

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only in relation to it." As long as the earth remains an absolute reference point, movement and repose also retain an absolute meaning. They become relative only if and when the earth is conceived as a body in motion and among other bodies (as in the Copernican worldview). But this is precisely the transition that needs explanation. Actually, a certain relativization of movement and repose already occurs at the most elementary level — the somatic level, which is the "central body" for all other bodies. Although it is consistent with the earth as ground, the latter has its own movement and its own repose. If my somatic body is transposed on two "relative grounds" — relative to the "absolute" ground of the earth — such as railway cars, then these are experienced in repose even though from past experience I know they are moving. At any rate, all these mediated forms of experience ultimately have reference to the earth's ground, which remains an absolute referent.

As with all theoretical matters, validation of the new Copernican representation of the world must begin with the subjectivity of the ego, which is the "source of all legitimation." This first involves my field of perception, i. e., that world which encompasses my somatic body and acts as the central body — that world which according to Husserl is one with the earth's ground-body. In primordial experience, my body is unlike other bodies in that it is not experienced in movement or repose; it knows only "inner movement and inner repose." Of course, as with all other bodies, my body moves or remains still. But it alone can say (or experience) "I am moving," that when I decide "to go" I determine kinesthetically the flow of things. "I have all things before me. They are all *there*, with the one exception of my own body, which is always *here*." This is why in *Ideas II* Husserl says that in primordial experience the somatic body "is something *constituted in a curiously incomplete manner*, something so *unique* that it cannot be considered just another part of nature."

Like the earth, the somatic body is as unique as the ground upon which it walks. This ground "is not experienced as a body which at will can be moved or held still." In this sense it is like my body: it does not lend itself to such manipulation.[11] This common bond ties my own as

11. Derrida has connected Husserl's observations in "Spatiality of Nature" with those on geometry: "In effect, geometry is the science of what is absolutely objective. It is the spatiality of those objects given by the earth, which is the common ground of human interaction. But if an objective science of earthly things is possible, an objective science of the ground of these objects, of the earth itself, is not. Like transcendental subjectivity, the transcendental earth cannot be objectively analyzed because it is not an object and can never become one. The possibility of geometry corresponds to the impossibility of what might be called 'geo-logy,' i. e., the objective science of the earth itself. This is the

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well as all other somatic bodies to the earth: "For us all the earth is a ground and not a body in the fullest sense," which is why it is the ground of our human bond.[12] Thus reference to the ego as the "legitimating ground" at this level of constitution ignores the Copernican identification of the earth with other celestial bodies. Things do not change if I imagine myself as a bird flying off and landing on the earth or as viewing the earth from a spaceship so that I can grasp it as a globe. For both the bird and the spaceship the earth remains the "place of origin" — the ground — rather than a body among others.

"If I now 'think'of the earth as a moving body, then in order to do so I must be able to conceive it as a body in the most original sense, . . . directly evident as a ground in relation to which all bodily experience and thus all experience of continuing existence in repose and movement is constituted." This demand for *another* ground, which appears early in Husserl's text, is discussed later as the only feasible hypothesis. Consequently, it would not be sufficient to consider the spaceship as the ground. In order to fulfill this function it would have to be perceived as the earth — as the primordial origin of my movements. It would be necessary that "we could fly and had two earths as grounds from which we could reach one from the other by flying. Then indeed one body would be the ground for the other." But precisely when there seems to be a way out of the situation in which the earth is the center and ground of our existence, whenever the prospect of experience so often anticipated by literary and philosophical imagination becomes realizable and in part actually realized, Husserl surprises us with an observation with decisive consequences for the development of the argument: "But what would two earths mean? Two parts of one earth with one humanity: both together would be one ground and each a body for the other." Thus "movement would always be relative to the other body and not to the

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sense of the fragment which reduces rather than 'refutes' Copernican naiveté. . . . In effect, the earth is at once both before and beyond every objective body — in particular, the Copernican earth. It is the ground, the here and now of every relative object. But it exceeds every relative object because it is at once the infinite horizon of such bodies. It is never exhausted by the process of objectification. . . . There is then a science *of* space, since the starting point of this science is not *in* space." See Jacques Derrida, "Introduction" to Edmund Husserl, *The Origin of Geometry* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), pp. 83-85 (translation altered).

12. On the relation of our own body to the constitution of spatiality, see Didier Franck, *Chair et corps: Sur la phénomenologie de Husserl* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1981), pp. 138-149. On the earth as "ground" and "body," see Giovanni Piana, "Riflessioni sul Luogo," in his *La Notte dei Lampi* (Milan: Guerini, 1988), pp. 243-283. See also A. Boatto, "La Terra, la Vertigine," in *Alfabeta* 101 (1987).

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synthetic body they have in common." They would be simultaneously absolute and relative, "which would result in movement and repose being uncertain: In relation to which of the two ground-bodies would it be relative?" The attempt to relativize the centrality of the earth led to the hypothesis of a larger ground that retains its absolute meaning. Even a "relative" relativization of the earth would only displace but not eliminate the demand for a common ground. Subsequent pages of Husserl's manuscript explore this hypothesis, which is developed to the point of exploring the problem of whether there are other beings on other planets. But let us return to the point of departure.

Originally what is given is only the ground of the earth, constituted by starting with the ego and its embodiment, and by the embodied presence of other animal and human subjects. The constitution of the ground also involves the constitution of the sky, i. e., the horizon within which everything surrounding the earth remains visible up to a point beyond which it disappears. I can imagine how points of light in the horizon — celestial bodies difficult to reach — might be inhabited. In this sense (bearing in mind the synthesis of experience on earth), "the ground may expand." This hypothesis, which shatters the initial experience of the I and the "more restricted 'we,' the 'we' of those who live together" on this earth, is threatened by an additional hypothesis which appears to jeopardize the presumed uniqueness (or collective uniqueness) of our ground. The firmament surrounding my primordial ground may have been crossed by spaceships from time immemorial or I and my family may have lived in one of these spaceships and considered it *terra firma* until "I learned that we are only navigators on the greater earth." The same would hold true for inhabitants of other spaceships.

Although Husserl does not say so explicitly, the hypothesis of this "possible experience" relativizes indefinitely the initial positivity of our terrestrial origin. Only the *movement* toward the origin remains.[13] It is as though we have the suspicion that our surrounding world hides

13. This is also how Derrida seems to understand it: "Toward the end of the text the earth acquires a more formal meaning. It is no longer a matter of *this* earth (the primordial *here*, whose reality ultimately would be irreducible) but of a *here* and of a ground *in general* which would allow the determination of its object *in general*." On the basis of Husserl's synthesis of the two earths (with only one humanity), Derrida concludes: "This unity of one humanity corresponds to the unity of the world as an infinite horizon of experience and *not* to the unity of *this* world." Consequently: "The world, which is not the historical reality of *this* world (as Husserl often reminds us) is the ground of grounds, the horizon of horizons. The transcendental immutability attributed to the earth is well deserved, but this is nothing more than its factual index." See Derrida, "Introduction" to Husserl, *The Origin of Geometry*, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

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other and greater worlds unknown to us. But this suspicion does not threaten the teleological meaning of experience in the transition from the given horizon to others either presupposed or merely found. The requirement of ultimate reference to a primordial and *unique* earth, which for Husserl must be common to all the hypothetical inhabitants of other ground-bodies so relativized, should be understood in the same way. Presupposing no point of origin, "a multiplicity of grounds, of home grounds, constitute one ground, an original homeland." Even if it were possible that history has been the scene of totally separated peoples, it is nevertheless true that "all relative histories to this extent have a single original history of which they are episodes."[14]

Copernican "Homogenization" in the Current World-View

Reiteration of the teleological orientation of experience, expressed in the notion of the uniqueness of a primordial earth, leads to a discussion of that universal "homogenization" brought about by modern cosmology and a consideration of its subsequent philosophical consequences. This homogenization is already presupposed in the hypothesis that the stars, first apprehended as enigmatic points of light, are celestial *bodies*,[15] which implies a universe of infinite space in which the earth is a body among others. "Homogenization is immediately understood by us ["we Copernicans"] in such a way that the earth itself is a body upon which

14. Here Husserl seems to reiterate previously articulated concepts, which makes his manuscript hard to follow. He compels the reader to deconstruct and reconstruct the development of the argument by going forward and backward. He seems to be saying that in our terrestrial world we perceive stars as points of light and apperceive them as distant bodies. Starting with this hypothesis, we subject them to the same scrutiny we subject all usually accessible bodies. In this respect, their objectivity is a function of the intersubjective constitution of a terrestrially grounded humanity, i. e., that humanity whose ground is not yet a body in the fullest sense, a celestial body among others. According to the hypothesis that these bodies are "secondary arks" — abodes for other peoples with a common origin in a primordial ark — the earth itself might seem to be one of them, i. e., one of these "secondary bodies" dependent on the original ground of the earth ("it is as if it would be for children born on ships, even if with some variations").

15. For clarification of the "hypothetical" nature of the interpretation of the stars, see Husserl, *Ideas*, Vol. II, "Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution" (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1989), §15b, pp. 40. Here Husserl touches on those kinds of apprehensions in which essential groups of characteristics, in particular those of specific materiality, are not represented. "This is how we see a rainbow, the blue sky, the sun, etc. It follows, therefore, that spatial bodies (qualified bodies), filled through qualitative extended *planum*, do not amount yet to things in the usual sense, things as real material." Thus the fact that stars are interpreted as bodies facilitates the homogenization of the earth with other celestial bodies. The remaining text, however, shows how even if there were no visible stars, the "homogenization" could have taken place anyway.

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we *happen* to be *wandering*" (italics added). Thus it acquires an axiological meaning that entails the reduction of the earth, of life on earth and finally human history, to an occasional episode which could as well be repeated under similar circumstances elsewhere. In the current world-view, which pervades the sciences of infinity (astrophysics and atomic physics), animate bodies are nothing more than physical phenomena produced by the happenstance interplay of natural laws and structured by causal forces. Given their purely casual origin, such structures could easily be thought of as not existing, meaning that it is no more difficult to conceive of nature without organic life — without animals and human beings — than of the earth before the advent of life, which is taken for granted. "It would also be taken for granted that the earth is only one of many chance bodies in the world, one among many, and it would be laughable to believe, after Copernicus, that the earth is the center of the world 'merely because we happen to live on it,' even privileged for its repose in relation to which everything moves."

However, the "centrality" of the earth and the teleological meaning of experience Husserl wants to retain is not intended as an anti-Copernican restoration. On the contrary, he often points out that phenomenology in no way challenges modern science on its own grounds. This holds true for all physical things, including the earth as a body in motion. Nothing is detracted from the conclusions of modern physics (although serious reservations can be raised concerning the legitimacy of a biology reduced to a physical level). What is challenged is the meaning ascribed to physics by "the current world-view," and this is the point Husserl elaborates in the final part of the manuscript.

According to Husserl, the essential point is not inadvertently to take for granted the naturalistic world-view, "i. e., the dominant one," nor to forget (as Husserl would later say in "The Vienna Lecture") that the natural sciences are spiritual operations presupposing a pregiven existence and activity constituted by the ego. The absurdity consists in twisting the constitutive relation (which, starting with such a pregiven world, leads to operations that produce the representation of the "physical world") so as to reach an inverse relation according to which a presupposed physical world would have produced — by chance evolution — an egological spirituality and its representation of the world. If one recognizes that the ego remains the foundation of all, then the earth "can as little lose its meaning as 'original homeland,' as ark of the world, than can my body lose its own wholly unique sense of being an original body." Nor can the "constitutive dignity or hierarchy of values,"

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according to which "we humans, given our sense of being, precede animals," can be abolished. This truth is not subverted by the homogenization that develops on the level of a merely physical conceptualization.

Considered as ultimate reality instead of a research method, physical reductionism leads one to think of human reality, the development of individuals and peoples and their world-view, as if they were a happenstance on earth that could as well have happened on the moon or Venus. This view was so disturbing to the old Husserl that he conjured up a final philosophical fantasy: "Why should I not imagine the moon as something similar to the earth, as something like an abode for living things? I can certainly imagine myself as a bird, flying from the earth to a distant body, or as an airplane pilot taking off and landing there. Yes, I can imagine human beings and animals there already. But perhaps I ask myself: How did they get there?" Any hypothesis, even one in a fragment that has detached itself from our ground and transferred a part of terrestrial humanity to another body, seems to Husserl preferable to the notion that the moon or Venus "could as well be conceived as original bodies divided," as locations of "casually" historical events that would reproduce casual events similar to those that took place on earth. "There is only one humanity and only one earth. All fragments which are or have been detached from it belong to it."

Only one humanity and only one earth. In fact, their *historicity* is "unrepeatable in principle" in that it belongs to and shares a uniqueness with the ego. Everything that appears itself as novelty, as a new possibility, is connected inextricably with what is already given, with the factuality of what is already constituted "as a permanent and expanding nucleus" (this excludes the possibility of "another world" not correlated with this unique constitution).[16] This constitutive genesis is "terrestrial." Thus, along with the living body, it also implies the ground on which it thrives and confirms the uniqueness of the earth and its dual status whereby,

16. As Husserl argued in *Cartesian Meditations*, it is sheer nonsense to think that several pluralities of monads can coexist completely separate from one another, each in its own world, each world separated from the other *ad infinitum*, so as to bring about multiple spaces and infinite times. Instead, one can think that this separation concerns every actual intercourse between different monadic groups. In any case, different monadic worlds can only be "mere aspects of a single objective world common to them," since "the two intersubjectivities are not absolutely isolated," but "as imagined by me, each of them is in necessary communion with me as the constitutive primal monad relative to them." Therefore, notwithstanding the multiplicity of *conceivable* monadic worlds, "*there can be only a single community of monads*, the community of *all* co-existing monads. Hence there can be only *one objective world*, only one objective time, only one objective space, only one objective nature" (See § 60, the Fifth Meditation in *Cartesian Meditations* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), pp. 140ff.

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even by becoming a moving body among others, it does not lose its centrality as the absolute reference point of all movement and repose.

Husserl not only foresees objections; he expects his arguments to be considered paradoxical or even foolish. Terrestrial life could be wiped out by cosmic events and the whole universe could fall into an anonymity no longer related to any consciousness. This hypothesis carries the problem of death to an extreme by excluding that continuity of renewal and repetition which constitutes a form of survival. "What sense perception could the huddled masses have in space, in a space absolutely homogeneous and *a priori* pregiven, if there were no constitutive life?" If the total elimination of consciousness in the universe ever makes sense, it does so only in that it is "eliminated by and in the constitution of subjectivity." The fear of broaching the most incredible philosophical *hubris* does not prevent Husserl from asserting the absoluteness of the ego which "lives and precedes that which exists either as actuality or possibility, existence understood in every sense, both real and unreal." This prefigures the closing statement of "The Vienna Lecture" : "for the spirit alone is immortal."[17]

Husserl on "Copernicanism"

To define the general meaning of the "anti-Copernican" thrust of "The Spatiality of Nature," it is necessary to consider the complex and even contradictory predicament of Husserl's philosophy. This is a function of the relations obtaining historically between the great cosmological turn of the modern age and the "Copernican revolution" of European thought, i. e., with the idealist tradition that connects Descartes with Kant — and even Husserl. As Michel Serres has shown, the earth's loss of centrality in 17th century philosophy gave rise to anxious questions concerning the possibility of a new center, of an Archimedean point no longer recognizable in the infinite universe and in the homogeneous space elaborated by the new science. This center was sought in an extra-mundane dimension entailing an irreparable split between philosophy (metaphysics) and natural science. This entails the philosophical relinquishment of the world to pure physical legality and the complete externalization of lived space. Thus, according to Pascal, "the cosmic and historical world has no holy places and no reference points for reason: it is profane through and through, it is homogeneous, it is the geometrical locus of science. Since the cosmos is desacralized,

17. Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. by David Carr (Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 299.

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God is *hidden*, absent from this infinitely homogeneous, havenless world: *The eternal silence of this infinite space frightens me* — each word of this sentence has an extremely precise and technical meaning. Trembling with fear, Pascal leaves behind the premodern religious experience: he abandons cosmology to science and to archaic traditions."[18]

The infinitization and homogenization of cosmic spaces and bodies, including the earth and the living bodies in it, is the other side of a philosophy and a religious faith that looks for its center outside this world. Descartes deals with this problem by placing philosophy in a privileged position (thanks to the *Cogito*, in order to proceed from this "solar," but in reality extra-cosmic, place toward the conquest of the lost epistemological, axiological, and practical centrality. It is a rigorously dualistic philosophy because of its radical division of human reality which, *qua* consciousness, is non-corporeal and absolute while, *qua* body, it is reduced to the status of a simple material thing subject to relativization and homogenization.

As the historical sketch of *The Crisis* shows, Husserl is perfectly aware of the consequences of the new philosophical-scientific approach which also involve Kantian philosophy. He reacts to naturalistic reductionism by developing a new, extraordinary kind of transcendental aesthetics in which the lived body assumes a primary role, whereby the world originally given to our experience presents itself as a dimension invested with an irreducible meaning. The exceptional status ascribed to the living body makes it the key to our openness to the world and, in particular (along with the ground of earth), the fulcrum defining the movement or repose of each body. Since, notwithstanding this "anti-Copernican"

18. Michel Serres, *Le système de Leibniz et ses modèles mathématiques* (Paris: PUF, 1968), p. 708. Serres equates Husserl's "anti-Copernican" move to Pascal's search for a fixed and extra-mundane center bestowing meaning to human existence. "Husserl brings back to earth the original earth that Pascal had transposed to the terrestrial paradise, at the gates of the celestial Jerusalem: Thus he brings the locus that Pascal had transposed to a higher nature back to an immediate world. He seals metaphysics' Odyssey, of which the *Pensées* are the point of departure. But it does not matter: their common meditations are located within the problems we have called 'pre-Copernican'; i. e., prior to the 'naive' decisions taken from Copernicus to Tycho, Ptolomy or Einstein, prior to the objective models of a cosmos. . . . It is nothing but a variation on the results that this earth is the same earth, or the Other. The same search for a fixed point, for a pole, remains." According to Serres, this search amounts to a demand for an umbilical center, typical of an archaic religion. "Thus philosophy will have to go through two rigorous filters if it is to criticize both the naiveté of scientific knowledge as such, and the massive return to archaic naivetés" (p. 712). Serres' observations might have been more precise if they made reference to the "extra-mundane" ego, to which Husserl constantly attributes the constitution of the world.

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move, Husserl remains committed to the idealist tradition and thus to the extra-mundane status of pure consciousness, he also tries to confine our own bodies within the limits of a constituted Being (even if it is a Being *sui generis*): "I, *qua* I [the constituting subject], consider myself [the constituted] in the kinesthetic function [typical of my living body] as the foundation of the relation of repose and movement, of what appears in external perception."[19] As such, he reiterates the dualism of consciousness and body, which corresponds more generally to the dualism of consciousness and world.

Post-Copernican homogenization, as already indicated, prefigures the totality of the real as the effect of laws that blindly assert themselves within material nature. The latter reabsorbs every sense of truth of our openness to the world through the physio-psychic dimension. From the naturalistic viewpoint, psychic life is nothing but a casual and contingent effect, relative to that complex but equally contingent structure of matter we call the living body. But if this is so, an analogous casual "effect" could have obtained on some of the countless celestial bodies that move in the open infinity of the Copernican universe, giving life to "other" humanities subject, like us, to a similar psycho-physical conditioning. Even today, in monitoring the universe, we actively look for signals coming from faraway worlds, emitted by "humanoids" whose existence and similar evolution would be statistically probable.[20]

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19. *Notizen*, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

20. See Paolo Rossi, "Rassegna di una Disputa sugli Umanoidi," in *Aspetti della Rivoluzione Scientifica* (Naples: Morano, 1971), pp. 371-85. Although over twenty years old, this work remains interesting because of what it prefigures. A 1959 article by Cocconi and Morrison inaugurated the debate by claiming that it was probable that a form of life, technically "more advanced" than ours, has developed on the planets of other solar systems, and that intelligent beings have started to transmit radio messages in mathematical language to other inhabitants of the universe. From the early 1960s extensive research programs have been developed. In Italy, as elsewhere, similar hypotheses have been advanced by Giorgio Toraldo. In a 1967 speech, he argued that it is highly probable that an extra-terrestrial civilization is "either much less developed than ours . . . or a few millions years more advanced." He thinks that mathematical language is the most appropriate instrument for interstellar communication. As Rossi notes (pp. 378-79): "the problem consists of deciding whether, on the basis of a series of extrapolations from the only example that we have available on earth, one can state that it is unavoidable, probable, improbable, impossible, that a form of life, whose origin is independent from the one on earth, has followed a similar or identical path. In the debate that divides contemporary biologists, several *exobiologists* . . . have accepted the basic hypothesis of a similarity or identity of development, by siding with the 'determinists,' rather than with the 'opportunists'." In contrast, Rossi quotes the paleontologist G.G. Simpson, according to whom "there is no direct line constantly leading from the protozoa to man, in correspondence to an itinerary aiming at a goal."

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According to Husserl, this way of thinking is absurd and ungrounded. Against the reduction of conscious subjectivity to a simple physio-psychic effect, one must reiterate that the modalities of appearing, the structures of the phenomenal world, *cannot be derived* from the laws governing the physical world. To the extent that these structures are typical of the ego, they are characterized by an *unretrievable historicity* that extends to embodied humanity and to the earth as ground.[21] At any rate, since all multiplicity presupposes unity, if we were to encounter in the universe beings similar to ourselves, able to communicate, write, etc., we would have to assume that in the past there must be a common historical root.

Such an encounter could only take place under special conditions in any case. These extra-terrestrials could help us see the earth as a "body" (in the same sense in which we use other people's experiences to interpret the earth as a globe), without excluding for us and for them the experience of one synthetic ground. But to this end we would have to reach an *understanding* with such beings. For phenomenologically unavoidable reasons, however, this communication implies an analogous embodiment and sensorial structure in relation to which a language or a communicating "logos" could be developed.[22] Only then could one

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On the contrary, "a constant and extremely intricate ramification" that makes man "the final result of one of the last branches" has taken place. This reduces almost to zero the probability of the hypothesis in question. However, the geochemist Harris Brown replies: "if the planetary systems are indeed very plentiful, one can equally conclude that man is not alone, that his equivalents can occupy hundreds or even thousands of bodies in our Galaxy. To listen . . . can be, in the long run, a useful and exciting endeavor." At any rate, as Lovejoy pointed out, once overpopulated on the basis of the Platonic principle of "fullness" and divine fecundity, the universe now tends to become populated again on the basis of the "nihilistic" principle of chance productivity, even if in greater moderation. On the modern prehistory of the debate, see Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of an Idea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936); and M.J. Crowe, *The Extraterrestrial Life Debate (1750-1790). The Idea of a Plurality of Worlds from Kant to Lowell* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

21. Concerning the historicity of psychic reality (as opposed to the ahistoricity of material things), see *Ideas*, Vol. II, *op. cit.*, p. 143. While material possibility implies the ideal possibility — however improbable — of a return, through cyclical processes, to identical external circumstances, psychic reality's essence implies that it can no longer return to the identical general state — psychic realities have a *history*. "Consciousness presents itself . . . so-to-say, dependent on itself"; i. e., on the prior state of the psyche itself. "Earlier lived experiences did not vanish without a trace . . . to the essence of the soul pertains a continous new foundation or re-formulation of dispositions."

22. An extraordinary page from *Ideas*, Vol II (*op. cit.*, p. 90) dealing with the problem of a possible understanding between God and man, illustrates these "conditions of experience." In order to have an understanding, the supposed absolute spirit would have to see things as we do through sensory perception, and would have to have his own body. Then there would be a dependence on sensory organs, which would have to

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say with Merleau-Ponty, who interprets "The Spatiality of Nature" along these lines, that: "As the earth is by definition one (since all grounds we walk on become automatically its provinces), so will the living beings with whom the sons of the earth will be able to communicate simultaneously become men or, if one prefers, terrestial men will become variants of a more general humanity which will remain one."[23]

Along with teleologico-religious yearnings for the meaning and destiny of the "community of monads," analogous considerations led Husserl to analyze prevailing notions about the probability that life on earth was preceded and could be succeded by a universe devoid of life and conscious subjectivity. Here too he seemed unwilling to make concessions to a genetic-naturalistic view that once again could imply the causal reduction of the phenomenal sphere and, on the ethical level, the identification of man and his historicity with the "natural history" of animal life or, ultimately, inert matter. Yet, notwithstanding the almost Pascalean horror for the masses becoming lost in space, in a universe devoid of subjects, he does not consider *absurd* this eventuality in the same way he does the naturalization of consciousness.[24] While facing

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be analogous to ours. Otherwise, God would be blind to colors etc., as we are blind to "his" qualities. Obviously, the difficulty would not be different if it were a matter of communicating with species endowed with a soma completely different from ours.: "Nature is an intersubjective reality. . . . There is always the possibility that the new spirits enter into this nexus; but they must do so by means of their bodies. . . ." In his essay on "The Eye and the Mind" (in Franco Fergnani, ed., *Il Corpo issuto*, [Milan: Il Saggiatore, 1979], pp. 207-08) Merleau-Ponty writes "If our eyes were made in such a manner that no part of our body could fall under our gaze, or if a malevolent mechanism, letting us free to move our hand on objects, prevented us from touching our body — or simply if, like some animals, we had lateral eyes, without intersection of the visual fields — then this body, which would not feel or reflect on itself, this almost unchangeable body that would not be completely flesh, would not even be the body of a man, and there would be no humanity." For Merleau-Ponty, however, this does not mean that humanity is reducible to the simple sum of these bodily articulations. See also Dorion Cairns, *Conversations with Husserl and Fink* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p. 4.

23. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Signs* (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1964, p. 180 (translation altered).

24. Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, trans. by N. Findley (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), Vol. I, p. 142: "Actually, nobody has yet thought of rejecting as *absurd* the well-known geological and physical theories that postulate for humankind a beginning and an end in time." Husserl seems to have considered at length the thinkability of a universe in which conscious life is absent. Notwithstanding the oscillation between different viewpoints, the answer which best harmonizes with his overall thought is, according to René Toulemont (*L'Essence de la societé selon Husserl* [Paris: PUF, 1962], p. 281), the one expressed in the following fragment: "*a world without subjects* able to experience the world effectively (of having a spatio-temporal-causal intuition) is thinkable only as the past of a world that *implies* similar objects," i. e., as the past of actual subjects who "retrospectively construe prior world eras, including eventually a merely material

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the problem of death, even collective death, the essential point is that it is also "posited" by a transcendental consciousness, i.e., an extra-mundane consciousness that, in its absolute presence to itself, precedes the world and does not lose its sense of being even with the extinction of "constituted" humanity.[25]

Husserl's dualistic idealism generates a series of aporias which, notwithstanding continuous re-elaborations, remain unresolved. As was pointed out by Heidegger early on, central among them is the difficulty in explaining credibly the relation between pure and embodied consciousness.[26] Following Heidegger and Fink, a significant part of the subsequent phenomenological movement moved away from transcendental idealism. It rejected the *Cogito*'s extra-mundane absoluteness and challenged the very notion of constitution.[27] Merleau-Ponty has spoken of a

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era." Notwithstanding the monads' universal connection and interdependence, which make them all co-neccessary for the making of this world's reality, nothing guarantees that the monads' community can renew itself ad *infinitum*." *Ibid.*, pp. 278-79).

25. Derrida deals with the problem of death in Husserl (which he also understands as a catastrophic demise of meaning, a disappearance of truth, in relation to the annihilation of the world) in the "Introduction" to Husserl's *The Origin of Geometry*, *op. cit.*, pp. 93ff. "To determine the sense of this 'disappearance' of truth is the most difficult problem posed . . . by Husserl's philosophy of history." Cf. also his analysis of the notion of "living present," in Jacques Derrida, *La voix et le phénomène* (Paris: PUF, 1967), pp. 60-61.

26. Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* (1925), in *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 20 (Frankfurt a/ M: 1979), p. 139: "How is it possible that this sphere of absolute position, pure consciousness, which must be separated by means of an absolute *caesura* from any transcendence, can at the same time converge with reality in the unity of real men who, in turn, exist as real objects in the world? How is it possible that the living experiences form an absolute and pure region of being and that, at the same time, they take place in the transcendence of the world? This is the problematic framework of Husserl's phenomenological field of consciousness."

27. Jan Patocka criticized the theory of reduction for assigning a secondary role to the evidence of the world as compared to pure consciousness. According to him, the world's contingency does not imply the existence of subjects. The two evidences, of the world and of the subjects, must be placed on the same level. "It would even be legitimate to state that the subject . . . is something that has always presupposed the existence of the world," which can only be experienced on its background. Cf. Jan Patocka, *Qu'est-ce que la phénomenologie?* (Grenoble: J. Millon, 1988), pp. 177 and 258-59. The preliminary gift of the "totality of the world" is not something constituted by a subject but rather is the presupposition of any constitution, the condition of the possibility of any experience (pp. 144, 175). Later, Patocka sought to elaborate a phenomenological cosmology according to which "the universe without man . . . and phenomena, belongs to the domain of the thinkable. Ultimately, the universe is also the foundation of phenomena. The phenomenon is not possible other than as a phenomenon of the totality, and it is a peculiar fact that the universe could exist without phenomena." Cf. Jan Patocka, *Platon et l'Europe* (Paris: Verdier, 1983), p. 42. At the same time, it remains equally true that this universe must be such as to make possible the structures of appearing. Thus it must be acknowledged that "the world has two aspects. On the one hand, it is the world of *existing things*,

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"true transcendental" that must be sought at the heart of experience, in the body-subject's undivided solidarity with the world.[28] Consequently, in "The Spatiality of Nature" he found a prefiguration of his own thought: the body proper, which is in the world but eludes the status of naturalistic objectification, drags along, outside the sphere of pure things, the earth-ground with which it has established an ineradicable tie. Thus, instead of a dualism between subject and object or between the constituting and the constituted, we see the outline of a new ontological dimension.

Merleau-Ponty's "New Stratum of Being"

Merleau-Ponty was particularly attracted by those trains of thought by means of which Husserl shook the established structures of his own doctrine, as in the case of the notion of constitution and the relations between the constituting and the constituted. In the classical formulation of *Ideas,* a fundamental role is played by the "bifurcation" of spirit and nature, between the absoluteness of the constituting consciousness and the relativity of the constituted world. But the apparent evidence of this bifurcation, which sought to ground the materialism of the physical thing on the idealism of immanent consciousness, clashed with those concrete phenomenological investigations that reveal a more profound dimension — a third dimension resistant to the rigorous distinction between the subjective and the objective. Since the "subject" is embodied, "my body must itself be meshed into the visible world; its power depends precisely on this fact that it has a place *from which* it sees. Thus it is a thing, but a thing I dwell in. It is, if you wish on the side of the subject; but it is not a stranger to the locality of things."[29] Like the lived body,

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and, on the other, it is the world of *phenomenal structures*. The world is not only the world that is, but also the world that appears. . . . The universe also contains *an unreal* aspect: the 'how' [the structures] of its manifestation." Although they are "aspects" of the totality of the world (and they are not the forms of an extra-mundane subjectivity), these structures reveal themselves to be *completely independent* in their internal connections from the structures of the real beings in which they manifest themselves. In other words, these structures *cannot be deduced* from objective or psychic structures, *op. cit.*, p. 39. From this viewpoint, the fact that appearing has been brought back to the world and that human subjectivity in particular must admit its finitude and final surrender to its annihilation does not imply (as Husserl seems to fear) an absorption of every meaning and of every truth in the non-sense of the great naturalistic object. See also Patocka, "Le tout du monde et le monde de l'homme" in *Le monde naturel et le mouvement de l'existence humaine*, *op. cit.*, pp. 265 ff. This work develops Fink's notion of the world. See also Reuben Guilead, *Il Mondo nel Pensiero Quotidiano* (Milan: Spinelli, 1984), pp. 262-90.

28. See *Phenomenology of Perception* (London: Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 377.

29. Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

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the earth is also one of those objects not completely constituted. In "The Spatiality of Nature" it is clear that the possibility of conceiving the earth as a celestial body among others must never obliterate its mode of being according to which the earth is always "on our side," not a "mere thing" in the sense of physics, but a "pre-object" generating an original temporality and spatiality.

Crucial in Husserl's late writings is the genetic moment and the subterranean connection between "pure" consciousness and its world: "[Husserl] sketches the description of those pre-objective beings that are the correlatives of the community of percipient bodies and form the itinerary of its primordial history. A prior stratum, which has never been suppressed and which will demand to be justified when the development of knowledge reveals the deficiencies of Cartesian science, emerges from under Cartesian nature.[30] Husserl described the earth as the seat of pre-objective spatiality and temporality, as the fatherland and historicity of the embodied subjects who are not yet unfettered observers, as grounds of truth or arks that transport the seeds of knowledge and culture toward the future. Before being manifest and 'objective,' truth inhabits the embodied subjects' secret order. At the source and in the profundity of Cartesian nature there is another nature, the domain of 'original presence' which, because it points to the total answer of a single embodied subject, is in principle also present in everyone else. Thus a philosophy that more than any other seemed destined to understand natural being as an object and as the pure correlate of consciousness rediscovers, thanks to its reflective rigor, a natural stratum in which spirit is almost buried and hidden in the bodies' harmonious functioning in the bosom of the bare being."[31]

Merleau-Ponty thought he could locate this reversal in Husserl's late writings where constitution, born as the "project for the intellectual possession of the world," becomes "the means to unveil the other side of things which have not been constituted by us." Behind the construction

30. Merleau-Ponty referred to this profound dimension obtaining in pre-objective spatiality and temporality as *ultra-things* — a concept he borrowed from Wallon. See *Merleau-Ponty à la Sorbonne, Résumés de cours, 1949-52* (Paris: Cynara, 1988), pp. 242-44. They are those fleeting entities, not completely controllable and observable, that populate children's world. Merleau-Ponty mentions the earth and the sky, but also children's unexpressed conviction of having always existed, of being "coextensive" with being. "Even for adult consciousness it is impossible to really conceive its beginning and end." Thus *death* also belongs among these inescapable *ultra-things*. "We cannot think beyond outside of all viewpoints, we can push further the frontier of *ultra-things* (by learning about the Copernican system), but we cannot eliminate them completely."

31. Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-67 (translation altered).

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of pure ideal objectivities, this other side reveals "those beings that secretly nourish them and in which he [Husserl] seeks to detect the noema." "The earth is the matrix of our time as well as of our space: each construed notion of time presupposes our proto-history as embodied beings co-present in one world."[32] In his working notes for *The Visible and the Invisible*, Merleau-Ponty again dwelt on the function of the earth and geography within a new philosophy of spatio-temporality: "Geography, — or rather: the earth as primordial ark, brings to light the bodily primordial history — 'The Spatiality of Nature'." There it is possible to catch the link between "history and transcendental geology (to understand) this very time which is space, this very space that is time . . . the simultaneous *Urstiftung* of time and space which allows that there be a historical landscape and a quasi-geographical inscription in history."[33]

In a course on the problem of nature Merleau-Ponty taught at the Collège de France in 1957 he dealt once again with Husserl's 1934 manuscript. At that time he asserted that the *archeology* of consciousness, established in the profound connection with the earth and with its embodiment, did not entail a new kind of psychologism — a psychological retranslation of ontological notions. Rather, it represented the opening toward a new ontology — the introduction of a "new stratum of Being."[34] "Husserl is seeking an "aesthetic" foundation, and rehabilitates a philosophy of nature, a framework of the perceived world" grounded on a Being that cannot be thought of as a mere object, which cannot be "constituted."[35] While he sets off on a path far from Kantian transcendentalism, Husserl also confronts the contradictions internal to his own theory of intentionality — a theory that irradiates from a unique

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32. Merleau-Ponty, *Résumés de cours*, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-16.

33. Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, *op. cit.*, p. 259. See also *Husserl et la notion de Nature*, *op. cit.*, pp. 266-67: "The earth is our basis, our original homeland. It is the source of our spatiality, the common homeland and the seat of an preimordial history, of an original inclusion. Husserl calls it the primordial ark. It is the basis of a preexistence and of a primordial existence. *In this regard, Husserl's philosophy is close to Heidegger's*" (italics added).

34. Merleau-Ponty, "Husserl et la Notion de Nature," *op. cit.*, pp. 264-66. "*Husserl wants to introduce a new stratum of being*. He aims at noematic terms, a noematic stratum more profound than the *blosse Sachen*. *Ideas II* can give the impression of psychologism. But what is at the bottom of all this is not psychological rubbish but an original mode of being, a primitive being, the 'logos of the aesthetic world' — since the articulated logos is derived from a meaning immanent to the precept of the primordial world, of experiential ground. *This is indeed an ontological regime*." (Italics added).

35. *Ibid.*, p. 267.

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center and justifies the dualism between absolute consciousness and the relativity of the world. Paraphrasing Husserl, Merleau-Ponty writes: "The domain perceived by other people represents a magnet for my subjectivity. Nature and the body (or the soul) are interchangeable one with the other. This represented a difficulty for Husserl. . . . Traditionally, to constitute (his philosophical task!) meant to go from the product to the producing thought. But reciprocity is no longer a linear relation! [i. e., only from consciousness to the thing]. How can the two aspects be reconciled?"[36] If Husserl never considered abandoning transcendental idealism, this was because he sensed the always present danger of relapsing into naturalistic objectivism. "Therefore, Husserl seems to have retraced his steps in claiming that the profound realm of primordial intentionalities was generated by the ego's acts. But, actually, one must first give credit to the world of *doxa*, with its more or less clear instances. The task of reflexive philosophy is impossible because it draws everything from what is unreflected. The natural attitude is not false, and philosophy starts there. Husserl's hesitations only emphasize the necessity and the difficulty of a philosophy of nature for transcendental idealism."[37]

36. See *Ibid.*, p. 268, where there is a reference to Fink and to "acting and operative intentionality" as a primordial stratum. Husserl's words, quoted by Merleau-Ponty, come from the appendix to *Ideas*, Vol. III, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 268-69.



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Editor: Thomas V. Cahill

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Patocka vs. Heidegger: The Humanistic Difference

Aviezer Tucker

The connection between Heidegger's philosophy and his Nazi politics has been the subject of a major controversy.[1] A comparison between Heidegger's and Patocka's philosophy and politics is instructive because, although their philosophies are very similar, their politics are diametrically opposed. Heidegger was a Nazi who never rejected his positions, while Patocka sacrificed his life for human rights. If a difference can be found between their philosophies and that difference can be connected with their politics, it may afford some insight into the philosophy of Heidegger and his followers, as well as into the connection between existentialism and politics. Following Levinas, Lyotard claimed that Heidegger went wrong by promoting ontology above morality.[2] By claiming that knowledge of the truth presupposes ethics, Patocka escaped the pitfall of ethical nihilism into which Heidegger fell.

I

For Heidegger, "This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term '*Dasein*' " (BT, p. 7/27).[3] *Dasein* literally means "Being

1. The most recent argument began with Victor Farias, *Heidegger and Nazism*, trans. by Paul Burrell (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989). For a discussion of the politics behind such a sudden "shocking" discovery of what has never been in doubt, see Paul Gottfried, "Heidegger on Trial," in *Telos* 74 (Winter 1987-88), pp. 147-51.

2. Jean-Francois Lyotard, *Heidegger and "the Jews"*, trans. by Andreas Michel Mark Roberts (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990).

3. BT=Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962). The first pagination is of the German edition, the second of the English.

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there" — an entity presupposed by inquiry. Heidegger rejects the subject-object distinction between an "outer" world as a collection of objects and an "inner" world of ideas and feelings. Dasein is merely a "clearing" or an "opening" where worldly things like self and objects manifest themselves. The essential state of *Dasein* that transcends the subject-object distinction is Being-in-the-world (BT, pp. 54/80), which is usually dispersed in various modes of Being-in: according to our concerns, looking after something, giving something up etc. As Being-in-the-world, *Dasein* is possible only within the world. This makes possible its interaction, absorption and fascination with other entities within this world. In *Being and Time* Heidegger attempted to study the structure of Being-in-the-world.

Although "*Dasein* is that entity which, as Being-in-the-world, is an issue for itself" (BT, p. 143/182), *Dasein* has no direct, ready-at-hand, understanding of itself: it only "finds 'itself' proximately in *what* it does, uses, expects, avoids — in those things environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is proximately *concerned*" (BT, p. 119/155). Heidegger notes that, although it is an issue for itself as an absent place where things may appear, *Dasein* is unable in principle to perceive itself as present-at-hand, in the same way it perceives all other entities in the world. Thus Heidegger's and Patocka's characterization of human existence is mostly negative: "But have we not confined ourselves to negative assertions in all our attempts to determine the nature of this state of Being? Though this Being-in is supposedly so fundamental, we always keep hearing about what it is *not*. Yes indeed. But there is nothing accidental about our characterizing it predominantly in so negative a manner. In so doing we have rather made known what is peculiar to this phenomenon, and our characterization is therefore positive in a genuine sense — a sense appropriate to the phenomenon itself. When Being-in-the-world is exhibited phenomenologically, disguises and concealments are rejected *because* this phenomenon itself always gets 'seen' in a certain way in every Dasein. And it thus gets 'seen' *because* it makes up a basic state of Dasein, and in every case is already disclosed for Dasein's understanding of Being, and disclosed along with that Being itself" (BT, p. 58/85). The discovery of the authentic *Dasein* is not something definite or positive, but rather the elimination of negatives: "If *Dasein* discovers the world in its own way and brings it close, if it discloses to itself its own authentic Being, then this discovery of the 'world' and this disclosure of *Dasein* are always accomplished as a clearing-away of concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of disguises with which *Dasein* bars its own way" (BT, pp. 129/167). Eliminating

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falsities, concealments and obscurities, and proving that certain questions cannot possibly be answered, are respectable philosophical traditions. According to Zimmerman: "To read *Being and Time* appropriately requires that the reader struggle to understand himself and, thus, to *exist* appropriately. This struggle leads one to undertake a voyage which may lead to a dramatic change in self-understanding. Because the book demands that the reader undergo for himself the self-disclosure traced in its pages, *Being and Time* resembles other philosophical works such as Descartes' *Meditations*, Spinoza's *Ethics*, and Plato's *Dialogues*. All these works are designed to provoke a change in their readers. . . . *Being and Time* never says that the reader should choose to be authentic. To have said this would have meant the end of existential describing and the beginning of existential prescribing. Surely it is a careless reader, however, who fails to notice the exhortative dimension in this book."[4] The basic problem here is that once one accepts what being human *is not*, and even goes on to eliminate those aspects of one's personality which are inauthentic, there may be many implicit or explicit positive characterizations of human existence that may be consistent with negative characterizations but inconsistent with one another. Further, some or even all these positive interpretations may still contain inauthentic elements, even if we grant that Heidegger helps his reader to rid himself of some inauthentic characteristics.

To a large extent, this drawback of the implicit normative aspect of Heidegger's account of human authenticity parallels problems with the philosophies of Marx, Freud and Derrida. Marx claimed that once capitalist society rids itself of surplus value, class distinctions would disappear, the superstructure would slowly dissipate, and "human history" would begin. But when Marx' followers attempted to interpret the few vague positive recommendations implicit in his description of capitalism, they ended up with conflicting interpretations, from Bernstein to Gramsci, from Plekhanov to Lukács. More importantly, when Lenin and his followers indeed abolished private capitalism and surplus value, class distinctions were not abolished, and the superstructure did not disappear. In fact, state monopoly capitalism proved to be more exploitative and oppressive than the capitalism it sought to replace.

Similarly, Freud devoted most of his work to the analysis of understanding and eliminating "mental illness." Yet one of the purposes of

4. Michael E. Zimmerman, *Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity* (Athens and London: Ohio University Press, 1986), p. 34. Italics added.

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psychoanalysis is "mental health," about which Freud had little more to say than a shallow platitude about "ability to function in work and love." Accordingly, psychoanalytic interpretations of "mental health" vary. The vague definition of "mental health" leads to misuses of psychoanalysis and psychiatry by money-grubbing professionals who define any potential patient as sick, by authoritarian regimes that use psychiatry for social control by stipulating a political definition to mental health, and military psychiatrists who certify everyone as healthy (*Catch 22*).

Finally, Derrida's deconstructionism is also a descriptive account with implicit normative recommendations. Although Derrida emphasizes that deconstruction is only the first stage, eventually leading to reconstruction, he has far less to say about reconstruction than about deconstruction. While it may be too early to assess Derrida's positive reconstructive interpretations or to associate self-proclaimed Derrida followers with the creation of a "politically correct" orthodoxy in the American universities to suppress the study of Western classics as mere products of "Dead White European Males," the parallel with Heideggerian authenticity, Marxian classless society, and Freudian mental health can be sustained.[5]

This is not to underestimate the liberating influence of Heidegger, Marx, Freud and Derrida on some of their readers. The point is that their significance stems from their being critical theories. The liberating influence of these theories on many of their readers is in their criticism of well established beliefs and power structures. Yet, after the first liberating "brain-storming" enlightenment, readers expect the great liberators of their minds to offer a positive alternative to deconstructed beliefs and institutions. There they meet ambiguity, vagueness, and lack of direction. Moses, the liberator of the slaves, is not the leader who enters the promised land with his followers.

In such a state of confusion, when old beliefs have crumbled and new ones are still out of sight, it is all too easy to fall prey to authoritarian promises of a better world, to the new Nazi man, free from neurosis and morality. This criticism parallels Ferry and Renaut's argument against Lacoue-Labarthe that Heidegger's Nazism is the product of his anti-humanism, rather than the other way round. Ferry and Renaut argue that in order to have a democracy, there must be some residue of subjectivity, some human responsibility for choices. Without such a humanist

5. See: "Thought Police-Taking Offense: Is This the New Enlightenment on Campus or the New McCarthyism?" in *Newsweek* (December 24 1990), pp. 48-55.

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residue, the road is open for authoritarian, dehumanizing ideologies and actions.[6] This is the intellectual mine-field into which Patocka was led by Heidegger. Although he triggered some of these mines, unlike Heidegger he did manage to come out of the mine field.

II

Patocka's answer to the question of human existence is a reformulation of Heidegger's Being-in-the-world; human existence is a "movement in the world."[7] (NWP, p. 269) Following Husserl, Patocka attempted to present his concept of human existence as a movement abolishing the Cartesian subject-object distinction between an objective world and a perceiving subject. Instead, he assumed that the world is constantly changing and human existence is a sub-movement within this whole that, like Heidegger's Being-in-the-world, is able to comprehend and understand the truth of the whole. Patocka's "movement" departs from that of Aristotle's dynamic realization of potentials and possibilities — a process of change toward a goal. By fusing Aristotle's self-moving *psyche* and Heidegger's Being-in-the-world, Patocka came to his concept of human existence: human movement in the world. In order to adapt Aristotle to Husserl's phenomenological framework, Patocka had to change the meaning of Aristotle's "possibilities" (that are realized in motion). "Possibilities" can no longer be the range of changes that can occur to an unchanged objective substrate. Following Husserl's understanding of the intentional character of human existence, possibilities in the course of realization are projections beyond the given (what Husserl called a "horizon"). In Aristotle, self movement is the *physis*, the essence, of the human *psyche*, and so is human existence in Patocka's interpretation. "To understand existence as movement means to grasp man as being in and of the world. It is a being that not only is in the world, as Heidegger puts it (in the sense of understanding the world), but rather is itself part of the process. This movement, precisely because it *is*, though in the form of the movement of existence, is a being that understands itself (understanding possibilities in their realization); it is a being that makes possible clarity, understanding, knowledge, and truth (MHE,

6. See Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, *Heidegger and Modernity*, trans. by Franklin Philip (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) vs. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction of the Political*, trans. by Chris Turner (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).

7. NWP=Jan Patocka, "The 'Natural' World and Phenomenology," in Erazim Kohak, *Jan Patocka: Philosophy and Selected Writings* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 239-73.

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pp. 279-89)[8] The natural world is an evident (unproved primitive) moving whole in which human movement is a part. Therefore our perspective on it can never be extra-mundane or objective. Man's movement in this world is never absolute, but from a standpoint.

III

In its narrow sense (excluding the vegetative and animalistic aspects of humanity) of (self) transcendence, human becoming is free. As elaborated and expounded in the later parts of *Being and Time*, it is human authenticity, unconcealment of life, wakefulness, achieved by Heidegger's self (*Dasein*) recognizing its finitude. This movement leads to the discovery of the truth, to transcendence of the particulars and to recognition of the whole. This is the dimension where people create meaning and values. Yet it can only be done in the face of death: "Thus at the center of our world the point is to reach from a merely given life to the emergence of a true life, and that is achieved in the movement that shakes the objective rootedness and alienation in a role, in objectification — at first a purely negative movement, one that shakes out bondage to life, setting free without revealing anything further; then with a movement that positively presents the essential — as life universal, giving birth to all in all, evoking life in the other, a self-transcendence toward the other and with him again to infinity. (NWP, p. 263) The negative element of human authenticity is clear here, though its positive counterpart remains vague. Instead of prescribing a set of characteristics as "human nature," Patocka prescribed the activity of knowing, the awareness of being human as problematic, and of seeking as characteristic of human nature and the most basic virtue. Being aware of the problematic issue of human existence and seeking self-awareness is care for the soul — a term Patocka borrows from Socrates' *Apology*.

For Patocka, being human is not a biological given but a kind of movement that has to be nurtured and protected by Socrates' "care for the soul." For Heidegger "Care is the Being of Dasein" (BT, pp. 180/225-30/273). Still, there are basic differences between Socrates-Plato and Heidegger. In Socrates-Plato, the care is of the soul, quite a different entity from Heidegger's *Dasein*. Socrates described the mission of the philosopher as "searching into myself and other men," (*Apology* 28e) practiced by the Socratic method of arguing: "For I do nothing

8. MHE=Jan Patocka, "The Movement of Human Existence: A Selection from *Body, Community, Language, World*," in Kohak, *Jan Patocka: Philosophy and Selected Writings*, *op. cit.*, pp. 274-84.

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but go about persuading you all, old and young alike, not to take thought for your persons or your properties, but first and chiefly to care about the greatest improvement of the soul." (*Apology* 30a-b) At the end of the *Apology* Socrates repeats the same idea, but mentions virtue instead of the soul as the object of care: "When my sons are grown up, I would ask you, O my friends, to punish them; I would have you trouble them, as I have troubled you, if they seem to care about riches, or anything, more than about virtue . . . reprove them, as I have reproved you, for not caring about that for which they ought to care. . ." (*Apology* 41e). Patocka fused the two Socratic cares and argued that care for the soul, self-searching into human existence *is* virtue.

For Heidegger, *Dasein*'s Being is care, concern with itself and other things. "Caring" and *Dasein*'s degree of authenticity and openness are interdependent. *Dasein* cares about itself by achieving authenticity through confrontation with its finitude. Patocka's "care for the soul" is closer to Socrates' than to Heidegger's in three respects: first, Patocka talks about the soul and not of *Dasein*; second, he accepted from Socrates and Plato that the practice of care for the soul, of search for the meaning of human existence, is the Socratic method; third, he accepts from Socrates the explicit ethical aspect of care for the soul — an aspect that, at most, exists only implicitly in Heidegger.

Patocka interprets Plato's "*arete*" as being authentically human. *Arete* in Plato is equated with "essence." Thus every thing has its *arete*, but only humans have a choice in realizing their true essence. This has to be differentiated from the existentialist assertion that there is no such thing as "human essence." By claiming that there is such an essence, that essence is virtue, and that there is a free choice either to realize it or not, Patocka is taking a small yet vital step beyond Heidegger towards the humanist camp. This step is the source for the different philosophical, moral, and personal paths of Heidegger and Patocka.

In the *Apology* Socrates defined "care for the soul" as the human essence and the essential task of philosophy, i.e., to pose and attempt to answer the question about the human essence or the essence of *psyche*[9] (PE, p. 281). According to Patocka, that praxis is the content of Socrates' philosophy as preserved in Plato's dialogues: the assumption of ignorance and the attempt to learn using a dialectic structure of question and answer. This dialogue can take place between people, or inside oneself

9. PE=Jan Patocka, *Platon et L'Europe*, trans. by Erika Abrams (Lagrasse: Editions Verdier, 1983).

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(PE, pp. 101-03, EH,[10] pp. 92-94. Cf. also *Gorgias*, 482).

While this sounds very complimentary to philosophers, what exactly is the "caring" human essence remains vague. Different people may and actually did care about their souls, ask questions about human existence and recognize the problem, but reached different and even conflicting conclusions. Although Patocka adds the Socratic method to Heidegger's "care as the Being of *Dasein*," Heidegger's vagueness about human essence remains and leads Patocka himself, at different stages of the development of his thought, to reach conflicting conclusions about the essence of man (some of which, especially in his *Heretical Essays*, are rather disturbing). When Patocka adhered to his Socratic-Platonic humanistic interpretation of "care for the soul" as asking the question about the essence of human existence, his answer is far more meaningful than it may appear at first sight. The problem is that Patocka himself did not always adhere to his own Socratic interpretation, and moved towards a more Heideggerian concept of "care," with some serious consequences for his philosophy of history.

Patocka divides "care for the soul" into three main currents, differentiated according to their distance from the self: first, there is a general investigation of being, an onto-cosmological investigation of truth, leading to "life in truth"; second, care for the soul within the community is justice, the creation of a community in which search for truth is possible; and third, an elucidation of what the soul is. This study of individual life is achieved through confrontation with death and the question of significance (PE, pp. 96, 105-07, 193).

IV

Following Heidegger, Patocka considers human beings as that part of Being to which it shows itself. By its very essence the soul (Patocka never uses Heidegger's *Dasein* but, rather Plato's "soul," which has some of the characteristics of *Dasein*) is destined to discover and unveil truth. The soul's perception of truth lacks ulterior or utilitarian motives. If the soul repudiates this, it will become corrupt and lose itself. Patocka believed that care for the soul began in presocratic philosophy with the discovery of truth as distinct from mere appearance. Both the founders of idealism and materialism, Plato and Democritus, differentiate between truth as profound, total and eternal presence, and appearance.

10. EH=Jan Patocka, *Essais heretiques sur la philosophie de l'histoire*, trans. by Erika Abrams (Lagrasse: Editions Verdier, 1981).

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Both also see the task of the soul as transcending misleading appearance to reach the truth.

The soul which fulfills its nature and discovers truth can live in the grand presence of truth. Since human essence consists in the ability to apprehend truth as different from appearance, to realize the potentiality for human life, to search for the truth, is the only authentic option. A man who chooses to realize his authentic nature is living in truth. Since man is an a-subjective movement, the appreciation of the truth is not a passive activity but a dynamic life in truth: a dynamic Being-in-a-true-world in contraposition to alienated inauthentic life in a lie.

Human authenticity as life in truth began with the Greeks. Democritus thought that truth is atoms and void, while Plato recognized truth at the top of the hierarchy of Being, in the higher ideas. Nevertheless, the characteristics of truth (eternal, total) as well as the relation between truth and the soul, are common and thus constitute the foundation of Western civilization (PE, pp. 81-100).

According to Patocka and unlike Heidegger, the discovery of the pure, eternal, and total truth is achieved by the Socratic method, by the internal or inter-personal dialectic. Life in truth is achieved in two stages discernable in the Platonic dialogues: first, as a skeptical analysis, rejecting false assertions and contradictory arguments. In effect, the soul is delivered from confusion, discordance and contradiction. As Socrates claims in the *Gorgias*, he would rather endure anything than be in discord with, or contradict himself. In the second stage the soul discovers the pure truth, through a gradual educational process as described in the *Republic*. In this process the soul achieves more than knowledge. As discussed in the *Phaedo*, that part of the soul that lives in truth becomes like it: eternal and pure.

The soul can choose to engage in an activity leading to pure truth, which would make the soul itself virtuous, possessing *arete*: pure, free of confusion, unified, nature. Authentic life in truth releases man from his dependence on corporeality — from the infinite indeterminacy of desires and the inevitable decline of truth. Since for Plato ideas are the measure of all things, knowledge of these ideas, of truth, leads to the virtue of being measured in our desires, prevents their becoming infinite and therefore unsatisfiable. Following Plato, Patocka claimed that, as ideal figures in geometry are limits of infinite surfaces, so does the knowledge of ideas limit infinite evil desires. The model for those who live in truth is Socrates. The model for those who choose to avoid truth is Callicles of the *Gorgias*: tyrannical, undisciplined, dissolute, unruly,

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like Danneides' barrel that can never be filled (PE, pp. 229-30, 281-91). Rorty is wrong when he interprets Patocka as claiming that "We should not read Plato as promising that, if we care for our souls properly, we shall win through to Absolute Knowledge, and sail into an anchorage beyond all receding horizons and fading margins."[11] Rorty provides a Heidegger-Derrida-Rorty relativistic interpretation to Plato-Patocka. Patocka's conception of truth was at times Heideggerian, and he also stressed the importance of search for truth. Still, life in truth flows from Patocka's Platonism; it is possible only because the soul is able to live in the grand presence of truth, eternal and complete, and not relative as in the philosophy of Derrida-Rorty. Further, the self-formation of the soul, as a result of life in truth, is possible only because the soul can remake itself in the shape of truth: finite, delimited, and eternal.

Here Patocka qualifies the meaning of human existence beyond his definition of "care for the soul" as the posing of the question about human essence. Still, there is no reason to object to stipulating that human essence, besides inquiring into the nature of human essence, is also the ability to distinguish truth from appearance, unless one is a phenomenalist, i.e., an extreme empiricist who believes that sense data *are* reality. Animals and vegetables certainly do not have a concept of truth, nor do they argue about it in Platonic-like dialogues. Even Heidegger acknowledges that *Dasein* learns about itself through Being-in-the-World. Hence learning about the world teaches man something about himself.

V

The implicit normative element in Heidegger becomes explicit as a humanistic ethics in Patocka, for whom human authenticity is good and inauthenticity evil. He also claims that human authenticity, the essence of man, as care for the soul is its ability to conceive and live in truth. Thus, ethics has to protect the right to practice life in truth. In his Platonic moments, the practice of life in truth is the dialectic. Thus, freedom of speech is the precondition of justice.

Thus "ought" is presupposed by knowledge of "is." Without freedom of speech, the truth, the "is," can never be discovered. In this sense, ethics is not the product of humanity, rather humanity is the

11. Richard Rorty, "The Seer of Prague," in *The New Republic* (July 1, 1991), pp. 35-40. The Editors of *The New Republic*, in their incomparable sagaciousness, described Rorty's review of *Platone et l'Europe*, *Essais Heretiques*, and Kohak's *Jan Patocka*, on the cover of the magazine as dealing with "Vaclav Havel's Guru."

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product of ethics. Morality is necessary for human authenticity. Immoral humans are inauthentic and vice versa.

By defining human essence positively, and at times giving truth a Platonic meaning, Patocka paved the way for an ethical commitment that Heidegger never made. As for the latter's involvement with Nazism, this account supports Ferry and Renaut's claim against Lacoue-Labarthe, that Heidegger failed morally because he was not humanistic and not, as Lacoue-Labarthe claims, because he was too humanistic.

When Patocka writes about the philosophers' obligation to search for truth and create a society where care for the soul is possible, when he talks of the life, death and Socrates' legacy , there is, in light of Patocka's own later personal moral undertaking, a touch of Socrates of the *Apology*, *Crito* or *Phaedo*. In retrospect, it is clear that Patocka is explaining the reasons for his own death and his obligation to uphold virtue, his care for the soul and his life in truth. He is attempting to create a community where care for the soul and life in truth are possible.

According to Patocka, care for the soul as life in truth is the basis of human activity. Yet, in some communities, care for the soul imperils the self it cares for. In such communities being human, caring for the souls, searching for truth, may lead to death, as Socrates' life demonstrated. Socrates' care for the soul was not aimed at provoking the Athenians. Rather, the very existence of care for the soul constituted a provocation in the Athenians' eyes. Like Plato's Socrates, Patocka accepted that the struggle between the virtuous, who is committed to truth and searches for the good, and the worst, who maintains an appearance of goodness, must end with the death of the good (PE, p. 97). In effect, Patocka accepted that the struggle between himself and the Czechoslovak tyranny was going to end as did Socrates' struggle with the remnants of tyranny in Athens. He accepted that his care for the soul, search for the truth and the good would constitute a provocation (and he said so in his underground seminars collected and published later under the title *Plato and Europe*). Yet he did not budge from being himself: a philosopher.

One of the main tasks of philosophy is to create a community that allows care for the soul. Freedom within such a community is freedom for truth. Patocka interpreted Plato's project in the *Republic* as exactly that: creating a state based on care for the soul and its main component, life in truth. Plato's ideal state is dominated by movement toward the *psyche*'s proper being: spiritual, eternal, and authentic. This was also the Stoics' task. Patocka therefore reproaches Democritus for being an egoist, an

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intellectual isolationist, because he advised those who wanted to preserve the purity of the soul to avoid practical matters and not participate in the creation of a community where care for the soul can be practiced (PE, 91, 98, 115, 296-97).[12]

Patocka recognized that historically justice, the idea of a community where care for the soul and search for the truth are possible, has been challenged from the Athenians who murdered Socrates to his contemporary dissidents. Yet Patocka was committed to the Socratic injunction to prefer suffering injustice to acquiescing in it. As much as truth is eternal and absolute, so is justice, the precondition to the discovery of truth. Therefore it was Patocka's task to attempt and create a just community in the unjust social environment in which he found himself.

Rorty misses Patocka's point when he argues that " 'The care of the soul,' writes Patocka 'is the search for the good,' but the caring and the searching are what matters, not getting the Good right."[13] For Patocka, the search for the good is the Good. To search for the good, we must assume freedom of speech and soon enough we develop an absolute ethical system: the good. Rorty is wrong when he claims that "It would be misleading . . . to think of Patocka as a philosopher of democracy and human rights, if this means the sort of philosopher who wants to give democratic institutions and hopes a 'firm philosophical foundation,' if you reject foundations. If you reject metaphysics, you reject 'positive' Platonism, you reject the idea that there are 'out there,' waiting to be known, such objects as 'the moral law' and 'human rights.' Nonmetaphysicians cannot say that democratic institutions reflect a moral reality and that tyrannical regimes do not reflect one, that tyrannies get something wrong that democratic societies get right. . . . Patocka's conscience led him to do the right thing, but he did not supply good philosophical reasons for doing what he did. . . ."[14] Rorty is deconstructing Patocka in the Heidegger-Derrida-Rorty ethical relativist image.

Patocka's ethical system explains his support and involvement with Charter 77. In 1977, at the Socratic age of 70, Patocka, Vaclav Havel, Jiri Hajek and others signed Charter 77, a document written primarily by Patocka, calling for compliance with the Helsinki covenant on human rights in Czechoslovakia, i.e., freedom of speech, freedom of the press,

12. Jan Patocka, "Negative Platonism: Reflections concerning the Rise, the Scope, and the Demise of Metaphysics — and Whether Philosophy Can Survive It (Circa 1955)," in *Kohak*, p. 182.
13. Rorty, "The Seer of Prague," *op. cit.*, p. 36.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

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and freedom of association — and therefore allowing the practice of the Socratic method, and hence life in truth and care for the soul.

The particular event that led to the creation of Charter 77 was the arrest of the members of the rock group "the Plastic People of the Universe." The lyrics of their songs were, as has been said of the songs of another "musical" group (2-Live-Crew) which were banned in Florida, explicit and offensive. The Czech authorities (like the Florida ones) decided to stop the corrupting influence of this "politically incorrect" group on Czech youth by arresting them. The Charter called for their release according to universal principles of justice, which allow care for the soul in the community: "If human development is to match the possibilities of technological instrumental reason, if a progress of knowledge is to be possible, humankind needs to be convinced of the unconditional validity of principles which are in that sense, 'sacred' valid for all humans at all times, and able to set out humanity's goals. We need, in other words, something that in its very essence is not technological, something that is not merely instrumental: we need a morality that is not merely tactical and situational but absolute. . . . No society, no matter how well-equipped it may be technologically, can function without a moral foundation, without convictions that do not depend on convenience, circumstances, or expected advantage. Yet, the point of morality is to assure not the functioning of a society but the humanity of humans. Humans do not invent morality arbitrarily, to suit their needs, wishes, inclinations, and aspirations. Quite the contrary, it is morality that defines what being human means."[15] Being human — the fundamental virtue for Patocka — means to care for our souls by living in truth and creating a just society where care for the soul is possible. The Patocka of the Charter is Husserlian and not Heideggerian. In Charter 77 Patocka argues that science and technology cannot create morality, not that they prohibit the possibility of it. Morality is the basis for knowledge, i.e., absolute freedom is necessary for the discovery of the truth through the dialectic. Patocka's ethical absolutism conflicts with moral relativism.

Charter 77, and Patocka's ethics on which it is based, applies far beyond the confines of Czechoslovakia. Contemporary philosophies of human rights attempt to find the correct balance between the right to free expression and other rights, such as the right to privacy, or the right not to be harassed. Patocka's ethics claims that the right to argue about the

15. Jan Patocka, "The Obligation to Resist Injustice," in Kohak, *op. cit.*, pp. 340-41.

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truth, far exceeds all other rights because arguing about the truth, life in truth, is the essence of man. Therefore he would have objected to all restrictions on freedom of expression, from speech-codes at universities, to restrictions on artistic expression to gag rules on the press. he would recommend to those who find certain expressions "offensive" to argue against them and thus become authentically human.

The choice of a philosopher in an evil society is between being his authentic moral self, living in truth and suffering the consequences, on the one hand, and becoming inauthentic, dehumanized and evil, on the other. Vaclav Havel put it even better: "The inability to risk, in extremis, even life itself to save what gives it meaning and a human dimension leads not only to the loss of meaning but finally and inevitably to the loss of life as well."[16] In other words, the choice of a philosopher in an unjust society is between death which preserves what makes him human, and the death of his humanity, of his capability to live justly and authentically in truth. Justice in the community is absolute human rights: "The idea of human rights is nothing other than the conviction that even states, even society as a whole, are subject to the sovereignty of moral sentiment: that they recognize something unconditional that is higher than they are, something that is binding even on them, sacred, inviolable, and that in their power to establish and maintain a rule of law they seek to express this recognition."[17] This is why Charter 77 struggled to implement the Helsinki covenant on human rights, which Czechoslovakia's communist government signed and made into law. Yet the significance of Patocka's philosophy is that he sacrificed himself for human rights.His sacrifice was not just for human rights in Czechoslovakia but for universal human rights: for genuine freedom of expression everywhere, irrespective of the local brand of "political correctness," no less than for "The Plastic People of the Universe" in Prague.

16. Vaclav Havel, "Anatomy of Reticence," in Jan Vladislav, ed., *Vaclav Havel or Living in Truth*, trans. by Paul Wilson (London: Erasmus Foundation, 1986), p. 183.

17. Jan Patocka, "The Obligation to Resist Injustice," in Kohak, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

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The Adventure of Albania's Young Turks

Arshi Pipa

The centuries-long Ottoman domination of Albania left indelible marks. Most Albanians converted to the Islamic religion and adopted many customs of Near Eastern civilizations, while their language was invaded by a host of Turkish expressions. What resulted is a frame of mind which, in many respects, is at odds with Western culture. This helps explain why Albania was the last Balkan country to shake off the Stalinist yoke.[1] The grotesque performances of Albanian Stalinism in its attempts to implement an ideology alien to Albanian history and traditions has been described elsewhere.[2] In no other East European country could political power have rested with one person for over forty years. Hoxha, a graduate of a French Lycée and a man who had lived many years in France and Belgium, ruled his country like a Sultan.[3]

Albania was part of the Ottoman Empire for more than five centuries, or ten times longer than Hoxha's sultanate. Yet the latter's impact on Albania has been almost as catastrophic. Exiled liberals seeking the decentralization of power, minority rights, a constitution, etc. opposed

1. A form of Stalinism, often referred to as "neo-Stalinism," exists in Serbia today. But this is one of those political oddities that baffle reason.

2. See my *Albanian Stalinism: Ideo-Political Aspects*, East European Monographs, no. 287 (1990), distributed by Columbia University Press, particularly the chapter on the prospect of Albania's Future.

3. That he was the son of a Bektashi family (Bektashism being a Shia sect), helps explain why Hoxha hailed the Ayatollah-led Iranian revolution as one that "had a class character, being in essence a social revolution, not a revolution of a religious character" Cf. Enver Hoxha, *Reflections on the Middle East* (Tirana: 8 Nëntori, 1984), p. 245. He also exalted Islam while degrading Christianity: "In fact the Koran is more complete and purer than the Bible (Torah) of the Jews, the Christian Gospel, etc." *Ibid.*, p. 463.

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the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the 19th century. Influenced by the Italian *carbonari* conspiring to bring about Italian unification, Turkish dissidents founded secret revolutionary groups. The first one, "Union and Progress," was started by students of the Imperial Medical School in Istanbul in 1898. Students and young officers constituted the first nuclei, hence their nickname: "Young Turks."[4] At the beginning of the 20th century Albanian patriots were quick to join these "clubs," hoping to promote Albanian independence. In February 1902, when the Young Turks met in Paris to plan the overthrow of the Sultan, many Albanians participated, including Ibrahim Temo, a founder of the original "Union and Progress" committee, and Ismail Kemal, the Turkish diplomat who ten years later proclaimed Albania's independence.[5]

Because the multinational Ottoman political system was based on religion and the Albanians were a favored ethnic group due to their conversion to Islam, the Albanian Young Turks called for an autonomous Albania within the framework of the Ottoman Empire. This autonomous Albania would comprise the four *vilayets* of Shkodër, Kosova, Yanina, and Monastir, constituting most of what was left of the decaying Ottoman Empire in Europe. At that point the concept of autonomy was unpopular with the Kosovars, who wanted to keep the Sultan: their "father king."[6] Yet it was Kosovars, gathered in Ferizović in July 1908 to protest the Young Turks' reforms as a threat to their privileges, who sent the Sultan Abdül Hamid an ultimatum demanding the reinstatement of the 1877 Constitution, as long as the latter would not abolish the privileges they had traditionally enjoyed (e.g., bearing arms, not paying taxes, and abiding by the Sheriat — the Moslem canonical law).

The Constitution was greated with enthusiasm by Albanians, both Moslem and Christians alike.[7] But the euphoria was short-lived. Once in power, the Young Turks proved to be as chauvinistic as their elders. They reneged on their promises to respect national rights, declared Turkish the only official language and forbade Albanians to have schools teach in Albanian. The electoral law prevented parliamentary

4. Stavro Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 335.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 336.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 341.
7. See Edith Durham's *High Albania* (Virago reprint, 1985, pp. 324-44) for a colorful description of the Mirditë tribe's reaction to the proclamation of the Constitution. The Congress for the Albanian Alphabet convened in Monastir in November 1908 within this euphoric context and agreed on an alphabet with Roman letters which has been in use ever since.

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candidates from identifying themselves as ethnics. Everyone had to be registered as "Ottoman." There were clashes when Parliament convened in December 1908 and the 26 Albanian deputies representing the four Albanian *vilayets* constituted themselves into an opposition party led by Ismail Kemal.[8]

Yet collaboration between Albanians and Young Turks continued for some time, resulting in a problematic situation analogous to that existing in Kosova today. As members of Young Turks clubs, Albanians were supposed to consolidate the tottering Ottoman Empire. In fact they undermined it by promoting the union of the four *vilayets*, leading to secession. Then, as now, Kosovars led the unification drive. Their rebellion spread among Catholics in Northern Albania, and subsequently to all Northern and Central Albania. It was once again the Kosovars who, while gathered in Prishtina awaiting the Sultan's answer to their demand concerning the fate of the four *vilayets*, occupied the city of Shkup, thus ending the Young Turks' rule once and for all (August 1912).

Today's rulers of liberated Albania are playing a role similar to that of the Young Turks. After Hoxha's death in 1985, the leadership passed to his faithful disciple, Ramiz Alia, who certainly deserved that title during the first four or five years when he cautiously introduced reforms Hoxha himself would have readily accepted. These were merely cosmetic, meant to placate growing popular discontent. Alia did, however, break with the legacy of his master in foreign policy. Albanian "revisionism" began with Alia's befriending capitalist countries such as West Germany, followed by the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Albania's two arch-enemies, the US and the USSR. Hoxha, who more than once said that Albanians would feed on grass rather than bend their knees before capitalism or make peace with Soviet "revisionism," would never have done this. Abandoning Hoxha's isolationism and his obsession with ideological purity was considered essential for Albania's survival as a communist state.

These major ideological departures implied a criticism of past aberrations. Bravely, Alia undertook that task, assisted by Foto Çami and a few other intellectuals. It first surfaced in nonconformist ways of dressing and behaving among the youth, long subjected to a Spartan discipline.

8. Skendi, *op. cit.*, p. 362. Reporting on one of these clashes, Faik Konitza wrote: "We must fight the Young Turks, who are the personification of the dragon (*koutchedra*) in our folk tales. But if tomorrow the old Turks reappear on the political scene, let us turn against them. True, there are some honest individuals among them. Yet, old or young, Turks are Turks, i.e. they are, as the latin adage goes, (bread) of the same flour (*eiusdem farinae*)." Cf. *Albania*, Vol. XII (1909), p. 43.

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Early on students and workers attempted to dynamite Stalin's statue in Shkodër. Alia responded with more half-baked reforms, which mocked the people's hopes for substantial changes. The usual evening promenades began to look increasingly like peaceful rallies. One day people of all ages and classes rushed into foreign embassies seeking political asylum (July 1990). The police opened fire. The first exodus was followed by many others, sensationalized by the international media. Alia purged some conservative members of the Political Bureau and reshuffled the cabinet. This emboldened students, who took to the streets. They demanded the removal of Enver Hoxha's name from the University in Tirana. When their demand was rejected, they went on a hunger strike and set in motion a chain of events culminating in a general strike which paralyzed the state. Alia gave in: he purged half of the Political Bureau and introduced political pluralism (December 13, 1990). A week later, the Democratic Party (DP) came into being. On February 20, 1991 a group of students toppled the gigantic statue of Hoxha in the capital's main square, to the jubilation of a crowd of 100,000 people. The police did not intervene. The Hoxha cult was finally over.

When students first took to the streets in Tirana, they requested a meeting with Alia. Innocent as they were about Stalinist diplomacy, they needed advice from someone experienced, who would act as their advocate. The choice fell on a cardiologist and university professor who had supported student demands: Sali Berisha (a Kosovar). Since Alia also comes from a Kosovar family, and considering Berisha's respectable party status, his role as a mediator made sense. The students wanted to have their own party. Berisha proposed a more representative party in which students would be the main force. Among the students who toppled Hoxha's statue, and acting pretty much as their main leader, was Azem Hajdari, also a Kosovar — someone from the same North Albanian tribe as Berisha, and one who has acted as Berisha's deputy in his capacity as the DP's Vice-President. Was the foundation of this party another Kosovar exploit — the outcome of a gentleman's agreement between an old coservative communist and a younger liberal communist, with an added input of a dissident communist student? Initially the DP's leadership was composed almost exclusively of renegade members of the Marxist-Leninist Party, some of them sons of old conservative communists still well entrenched in the party apparatus. It is unclear whether this was also the case with the Young Turks. Yet both renegade communists and the Young Turks rebelled against their elders' corruption. In both cases it was basically a generational conflict characterized by opportunism: the renegade communists opposed

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Hoxhanism in the name of democracy without being themselves democrats, much as the Young Turks opposed the Sultan's regime by posing as liberals. Similarly, both the Young Turks and the renegade communists did not initiate the revolutionary movements they led.

Shortly before the first elections (March-April 1991) the communists changed the name of their party to "the Socialist Party" (SP). By manipulating the results of the elections, they managed to secure the two-thirds majority needed to elect Alia President. One of the first actions of the SP-dominated parliament was to contain pluralism by delaying recognition of a Shkodër opposition party called the Popular Islamic-Christian Party (PICP).[9] A deal was worked out between the two parties in parliament: the SP would veto the registration of an extremist SP fraction on the condition that the DP did not protest the "suspension" of the PICP. The rationale for shelving the PICP's recognition was the party's religious character. But religious parties are an ordinary phenomenon in democratic Europe. The undemocratic character of the two parties became even clearer shortly thereafter when they denied registration to a Greek party on the grounds that it was "ethnic" — something entirely normal in democratic Europe. Clearly, by time the second elections took place the DP had yet to learn the ABCs of democracy.

Some 18 parties and associations participated in the second elections (March 23, 1992). Since many of them were registered very late (the DP did nothing to expedite their recognition) they could not obtain the 3-4% of votes needed to claim a seat in the new parliament. The only way for them to enter parliament was to attach themselves to the DP, a tactic used profitably by the SP during the first elections. But the DP made it a virtue not to associate with other parties, except two of them: the Republican Party and the Social Democratic Party. These two parties had already participated in the first election, but had failed to gain a single seat since most of their members and sympathizers voted for the DP to increase its chances to win. This was a commendable choice in that party interests were put aside in favor of the overriding goal of defeating communism. Since the defeat of communism remained on the agenda in the second elections, and considering that a DP victory was by no means certain, it was imperative for the opposition parties to form a democratic front.[10] This is how the communist dictatorship ended in

9. *Dielli* (The Sun) published PICP's letter of protest addressed to the US Secretary of State in the periodical's August-September 1991 issue.

10. This was emphasized by *Dielli*. See especially Niko Kirka, "Atdheu në rrezik" (The Country in Danger), in *Dielli* (October-November 1991).

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Nicaragua (something hardly attainable had the various democratic parties run separately). An opposition running as a democratic front was bound to have greater chances to win: dispersal of votes favoring the adversary would have been avoided and a sense of strength generated by a multiparty alliance would have encouraged undecided voters to vote for it. The bulk of the peasant vote, which in the first elections went to the SP and insured its victory, would this time go to the democratic front. Pluralism offered more options than the single party system. Yet the DP chose the latter, thus leaving itself open to legitimate charges of having subordinated national interests to party politics. Far from being in the spirit of pluralism, the DP's alliance with only two opposition parties was a mockery of it, since the two parties in question were ruled by ex-communists as was the DP.

The second elections' results were completely the opposite of those of the first. The DP obtained about 70% of the seats. The two allied parties each obtained one seat, with the bulk of the rest going to the SP. Considering that in the first elections this party obtained 67% of the seats, the SP suffered a humiliating defeat. This reversal, however, cannot be seen as a victory for democracy. Democratic gains are slow and painstaking, whereas reversals of this kind indicate political immaturity. The self-styled democrats running the DP are no more democratic than the old communists are socialists. Changing names does not necessarily change the essence. Habits of thinking and acting cannot be changed so easily. One cannot be expected to go to bed as a communist and wake up a democrat. The saber-rattling begun in the first parliament will go on in the new parliament, often degenerating into insults. Since there is no democratic tradition in Albania, the conflict between the two parties will remain a family quarrel with renegade communists as the new rulers and old-guard communists representing the opposition.

Commenting on the second elections, a well-informed English political research center had this to say: "The democrats have no clear social, diplomatic, or economic policies of saving Albania from the current chaos. . . . Berisha yesterday made two statements that do not augur well for the profile of the new government. He stated that, in the spirit of national reconciliation, he would not purge ex-communists from the state apparatus. This ostensibly intelligent approach sits badly, however, with the anti-communist rhetoric of the electoral campaign: the DP ia a party of former communist intellectuals, but its supporters are vengeful youth, who want blood sacrifices for the crimes and missed opportunities of the past. Berisha's other statement is a constant theme of his:

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the plight of Kosovar Albanians. He will offer thereby citizenship to all ethnic Albanians, bringing relations with Serbia and Macedonia to a crisis point."[11] This he may indeed do, considering what Milosević is doing to Bosnian Moslems. Once the battle in Bosnia ends, it will be the turn of Moslem Albanians to bear the brunt of Serbian wrath. And what can the Albanian government do but come to the Kosovars' rescue? This prefigures another bloody war in the Balkans.

While divided along tribal lines, Kosovars have come to develop a strong sense of collective identity. Beginning with the League of Prizren (1878-81), Kosovars have been the vanguard of Albanian nationalism. Their predicament under Serbian domination has made them all the more determined to unite with Albania, even by conquest.[12] Hoxha's Albania has been but a stepmother to Kosovars: it has incited them to provoke Serbs and challenge Serbian rule, but it has imprisoned them when they have sought refuge in Albania. Berisha will not do that: he is not another Hoxha. Yet democratic proclivities are not his forte.

Albania's predicament is similar to Rumania's. The latter is also ruled by former Stalinists who pay democracy only lip service. The difference is that Iliescu and his men plotted against Ceausescu and toppled him by risking their lives, whereas Albania's new rulers risked nothing. All they did was to ride the crest of a revolutionary wave started by students and upheld by workers' strikes. How long will the DP rule last? The Young Turks' government ended after four years of sham experimentation with liberal and democratic ideas. DP rule may last even less in view of its difficult task of running a country in shambles. The new leadership has been vociferous in blaming its elders, implying that they will be put on trial. Yet opening files can be suicidal, since the new leaders are all more or less tainted.

It was naive to think that Alia would be an Albanian Gorbachev: he had neither the intelligence nor the determination. The Albanian diaspora in the US, representing the only viable alternative to help create an opposition in Albania by first organizing it in the US, failed to take that initiative. For its part, having become the representative opposition party in Albania, the DP made the error of entering a coalition government,

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11. "Albania: Communists Ousted," in *Oxford Analytica* (March 24, 1992).

12. "Already in the 70s and perhaps due to an earlier tradition, an idea took shape among Kosovars. According to that idea, they are destined to play an 'awakening role' also with respect to Albania itself. Tirana's fear of the Kosovars as well as its strivings to establish good relations with Belgrade rather than Prishtina is rooted, apart from economic considerations, in that idea." Victor Meier, "Discrimination Makes One Self-conscious," in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (December 5, 1985).

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thus emasculating itself. Consequently, today the party is vulnerable at least on three points. One is its tendency to monopolize political power — something at odds with democratic pluralism. Secondly, the DP's reputation is tainted by its leaders' association with communism. Thirdly, the DP is a *parvenu* in the history of Albanian dissent: an intruder which, as such, cannot aspire to lead the country. This last point is particularly damning in that it reveals the DP to be a careerist party with little understanding of national needs and interested only in exercising power. By agreeing to govern the country with other opposition parties, not merely with two of them founded and ruled by former communists, the DP would have deflected the charge of power monopoly while also giving legitimacy to its leading role in a democratic front. What the DP has failed to accomplish, however, may very well be done by some other party not yet represented in parliament. Such a party could be one of the three so-called "historical" parties: the National Front (*Balli Kombëtar*), the Royalist Party (*Legaliteti*), and the Independent Bloc. All three have been bitterly anti-communist. Since the first two were founded during the Italian occupation of Albania and were engaged in the liberation struggle, they have a greater chance to attract much of the vote that went to the DP. The initiative to create what might be called the Democratic Bloc, however, may be taken by any opposition party.

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Special Section on Poland:

Introduction: Shock Therapy and Its Discontents

David Ost

Finally, real information about Poland is becoming available. The first years following the collapse of communism found scholars as confused as what they were studying. Nice-sounding slogans of "democratization," "marketization," "privatization," "civil society," and "cutting back the state" substituted for empirical studies. Political analysis meant little more than reporting the statements of the various new political figures and parties dancing on the post-communist stage. And that was concrete compared to discussions of economic developments, more concerned with one's attitude to "shock therapy" than anything actually happening.

This is beginning to change, as the following contributions show. Instead of accounts of government policies, we have accounts of how various social groups have responded to the transition. Instead of speculation about the "danger" of working class militancy, Kloc recounts exactly what Polish workers have and have not done in the two years since the neoliberal program went into effect. Marciniak speaks of conflicting models of trade unionism that have developed since Solidarity came to power and shows why they are all unsatisfactory, unable to deal with the complexity of the transition. Kuczyńska explores the other side of "the new class struggle" — the budding capitalists. Who are they? What kind of political influence is exercised by this class-in-formation? Bauman speaks about "liminality" or social indeterminacy to unravel the riddles

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of post-communism, especially the peculiar dilemmas facing intellectuals, as these one-time heroes of the revolution are now (for many) the representatives of a new class trying to legitimate a new repressive order. Finally, Wedel explores the role played by the West and its institutions of benificence. What actually happens to all the funds allocated for Eastern Europe? Whom does aid really aid?

All these contributions, as well as the larger discussion in Poland of which they are an integral part, provide a new understanding of the process of post-communist reforms. They all express reservations about the predominant strategy that focuses almost exclusively on universal privatization, the rapid elimination of the state sector and the empowering of a new market elite. This caution stems not from *a priori* ideological commitments but from an assessment of what two years of "shock therapy" have actually produced.

As the post-communism era unfolds, perhaps the critical drama is being played out at the level of the firm. Changing the behavior of firms was the main goal of the Balcerowicz plan. By freeing prices, liberalizing trade and slashing subsidies, firms were supposed to start behaving according to market rules. Neoliberal planners expected that many state firms would not be able to survive. Indeed, that was the outcome they sought, for they were convinced that most state firms were hopelessly inefficient. The ones that proved their worth were slated for rapid privatization. In this way, market planners anticipated a rapid transition to an efficient market economy based largely on new private enterprise. With the demise of state firms, state expenditures were to be drastically reduced and private enterprise would provide the tax revenues this reduced state would need.

Reality, however, has unfolded rather differently. State firms have turned out to be surprisingly resilient, privatization has proceeded more slowly than anticipated, and state funding needs have remained high. As a result, the state has had to rely for revenues on the very state sector it is trying to eliminate. According to critics, these developments make the neoliberal agenda not only ill-advised but self-defeating. Even Balcerowicz, who lost his job as Finance Minister after the October 1991 parliamentary elections, agrees that his plan did not yield the expected results. Allegedly, the main problem was that too many state firms managed to avoid bankruptcy, e.g., by responding to a strict monetary policy by running debts with each other when they could no longer do so with banks or ministries.

For Balcerowicz' critics the problem is not with the firms but with the

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state. What is ruining the economy, they charge, is not state firms' attempts to survive, but the state's insistence on confiscating revenues from them to stay afloat.[1] In other words, the problem is broader — a catastrophic and largely unanticipated fiscal crisis of the state that the government has tried to address through heavy taxation of state firms at the expense of state-sector workers. This seems to be the central paradox of the neoliberal program. It precipitates a fiscal crisis that makes the state increasingly dependent on those it seeks to destroy.

Reports of the death of the state in Eastern Europe have been greatly exaggerated. After all, it is the state that is managing the huge process of market transition, devising the ways in which industry is to be privatized.[2] Moreover, promoting economic growth leaves the state with a considerable number of tasks. It must build an infrastructure able to promote business investments, deal with disasters such as vast ecological devastation left behind by the old system, and provide citizens at least some basic entitlements (if not the full gamut of cradle-to-grave subsidies, at least social security, unemployment and basic education).[3] It must also provide all the other trappings of statehood, such as a large diplomatic corps and a new police and judicial system. But how is the state to pay for all this?

The Polish state ran into problems with finances because of the recessionary policies central to the Balcerowicz plan. The recession was driven largely by a plummeting of demand, brought about by two policies central to the neoliberal plan (as well as conditions for Western aid): free prices and the liberalization of trade. As a result of the first policy, many goods suddenly became unaffordable to millions of people. As a result of the second policy, the opening of borders to non-tariffed foreign goods, those people who could afford high-priced Polish

1. One of the reasons state firms have survived is that many of them have already undergone successful market restructuring without changes in ownership. By seeking to drive state firms under before they have a chance to restructure, shock therapy endangers not only the weak firms but potentially strong ones too. Thus the critics respond that the state should help existing firms adapt in order to succeed in the new environment.

2. Paradoxically, it was under communist rule that the state played a minor role in this process. But the strategy of letting *nomenklatura* managers work out privatization methods resulted in a number of *apparatchiki* enriching themselves. The outcry against that process made the post-communist state take over the process.

3. Social security expenditures will soon prove an even greater burden, since the ratio of pensioners to workers, according to OECD estimates, is expected to rise from about 15% in 1990 to 25% in 2025. See John Campbell, "Reflections on the Fiscal Crisis of Post-Communist States" (Working Papers on Transformation Processes in Eastern Europe, No. 11, Cracow Academy of Economics, 1992), p. 10.

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items could now buy preferred Western ones instead. The crowning blow came with the collapse of the Soviet market. Domestic production declined almost 40%, severely eroding the state's tax base.

Privatization was advertised as a panacea. A private sector boom would revive the economy and rebuild the state's tax base. In the long run that may be true. For the time being, however, the emphasis on privatization has only worsened the fiscal crisis, since all private investments qualify for generous tax breaks. Meanwhile, the private sector has largely been able to evade paying taxes thanks to another crucial aspect of the neoliberal plan: reduced regulations.

On the whole, neoliberal policies have left the state starved for revenues. It has turned to the state-owned enterprises[4] and, in particular, to workers in the state sector. The weapon of choice has been the "excess wage" tax or *popiwek*. As Kloc shows, the *popiwek* has been the direct cause of most labor conflicts in the past two years. It establishes a wage norm for a given firm or sector and then taxes all wage increases above that up to 100%. For example, a firm might be paying 100 workers 1 million *zlotys* (about $90) per month, for a total pre-tax wage bill of 100 million *zlotys*. If five workers retire and their skilled replacements can only be hired for an additional 500.000 *zlotys* each, the firm can pay them the additional sum only if it pays an equivalent sum into the state treasury as excess wage tax.

The *popiwek* was originally intended as a way to prevent state-owned firms from "eating" profits in the form of wages, driving up inflation as a result. It was based on three assumptions — that workers would irresponsibly demand unrealistic wage increases, that a management unchecked by owners of the enterprises would give in to these demands, and that wage increases were a waste of money better spent on something else. None of these assumptions has been borne out. As Kloc and Marciniak demonstrate, on the whole workers have shown considerable responsibility during difficult economic times, as can be seen by their remarkable self-restraint during two exceedingly painful years. As for the second point, since state firms already operate in a market environment, managers' incomes depend on a firm's well-being

4. More correctly, these are "unowned" rather than "state-owned" firms. Although formally owned by the state, since 1989 these firms have been completely on their own, free to set prices, find markets, hire and fire workers, and invest wherever they choose, with responsibility neither to plan nor to (non-existent) ministries but only to local enterprise employee councils. The state takes over only when firms ask to be privatized, at which point the Ministry of Property Transformation — a kind of "anti-ministry ministry" whose goal is to sell the firm to private owners — takes over.

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even without ownership stakes. Moreover, the market success of a state-owned firm will easily translate into the personal success of its managers when the firm is eventually privatized. In other words, state enterprise managers do have an interest in rational management.[5] Finally, contrary to the view of many intellectuals, wage increases are an essential part of a sound market restructuring program. They are used by firms to procure skilled labor and establish a competitive wage structure, not just as devices to keep irrational workers from striking. By making it difficult for firms to use wage policies in a constructive manner and by taxing them heavily when they do, the *popiwek* has often obstructed healthy economic restructuring.

If it is not economically necessary to a thriving private economy, why then is the *popiwek* still in place? One important reason is that it helps alleviate the fiscal crisis. For despite the high tax rates, firms regularly exceed the acceptable wage bill and pay enormous sums into the treasury. The *popiwek* thus helps subsidize the state when other sources of revenue are drying up. Nor is it the only way the state survives off state-owned firms. Since non-privatized firms are considered to be using state property, they are also required to pay "dividends" on the capital they are said to be "borrowing." According to some estimates, up to 90% of state firm income, which could be devoted to productive investment, is confiscated by the state through these two taxes. *Popiwek* and dividends combinted account for some 20% of Poland's state budget.

The problem with the neoliberal program, therefore, is not that it is wrong but that it is incoherent. The single-minded commitment to privatization prevents state firms from restructuring because it forces the state to rely on these firms for income. The insistence on promoting the growth of a capitalist private sector, without a strong capitalist class fighting for itself, leads the state to penalize workers in state-owned industry and, by eradicating workers councils, to make it difficult for all workers to defend themselves. According to critics, workers bear so many costs not because market reforms demand it but because an erroneous reform strategy needs it as a cover for its own shortcomings.

Those protesting neoliberel shock therapy are not "naive" critics "nostalgic" for the communist past. What the following section makes clear is that the critics are committed to a healthy marketization and a

5. They may also be more talented in this regard than private entrepreneurs. As Kuczyńska notes, managers in the state-owned sector are more highly educated and more familiar with international markets than their counterparts in the private sector.

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constructive restructuring of the firm. They oppose only the irrationalities of a neoliberalism that creates havoc at home by needlessly weakening domestic industry[6] and dangerously alienating most of the population. The problem is not capitalism but the attempt to impose it according to ready-made blueprints, blithely treating entire sectors of an economy as necessary sacrifices of a brave new world without taking account of a country's real situation.[7] The entire post-communist experience demonstrates that it is this approach, the essence of neoliberal shock therapy, that can lead the population to reject marketization *in toto*, with devastating results politically and economically. We see this again in the strength of the Right in Slovakia, the communists' electoral victory in Lithuania, and the current turmoil in Russia.

Critics of neoliberalism are usually considered "radicals." In fact, all they claim is that development must take place according to where the economy actually is, not where the planners would like it to be. If we look at this from the perspective of the classic Soviet industrialization debate of the 1920s concerning how to accelerate accumulation, the neoliberals, ironically, play the part of the Preobrazhensky-Trotsky Left Opposition, with one crucial twist: where the Soviet Left argued that primitive accumulation can only take place at the expense of the peasantry, the neoliberals say that it must be at the expense of state-sector workers. Critics of liberalism appear as the *followers* of NEP, arguing that healthy development must be based on where a country and its people actually are, not just where the authorities would like them to go.

The following section helps make clear just where post-communist Poland really is. It is this, and not wishful thinking, that must be the starting point for critical analysis and policy recommendations alike.

6. In light of this inevitable consequence of shock therapy, while Wedel may be right in seeing the West's aid for privatization and liberalization as a mistake, it can also be interpreted as part of an effort to keep Poland in state of perpetual dependence.

7. "Designer capitalism," in David Stark's apt phrase. See his "Path Dependence and Privatization Strategies in East Central Europe," in *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 6. No. 1 (Winter 1992).

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The Polish Predicament: A Model In Search of Class Interests

Zygmunt Bauman

Popular wisdom accuses revolutions of infanticide. The charge of parricide, however, would be more appropriate. All-too-often the children of the revolution thrive at the expense of their parents. Since revolutions disrupt routine procedures and accelerate the flow of events, children turn into parents on a pace that defies the common view of generational change. Thus, in the short span of the revolution, parricide tends to be repeated many times over. Yesterday's children are today's parents and thus ripe for the chop. Far from being a one-time event, revolutionary parricide becomes a "permanent" feature of public life. Its persistence is the surest sign that the revolutionary process has not yet reached completion.

Sedimented in modern consciousness as welcome events, revolutions call for a favorable attitude — few mainstream political camps today describe themselves as "counter-revolutionary." When they speak of abortive or defeated revolutions, their vanquishers deploy a long string of dismissive epithets ranging from "riots" and "disturbances" to "rebellions" and "mutinies." To assure their rights to the title of "revolution," insurgents must first win. Since revolutions are narrated by triumphant revolutionaries, the narratives tend to be inside stories. They all aspire to the pattern of the "Glorious Revolution": outdated rulers admonished, chastised and forced to listen to the clamoring of the new, or — if stubbornly sticking to their guns — replaced by alternative elites able and willing to follow the call of the times. It is not against such revolutions, however, that the charge of parricide

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is lodged. These are not the only revolutions, and extrapolating their experience may serve the self-legitimating needs of other revolutions well, but would hardly account for their different trajectory. Such other revolutions are marked by *the separation between the interests that brought the fall of the old regime and the interests which the new one serves and promotes.* These revolutions take place in two stages. In the first stage, the old regime is toppled; in the second, a new regime emerges, by fits and starts, among the ruins. In between, there are only ruins and disoriented dwellers.

In the Void of Liminality

Many years ago Arnold van Gennep suggested[1] a tripartite scheme to analyze the rituals that simultaneously produce, reflect, and announce the transfer of a person from one socially defined position to another. The first stage is "separation," during which the person tends to be stripped of all trappings of the previous status; the last is "aggregation," during which a new role is acquired and new rules come into play. There is, though, an in-between stage, the stage of "liminality" (*limen* means "threshold" in Latin), where neither the "old" nor the "new" rules apply. Liminality is not determined, neither is it determining. Rather, it is a break in determination.

With an important proviso Van Gennep's scheme may be useful in analyzing the "parricidal" brand of revolutions. "Rites of passage" assume a person moving between fixed "structures"; mobility is invested with meaning by the fixity of the existing positions. No such assumption can be made if the "passage" is performed by society. Fixity and mobility cannot be visualized as separate conditions. The old structure does not survive the movement and the new one is not "fixed" before the movement starts — its "fixity" is but a sediment of mobility.

Particularly relevant here is van Gennep's insistence on the unavoidability of the mediating "liminality" stage which separates the dismantling of old from the aggregation of the new order. In Victor W. Turner's rendition, liminality is "necessarily ambiguous": in case of the rites of personal passage, liminality is "frequently likened to death, to being in the womb, to darkness, to bisexuality, to the wilderness, and to an eclipse of the sun or moon." When cast in the condition of liminality, the persons traveling from one position to another are

1. Cf. Arnold van Gennep, *The Rites of Passage*, trans. by Monika B. Vizedom and Gabrielle L. Caffee (London: Routledge, 1960).

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stripped of all socially meaningful attributes determining identity. For this reason "their behavior is normally passive or humble; they must . . . accept arbitrary punishment without complaint. It is as though they are being reduced or ground down to a uniform condition to be fashioned anew . . ." The foremost characteristics of those cast in the liminal condition is the state of a *tabula rasa*: "The ordeals and humiliations" to which they are submitted "represent partly a destruction of the previous status and partly a tempering of their essense in order to prepare them to cope with their new responsibilities. . . . They have to be shown that in themselves they are clay or dust, mere matter, whose form is impressed upon them by society."[2]

The key idea here is that in systemic revolutions[3] there is no direct road leading "from the "dismantling" to the "aggregation" stage. The first process peters out in the quicksand of liminality; in which stable aggregations have yet to form and from which they must later extricate themselves. The moment society is sunk in the liminal condition, there is no way of predicting the shape of things to come. The forces that authored the dismantling of old societal forms are exhausted; they meet their demise the moment their task has been accomplished. They do not, and perhaps cannot, survive the system they brought to destruction. In the formless magma in which they dissolve new forces eventually crystallize: hastily invented traditions provide (in retrospective narratives) their only link with the past.

As Slawomir Majman wrote in the wake of the abrupt demise of the last *Solidarity* government headed by Jan Olszewski: "Three years after that June of hope and enthusiasm (i.e., the establishment of the first *Solidarity* government in 1989), the post-Solidarity camp has compromised itself thoroughly through constant quarrels and retributions. . . After three years, the post-Solidarity camp is tired of power . . . like all revolutions, this one is rapidly growing old. . . . Why has blindness befallen people who used to fight together for a common cause? Why does something that began in exultation, end with the triumph of mediocrity?"[4]

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2. Victor W. Turner, *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (London: Routledge, 1969), pp. 95, 103.

3. "The *systemic* character of recent revolutions in Eastern and East-Central Europe is in that the social forces which led to the downfall of the communist power . . . are not those that will eventually benefit from the construction of the new system. Forces whose interests will gain from the working of the new system will need to be brought into existence in the process of system-construction." Cf. Zygmunt Bauman, *Intimations of Postmodernity* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 157-58.

4. Slawomir Majman, "Beginning of Thermidor," in *Warsaw Voice* 24 (190), p. 8.

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In 1989 *Solidarity* won: its enemy toppled, the road to new life was wide open towards what the nation wanted but was not allowed to enjoy. . . Today, it is *Solidarity* that lies in disgrace, its gallant heroes occupied with vilifying their brothers-in-arms of yore and cutting each other down to size. In the eyes of the crestfallen nation, the parents of the Polish Revolution become indistinguishable from the old establishment. The fate of the Hungarian *Free Democrats* or the Czech *Forum* has not been very different.

In May 1992 Adam Michnik, the unimpeachable voice of conscience of the anti-communist revolution, appeared on the French TV alongside the man he did more than anyone else to overthrow: General Jaruzelski, who had come to Paris to launch the French translation of his reminiscences. Michnik and Jaruzelski talked to each other amicably, without difficulty, and seemed to agree on most points. The audience was shocked; some were furious with Michnik. What they failed to comprehend was that Michnik and Jaruzelski were integral though mutually opposite partners of the same historical discourse. Only together, in their conflict, could they gestate the discourse which led to the dismantling of communist legitimacy, and it was within that discourse that their respective historical significance was in turn constituted. The resolution of that conflict was the end of the discourse. With the fall of communism, the discourse lost its subject matter. In front of the French cameras, *both* Michnik and Jaruzelski *reminisced*. Their past struggle tied them to each other more closely than Michnik's victory tied him to those who gleefully flocked to partake of the victory's fruits.

Michnik and Jaruzelski, *Solidarity* and PUWP, Free Democrats and the by now almost forgotten hapless reformers of the post-Kadarian party — all belonged to the *dismantling* phase of the systemic revolution. Some of them emerged from that phase as winners, others were defeated, but all entered the uncharted wasteland of liminality as homeless.

Reform Through Suicide

Poland's quandary is perhaps more acute than that of its Central-European neighbors. In Poland, as Henryk Domański recently reiterated the by now trivial observation, "there is no section of society to which the government may direct its promises hoping to stimulate economic activity."[5] This is the experience shared by all post-communist societies; everywhere the anti-communist revolutions

5. Henryk Domański, "From Class to Class," in *Polityka* 24 (1832), p. 3.

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adopted the pro-capitalist label with no native capitalists to wear it and virtually no *Bürgertum* to covet it. But the Polish situation is aggravated by a factor which (thanks to Poland's pioneering role) the neighbors had neither time nor need to acquire: an active, self-confident, militant and well-organized working class and peasantry, conscious of its strength discovered and tested in the recent victory over communist powers — and determined to resist all powers daring to overlook it. It was the Polish *Men of Iron* who made the Czech revolution so *velvety*, while sparing the Hungarians even the trouble of night vigils at Vaclavske Namesti.

These differences notwithstanding, all the national revolutions were both indigenous and contrived. They were *indigenous*, in as far as the communist nation-states collapsed one after another under the load of dissent they bred yet could not contain, and demands they promised to satisfy yet could not meet. They were *contrived*, as the intensity of disaffection was beefed up by essentially imported values and its postulated causes were given a foreign name.

Communism preached and practiced the state-monopoly of justice (to wit, distributive justice as the core function and *raison d'être* of state power, demanding that power to be dictatorial). Monopoly, however, meant sole responsibility. Therefore, every real or imagined injustice was a potential complaint against the state; every disaffection turned into anti-state dissent. The communist state ended up displaying an uncanny ability to attract the most diverse strands of discontent and get them to form a society in which the quenching of desire is sought in the market place. The joint address for complaints overrode the deepest conflicts which otherwise would tear the opposition apart; it also cancelled (more correctly, suspended for the duration) the most incongruous incompatibilities between dissenting camps. It was this which rendered disparate forms of dissent and contentious issues *cumulative*.

Sooner or later, the mass of discontent had to transgress the system's capacity for accomodation and force it on the road to self-cancellation. This process, however, was itself deeply paradoxical. Dissent bore deep marks of its birth. It was prompted by the system's malfunction, i.e., by the sentiment that the system does not function the way *this kind of system* promised, was expected to, and should. Dissent was not anti-systemic in the content of the demands it spawned: most of those opposing the state wished to press its practice closer to its ideal; there was a sense in which their demands were more faithful to the stated principles of

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the communist patronage state than the actions of the system's managers. At the height of universal dissatisfaction in Poland, during the heyday of *Solidarity* and in the years of its legal suppression that followed, research after research found a large (and growing!) majority of the population wishing the state to deliver more on its specifically communist promise. Still in 1985, 62% of those questioned emphatically stated their preference for a "caring" patronage state, and only 29% preferred a society in which individuals themselves bear responsibility for their well-being. For that reason perhaps 50% (against 27%) considered capitalism to be a more unjust and exploitative system than their native form of socialism, and 55.7% (a ratio which grew with every successive opinion poll) approved of the introduction of martial law.[6] It was not the *content* of demands that jarred the regime's stated principles but their *volume* which exceeded the capacity of the centralized system of production and distribution, notorious for its ability to cut the unemployment lines but at the expense of ever longer lines for consumer goods. In the words of Claus Offe: "In the European capitalist democracies, queues form in front of the job offices, while in the countries of 'really existing socialism' they do in front of butcher shops. In the first, there is a 'reserve army' of workers waiting to be employed as well as a reserve army of commodities waiting for customers, while in the second the managers wait for the workers and the workers wait for consumer goods."[7] It was for the latter reason that the system could not hope to placate discontent once and for all. The only "hope of salvation" for the system was to detract from the volume and intensity of anti-state discontent by deflecting at least part of dissent away from the government, by shifting some of the state's responsibilities to the market and, more generally, to private or group initiatives — a stabilizing practice deployed by liberal democracies presiding over market-managed economies (and dearly desired by the "radical reformers" such as, e.g., Rakowski's team in Poland shortly before its electoral defeat). From the very beginning, however, this was a dubious salvation for the system: it amounted to self-dismantling, one that only the most naive rulers could hope to contain and control once in motion.

In other words, the accelerating disintegration of the communist system was in a way an unanticipated outcome of demands the system

6. Quoted in Mira Marody, "Sens sbiorowy a stabilność i zmiana ladu spolecznego," in *Legitymacja: Klasyczne teorie i polskie doświadczenia*, ed. by Andrzej Rychard and Antoni Sulek (Warsaw: PTS, 1988), pp. 280-85

7. Claus Offe, "Ist der Sozialismus am Ende?," *Die Zeit* (Dec. 8, 1989), p. 64.

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itself genetated — demands shaped in the image of the system in which they were born. The dissenters made demands that in principle (and certainly within the limits of the dissenters' vision) required a strengthening of the managerial role of the state. It was not fully understood by most that it was precisely that managerial role, already stretched beyond its capacity, which stood in the way of the opposition's demands. The truth of the matter was on occasion seen clearer by the communist rulers than by their opponents: in their inchoate attempts at "reform" (ceding the task of satisfying needs to the market) the more far-sighted among the rulers found themselves deserted by the very forces of dissent whose demands the planned measures were meant to meet. The Jaruzelski-Rakowski plan of releasing the economy from pernickety governmental control was overwhelmingly rejected in a free popular vote. Similarly, no one sitting around the Warsaw *Round Table* (and not merely for tactical reasons or because of fear of reprisal) proposed to dispose of state ownership and to float the responsibilities of the patronage state. Blue- and white-collar protesters alike objected to the shabby existence meted out under the auspices of state-administered justice. What they wanted, however, was more justice in state administration, not abdication of state responsibilities. It was far from clear that they were prepared to trade off state-guaranteed job security for the consumer joys they demanded.

These were to be the first victims of revolutionary parricide. The dismantling of the communist system did not just brush the dust of drabness off their daily existence, but tore apart its very foundations. Polish workers who flocked under the banners of *Solidarity* were part and parcel of the absurd centralized system their protest was about to sap. It was the economic absurdity of the system that kept them in existence. They were bound to go under with the rulers they toppled. In its first "dismantling" stage the anti-communist revolution accomplished what the first phase of revolutionary passage should accomplish: it dislodged the structures allocating identity and positions, and set society afloat in the shapeless brew of liminality.

As Walter Benjamin wrote, the face of the Angel of History "is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from the Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the

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future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress."[8]

The effort to "make whole what has been smashed" was the very storm that made the "wish to stay" impossible to implement. The state of liminality was not what was sought. Its invisibility was a condition of "progress." It was not in the name of liminality that the dismantling stage of the revolution was undertaken.

To complete the paradox of the anti-communist revolution, the grievance that made the masses into the gravediggers of the communist system stood no better chance of rectification under conditions that emerged after the system's collapse. Neither the crews of the communist-built industrial dinosaurs nor the state-tied farmers got what they bargained for,[9] and to rub salt in the wound they got much they did not want, e.g., mass unemployment or cancellation of state credits. When the celebration fizzled out and the dust settled, most found themselves worse off than before what was proclaimed to be their victory. By force of habit, they addressed their complaint to the state, now managed by yesterday's dissidents. This time, however, the powers that be refused to acknowledge responsibility. The state stopped being a "caring" one before its wards stopped needing care: it abandoned responsibility before its subjects ceased to be its clients. Exactly like their predecessors, the new rulers could not devise a policy which would cater to any of the unsatisfied interests. As for the policies they could devise, there were no interests likely to be stimulated by them. Politically, liminality is a time of mass apathy and of the massacre of elites.

The Wandering Stimulus and its Avatars

A few years ago, when the velvet revolution was still a dream, Milan Simecka complained that "we here on the eastern border of the West will just have to go on dutifully playing our roles as victim's and outsiders of history."[10] History is written by the winners and the strong. Thus for

8. Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations: Essays and Reflections*, trans. by Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken. 1969), pp. 257-58.

9. In his analysis of the post-revolutionary plight of Polish farmers, Andrzej Koraszewski wrote: "In September 1989 the Polish village not only knew already that the new government had no agricultural policy, but also that it believed that the threat to the farmers' existence offers an excellent chance of slighting any demands coming from that occupational category." See *Wielki Poker* (Warsaw, PWN 1992), p. 34.

10. Milan Simećka, "Another Civilization? An Other Civilization?" in George Schöpflin and Nancy Wood, eds. *In Search Of Central Europe* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), p. 161.

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some time now the writing of history has been the West's prerogative.[11] Those left outside the Western narrative cannot but agonize over their plight which they perceive only as deprivation — a deprivation defined by what "the West" stands for and what, accordingly, "the East" feels lacking. Under Lenin and Stalin, it was electrification, steel works, tractors and technical skills. Under Yeltsin, it is Macdonalds, Woolco, Sun Holidays and Virgin Records. For Simecka, Tolstoya and others like them, "the West" is a land where politicians do not expropriate thinkers and artists of their professional prerogatives and do not forbid them to write and paint what rich patrons enable them to do. It also means emancipation of thinkers and artists from social responsibility and political engagement — a comfortable novelty, when compared with that "West" admired from afar by past generations of "Eastern" intelligentsia.

Under "Eastern" conditions, in the midst of the post-communist liminality, the thinkers' and the artists' search for the postmodern freedom from social duty (or, as Philippe Genestier recently put it, for "disconnection of the registers of ethics and aesthetics"[12]), so seductive in the West but not yet tested in the East, casts them in a politically engaged situation. Reluctantly, they must assume once again the traditional role of "Eastern" intelligentsia: that of spiritual leaders, guides and teachers of "the people" stuck in obsolete values and resentful of "progress." As things stand, they must even take the role of active politicians. Once again they must tell "the people" what is good for them and how to get there. And if talking is not enough, they must legislate them into the new and better world they are reluctant to enter on their own. The conditions for postmodern emancipation of intellectuals are still far away and "the people" feel little motivation to go there. They are ill-prepared to enjoy the insecurity, unemployment, unfamiliar loneliness and other sacrifices. Like in the good old bad times, when the smoke of factory chimneys was greeted by the intellectuals and made the object of poetic elation, unaided "the people" cannot be

11. "In the popular imagination" wrote Tatiana Tolstoya, "the West, where the sun goes down, is a corridor to another world, a bewitched location . . . The line that divides East from West is a magic site where people are transformed. . ." See "Tsar of All the Answers," in *The Guardian* (June 25, 1992), p. 25. This was so for a long time — if not for the "Russian popular imagination," then for its spokesmen: since Peter the Great through Herzen and Plekhanov to Lenin and Stalin, Gorbachev and now Yeltsin.

12. Philippe Genestier, "Grand projets ou méoiocres desseins?," in *Le Débat* 70/1992, p. 90.

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trusted to determine what would make them happy, travel where they should without being instructed or (if need be) pushed. Therefore, even postmodern intellectuals must play the thoroughly modern role of those who are in the know and fight for the position from which they can tell "the people" what they do not know — and with authority.[13]

Arnold J. Toynbee described the intelligentsia gestated along the *limen* between the coveting and the coveted civilizations as the "class of liaison-officers" or "a transformer class."[14] The intellectuals of the *limen* "were products and symptoms, not of natural growth, but of their own societies' discomfiture in collisions with an alien Modern West." Toynbee's summary of the intelligentsia's past record was a cautionary tale. Since the "modern" is synonymous with the "middle class" ("western communities had become 'modern' as soon as they had produced a *bourgeoisie* capable of becoming the predominant element in society"), the intelligentsia of the *limen* wished to emulate the form while having no access to the content that could sustain it; "The Kerensky regime was a fiasco because it was saddled with the task of making bricks without straw: making a parliamentary government without having competent, prosperous, and experienced middle class to draw on."[15] In so far as modern liberalism was the form of life of free *bourgeois* producers, and postmodern democracy is the form of life of free *bourgeois* consumers, the "Eastern" intelligentsia that preached and promoted these forms in generational succession had to deputize itself for the non-existing "historical subject" of the world it set about to build.[16]

There is little doubt that the life of the affluent West, "as seen on TV," holds a tremendous and unqualified attraction for "the people," even if not briefed to this effect by the native intelligentsia. What is not

13. As Kennedy has suggested, it may be that intellectuals, raised to positions of political authority on the wave of the revolution, "by necessity return to their role in the beginnings of modernity; providing legitimation for the suppression of popular wants on the basis of knowing the public's true needs." Cf. Michael D. Kennedy, *Intellectuals, Intellectuality and the Restructuring of Power after Modernity and Communism*, forthcoming with the University of Michigan Press.

14. Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. 5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 154.

15. Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*: Abridgement of volumes VII-X by D.C. Somervell (Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 185-87.

16. In the current postmodern predicament, the premonition of this need to deputize has manifested itself in the "Eastern" intellectuals' predilection to portray "*społeczeństwo obywatelskie*" (literally: "society of citizens"), a distant travestation of Ferguson's *civil society* or Hegel's *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* (i.e., societies formed by free bourgeois producers), as the site of political democracy — as a territory managed primarily by makers and distributors of ideas).

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so clear is the form this attraction takes. The very plenitude and putative accessibility of material goods arouses desire. But do those other aspects of life which go with the enjoyment of consumer goods, still totally unfamiliar in the East, share in this seductive power? Western consumers seem to take such nuisances in stride without complaining; presumably, the pleasures of consumer life — of life as consumption — are ample enough to outweigh the displeasures of its spiritual price. This is not, however, the predicament of the post-communist East, squeezed between the fall of the standards of living and the rise in unemployment. Would-be consumers are asked to pay the full price of consumer bliss, while the date of delivery is not even in sight. Little wonder that the Russian emigrée Vladimir Voinovich found on his recent visit to his homeland that "everybody there wants to be rich, but no one wants to earn money."

Little wonder also that the brief, spectacular, carnavalesque honeymoon between the intelligentsia and "the people" is by and large over throughout the post-communist world. Once more, things have fallen in line with the logic of life in the *limen*: intellectuals (whether in or out of ministerial offices) are at last returning to their usual complaints against witless and mindless "masses" notoriously unable to see what is good for them, while the "masses" are back to their habitual half-wary, half-derisive view of "those men with briefcases in the capital" who do not know and would not care anyway what real life is truly like. The present break of communication between the educated elites and the "masses" has, however, certain important new features. It occurs at a time when the fast disappearing patronage state is far from losing its hold over the popular imagination.

The toppling of the communist power was to a large extent a perverse vindication of that hold. The communist state advocated social engineering. The massive delegitimation of the regime was an eruption of accumulated distrust with communist management. In some perverse way, however, it also expressed the deeply ingrained belief that collective well-being ultimately depends on what state rulers do, that *l'état peut tout*, and for this reason it should remain the obvious address of collective grievances. The educated classes joined popular protest with a different agenda. Informed of, and impressed by, the rapid discreditation of social engineering (particularly state-managed engineering) and the dramatic rise of neo-liberal philosophy in the West, they have been converted to the old, recently resuscitated rhetoric of the inherent wisdom of nature and the futility of all attempts to tinker

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with the "natural course of events" by political means.[17] As Andrzej Koraszewski put it, in Poland intellectuals are busy curing diseases afflicting others countries. Thus, proof of competence in today's Poland is the ability to move freely in the realm of problems experienced by countries at a different level of development."[18]

In all fairness, the polarization of the "intelligentsia" and "the people" is not simply the fault of the collective snobbishness of the educated classes in power. External coercion also exacerbates innate imitating instincts. Post-communist governments have little freedom to choose their policies, even if they wished to do so. A strict regime has been imposed by the IMF, world governments and world bankers, none of which brooks local initiatives gladly unless they contribute to making the locality hospitable for unbridled market forces. Caught as they are between the devil of the impatient population at home and the deep blue sea of the world financial centers, the elites presiding over impoverished post-communist economies have virtually no room for maneuver. There is little choice left even for those members of the new elites who know or suspect that "wealthy countries destroy more than they create when they export their economic programs and their values to the developing world."[19]

As Winicjusz Narojek has argued in his remarkably insightful study of the "post-communist utopia,"[20] the decline of the "socialist welfare state" presents a grotesque spectacle: "the populist euphoria is largely the result of official propaganda and the claim of omnipotence of by now demoted rulers, while the abandonment of dreams to improve the world and of the previous forms of social organization is preached by elites which include a large number of people who only recently advocated socialist construction." The irony here is that it is the intellectual elite, which praises the "invisible hand" of the free market and

17. As Hirschman has pointed out, the philosophy behind the recent revival of the essentially right-wing argument against the state's excessive ambitions and social engineering in general is twofold: sometimes the social world is viewed "as a highly volatile universe, in which every move (in the sense of a chess game) attracts numerous and unpredictable counter-moves"; some other times the social world is seen "as remarkably stable, structured by immanent laws which human action is incapable of modifying." Cf. Albert O, Hirschman, "L'argument intrensigeant comme idée reçue," in *Le Débat* 69/1992, p. 106).

18. *Wielki Poker*, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

19. Walter Schwarz, "Beware the Rich Bearing Gifts" (a review of three recent studies of the effects of "exported development"), in *The Guardian*, 11 (July 1992).

20. Winicjusz Narojek, "Utopia postkomunistyczna," in *Główne Problemy Dzisiejszej i Przysztej Rzeczypospolitej* (Warsaw University, 1990), pp. 274-79.

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condemns all political interference with the spontaneous wisdom of nature, which has to *enforce* changes against the wishes, or at least without the active cooperation, of the "masses." At this stage there are remarkably few people interested in freedom from the state outside the creative intelligentsia, which reads it as freedom from censorship and state-enforced criteria of artistic propriety. It can also count on the support of the small number of budding entrepreneurs, often practically indistinguishable from speculators and double-dealers, who interpret the situation primarily as freedom from public scrutiny and eccessive taxation. What is lacking is a broad constituency able to enjoy the pleasures of consumer choice. If anything, full shops make things worse: they document the insignificance of the gains made so far and the exorbitant price that has to be paid for uncertain future gains. Ostentatious display of affluence combined with the still vivid memory of the "delivering state" combine into an explosive mixture; it threatens that third freedom which underlies the rest: *political* freedom. For the time being, it results in the intellectual leaders of the anti-communist revolutions being squeezed out of the freely elected parliaments by rabidly nationalist-populist forces and post-communist guardians of nostalgia.

As John Kenneth Galbraith has pointed out, the continuous democratic approval of the kind of social order which heightens class differences has been achieved in the West thanks to the growing number of citizens who may reasonably expect a better deal from the free market than from any of its alternatives. For the first time in modern history, and due largely to the remarkable success of the welfare state, their number now exceeds that of those who cannot do well without state-managed rectification of the outcomes of market mechanisms. The first easily out-vote the second. Consequently, the new *contented majority* has vested interests in enhancing the sacred rights of individuals and in maintaining political freedoms. Democracy, as it is understood and institutionalized in the West, is safe in their hands.

This is an unprecedented situation. In the previous stages of modernity the defense of inequality called for some curtailment of democracy and especially voting rights (recall the panic among the English educated classes in the wake of the two British reform bills of 1832 and 1867). Non-exclusive democracy, i.e., the universality of rights, has always resulted in the growth of state re-distributive interference and led to the creation and expansion of the welfare state. Combining universal political democracy with a state that leaves social integration to blind market forces was considered impossible — and it is, unless a majority of

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the people is content with the way the market attends to their livelihood.

Alain Touraine has forcefully reiterated the all-too-easily forgotten truth that in the West a very long period of brutal capitalism preceded the organized and in the end successful attempt to establish a degree of social control over the economy.[21] The initial savagery was eventually overcome by the establishment of a solid system of respected impersonal laws, enforced by a strong state and sustained by a popular morality closely approximating Weber's worldly asceticism. None of these conditions are available in Russia or elsewhere in post-communist Europe. A strong state and a respected legal system seem remote. The lack of a respected legal system is most daunting as the countries in question enter their post-communist history prompted by postmodern values rather than the postponement of gratification in the name of future gains. The communist regimes were the last defenders of an asceticism predicated on delaying gratification for a better future (although in a "collectivized" form significantly different from the orthodox Weberian variety). This was one of the main causes of dissent as Western consumers were increasingly gaining access to postmodern facilities. According to Touraine, the combination of the absence of the necessary conditions for a socially controlled economy and the pressure of postmodern consumer ethics may result "not [in] a capitalist economy, but in a free-for-all, where speculation, black market and criminal monopolies will keep the country at ransom while production continues to fall."

Zdzislaw Krasnodebski has defined the current state of the post-communist East as "waiting for the supermarkets."[22] The latter have arrived, but nothing seems to have improved. One still needs ration cards (this time disguised as cash) and these are cruelly honest and thus socially explosive. Instead of providing the comfortable self-deception of the old-fashioned ration cards "that bureaucratic distribution has let us down again," they immediately reveal just how poor one is and how much inequality there is.

The Morning After

The revolutionary parricide can be interpreted in individual terms. Those who advocated revolution are blamed for the rude awakening following the euphoria of political victory. But in systemic revolutions

21. Cf. Alain Touraine, "Les deux tâches de la Russie postcommuniste," in *Le Monde* 3 (July 1992), p. 2

22. Cf. Zdzislaw Krasnodebski, "W oczekiwaniu na supermarkety, czyli upadek komunizmu w świetle postmodernistycznej filozofii widziany," *Przelom i Wyzwanie: Pamietnik VIII Ogólnopolskiego Zjazdu Socjologicznego, Torun 19-22.09.1990* (Warsaw: PTS, 1991), pp 146-52.

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the parricidal tendency is also aimed against whole classes of people — the same social forces whose resistance bankrupted the old regime. They are the first to pay the price for the post-communist utopia.

As *Gazeta Wyborcza* reported April 25, 1991, 91% of the Poles did not attend a single political meeting since "the end of the revolution" — a period during which the first multi-party electoral contest and the presidential campaign took place. These were elections conducted in the full glare of the rapidly "westernizing" media. The number of people who voted was small by comparison with the excitement of the brief yet spectacular anti-communist popular activity which led to the change of regime. New political parties spring up in Poland almost every day. Yet more than 90% of the people keep their distance.

The notorious "us vs. them" outlook, considered to be the most pernicious socio-psychological product of the communist patronage state, emerged virtually unscathed from one of the most profound political shifts in recent history. Shortly after the change of state power, this outlook reemerged with a vengeance, turning against those who had led the battle against the communist regime. In the presidential contest, the chances of the opposition leader Tadeusz Mazowiecki to better the political adventurer Tyminski were greatly diminished by the "stain" of his brief governmental tenure — a tenure long enough to strip Mazowiecki and other former dissident leaders of the once whole-hearted support of the social forces that had brought them to power. In accordance with the way of thinking inculcated by the long rule of the patronage state, the rulers were held directly responsible for the growing list of collective and individual sufferings. Particularly affected were those sectors of industrial labor which played a decisive role in toppling the communist regime. Mistrust of rulers is in direct proportion to the intensity with which popular expectations are focused on a state still assumed to be omnipotent.

Today artists, writers and scholars collectively pay the personal costs of the collapse of the patronage state. The first to go in the retreat from the patronage state were the huge sums the state used to spend on cultural institutes, theaters and the visual arts (for instance, the communist state in Poland fully funded 69 state repertory theaters.) Most "thick journals" — the favorite outlet and main source of income for the intelligentsia — were heavily subsidized and consequently boasted an artificially inflated readership. Today they have all folded, along with dozens of weeklies representing all shades of literary and artistic opinion. Publishing houses were told to learn commercial self-sufficiency, to

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which they reacted by promptly decimating their publishing plans. Theaters were told to stop running deficits or to close down. With the price of seats shooting up, the size of the audiences plunged. The buildings once occupied by state censors are now dedicated to worthier purposes. The old comfort of state-guaranteed financial security, however, also disappeared with the office of the censor. As a member of the Polish anti-communist resistance put it, "under state censorship culture suffocated; without funds it cannot breathe."

As far as the cretive intelligentsia is concerned, there are several reasons for easiness.The income of writers and actors used to depend on the job performed, not on its commercial success. The latter was not a decisive factor in publishing or repertory decisions. Writers never learned the complex art of churning up bestsellers. Formulae for securing box-office success were the last among their worries. Now they must learn fast. But learning the new art of commercial success also means to drastically revise the criteria of artistic evaluation and self-assessment. The established hierarchy of literary and artistic prestige is unlikely to survive the new standards. Thus far there are few, if any, signs that new literary and artistic figures are about to surface. There has been an appalling dearth of outstanding new artistic works normally expected to erupt once the shackles are broken. The disappearance of political censorship did not do away with constraints: the old familiar constraints have only been replaced by new unfamiliar ones. Now publishers do not reject books for fear of political reprisals, but they still reject them for reasons having nothing to do with artistic merit: they reject them for fear of financial losses. Authors who once learned how to dupe the censors must yet learn how to deal with market-wise managers.

The second source of anxiety is that the new possibilities to undertake artistic experimentation is rendered meaningless by the dearth of commercially viable outlets. Unlike wealthy Western countries with their prestigious galleries pandering to the rich, impoverished post-communist countries have no artistic market able to absorb anything beyond pop-art. Thus in these countries the danger of the "levelling down" impact of the commercialization of culture is much more real than in the West. The creative intelligentsia, which had most reasons to resent state interference, is finding out that it exchanged the devil it knew for the deep blue sea it does not know.

The third reason to worry is the redundancy threatening a large part of the creative intelligentsia now facing a much smaller audience. The

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levels of cultural consumption, inflated by lavish subsidies, cannot be preserved once "commercially viable" prices are charged for literary journals or theater tickets. Still a distant threat to other professions, unemployment has become a serious problem for a good part of the cultural intelligentsia — hence the joke, circulating in Warsaw intellectual circles: "an ancient curse has been recently discovered: May your dreams come true."

Behind all this there is the most elusive of anxieties: a vague feeling that something important has been lost. It is clear now that state censorship was an oblique recognition of the power of words. Intellectuals did *matter*. Naturally, the surveillance was resented and intellectuals were nauseated by the "we know better" bureaucrats. They saw both as a collective expropriation and a sort of "liquidation of the intelligentsia as a class." Intellectuals rebelled against such a state of affairs in the name of returning the control of culture — the spiritual life of the nation — to its "natural owners." It did not happen after the successful revolution. Let go by the state, the cultural life of the nation did not fall into the intellectuals' hands. As in the West, it has fallen prey to the vagaries of the commodity market. Indeed, it has been commercialized long before the promised privatization of state-owned industrial assets.

This new expropriation has been all the more painful because it has caught the victims off guard. It adds insult to injury: it renders intellectual work politically irrelevant. As if to rub more salt in the wound, those intellectuals wishing to bask in the glorious memory of the recent past when they (at high personal cost) labored full-time for the liberation of the people, receive little appreciation and find themselves among the favorite scapegoats of the revolution's parricidal urge.

Thus the impending generational change in the ranks of intellectuals may result in bitter recriminations in the course of which the most recent history of Eastern and East-Central Europe will be re-evaluated and thoroughly re-written. The wisdom and the accomplishment of the spiritual fathers of the revolution will be subjected to close scrutiny according to standards *different* from those they used to deploy. For one reason or another, they will be condemned by the following generation.

Scenarios and Actors in Search of Each Other

The bitterness and venom of political life "at the top" is a result of the difficult predicament of the elites: there is a yawning gap between what elites can offer and what their constituencies want. Better yet, there are few if any constituencies in sight for the "realistic" programs the elites

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put together, while *potential* constituencies await feasible programs which could forge them into real constituencies. If there is something the post-revolutionary political elites share, it is the view that there is little hope "the masses" will agree with what has to be done to re-make them into voters agreeing with what will have been done. Therefore, in the foreseeable future far-sighted rulers will have to ignore what "the masses," in their present form, think and feel.

One danger about such a belief is that its holders argue among themselves in the absence of any substantial standards by which their actions may be judged and, if necessary, corrected. Without due respect for democratic procedures, things may go haywire, while mutual recriminations and backbiting may go on without bringing closer the day when conflicts of opinion can be consensually resolved. Another danger is the political void between the elites' daily preoccupations and those of the men and women who should be, but are not, their constituents. In such a void, particularly at a time when redundancy and poverty are the only rapidly growing socio-economic indicators, the voice of demagogues offering simple solutions may find a resounding echo. Another more serious problem is the state's weakness. The dissipation of whatever has been left of governmental authority and the disdain for laws no one is able or willing to enforce is becoming the normal way of life. Post-communist states find themselves in a debilitating legitimation crisis since the preferred legal-rational legitimation is not being recognized. But the plight of contentious charismatic legitimations is not much better. Thus far they wilt and fade as soon as they are born, as disintegrating hopes poisons the political atmosphere.

All post-communist regimes find themselves in a predicament of liminality in which *everything may happen yet little can be done*. The absence of a strong government and of established rules of political conduct leave open an unusually wide range of alternative scenarios, while incapacitating the forces willing to pursue any of them consistently. One scenario challenging all historical precedents is the conjunction of universal political freedom and parliamentary rule with the dismantling of what the French call *l'état providence*, the English call the *welfare state*, and the Pole call *państwo opiekuńcze* (the caring state) in a situation in which less and less members of the body politic can attend to their own survival using the impartial services of the consumer market. One of these ill-fitted factors must let go. Yet all the internal pulls and external pushes militate against their separation.

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The Unintended Consequences of Western Aid to Post-Communist Europe

Janine R. Wedel

Foreign aid is a powerful vehicle for influencing the policy — and the psychology — of the recipients. It can threaten delicate balances within the recipient countries, and this may deflect attention from the real issues confronting them. The impact of any aid depends on how the donor structures and implements it, as well as on how the recipient's cultural and institutional capacities shape the ways aid is put to use. The donor's agenda, strategies and priorities are inevitably altered by the political and socioeconomic context into which aid is delivered. Aid is never neutral. It is not and cannot be simply a means of introducing outside expertise or physical goods into a country. Since the 1989 collapse of the Communist Bloc the European Community (EC), the US and other Western nations have allocated some $38 billion to help Eastern Europe's transition to democracy and a free-market economy.[1] With the end of the Cold War, the West pledged more billions in aid to the republics of the former Soviet Union. Yet little has been established about its consequences.

Western aid to post-communist Europe has generated new dilemmas, both for donor governments accustomed to assisting Third World nations and for Eastern Europe, which hitherto had relatively little experience with international aid agencies. Following Communism's collapse

1. This figure does not include the $14 billion provided by international financial institutions (the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development). Cf. CRS Issue Brief: *Eastern Europe: U.S. and International Assistance* (Congressional Research Service, July 20, 1992).

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in Eastern Europe, both donors and recipients had great expectations for what aid could do. One reason Poland was the first to receive Western assistance and is still the largest recipient is because it pioneered the stabilization reforms of the region. Similar strategies have been deployed in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the second and third priorities of Western donors, as well as in Bulgaria, Romania and Albania. Yet, three years after the initial enthusiasm, disillusion is sweeping the region. Leaders like Lech Walesa have publically denounced Western efforts. "We believed their slogans," said Walesa at a Council of Europe meeting, "and we were cheated." To understand the reasons for this disillusionment one must examine the circumstances under which aid has been provided and how it is structured, the environment into which it has been delivered and how it has been disbursed and received.

In 1989 talk of democracy, markets, nationhood and "return to Europe" filled coffeehouses from Budapest to Sofia. Having thrown off the yoke of communism, people felt they could do anything and that the transition would be simple, straightforward and painless. For a while many East Europeans expected that, with a little financial help from their friends in the West, the new leaders could transform their devastated economies overnight. Rita Klimova, a former Czechoslovak ambassador to the US, characterized the popular expectations of her countrymen at that time: "People imagined the US to be a kind of rich Soviet Union." What she meant was: "We expected to have a relation of dependence, but with a lot more cash coming our way."

Misleading information about the amount and priorities of Western aid circulated throughout Eastern Europe. In Poland, $30 billion was cited as the amount of aid the West had promised, usually without the crucial qualification that this figure included export credits, stabilization funds and loans, and that the aid was for technical assistance, generally in the form of advisers and consultants going to the region to offer their services. Western VIPs streamed in to anoint the leaders of the new democracies. Such encounters were important to both East and West, but they may have unwittingly buttressed unrealistic expectations.

The mainstay of aid to Eastern Europe is technical assistance. The overall problem concerns the consequences brought about when such aid — seen as the transmission of objective knowledge — is passed from one society and complex of institutions to another. What come into play here are the points of interaction between the cultural and institutional frameworks of donor and recipient societies. These serve to pattern how and under what conditions knowledge is relayed and the impact this can have on the recipient's political, economic and social

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institutions. The particular context of the East European case is framed by how that region's institutions and movements, working to bring about democracy, the rule of law and market economies, interact with Western aid agencies that are almost as unprepared for the situation.[2] The crucial question here is: What difference does the technical assistance make with respect to the recipients' institutions and social processes, both as a stabilizing agent and as an agent of change? Many East European officials have concluded that their countries are "technically over-assisted." Marek Kozak, a Polish official who monitors foreign aid, claims that the main benefit derived from the consultants' presence is not from the expertise they provide but the introduction of hard-currency bearing Westerners into the local economy.

The donors' strategies and structuring of aid delivery can affect the consequences of aid efforts in several ways: 1) How does the relation between donor commitment and actual disbursement affect expectations and disappointments among recipients? In the East European case, the actual disbursement has fallen far short of original commitments.[3] This has led many in Eastern Europe to wonder about "who stole the goods." 2) What effect does politicizing donor approaches to aid have in creating cynicism with respect to the long term implications of Western aid? Donors of bilateral aid in particular prefer "demonstration projects" with high visibility rather than projects that might be more useful. 3) How does the political and administrative context of the donor community , as exemplified in contract procedures, facilitate or constrain the passage of assistance to the recipient? The EC, for example, stresses balance among EC member countries so that consulting firms from certain countries do not receive all the contracts. This works against hiring the best consultants. In order to meet quotas, Irish and Portuguese firms with little experience are often chosen over qualified British or French companies. The PHARE program, administered from Brussels, is constrained by regulations designed to ensure "fairness." Often, however, these regulations work against effectiveness. Similarly, the internal bureaucratic procedures of the US

2. In the case of US assistance to Eastern Europe, the organizations involved are largely those with little expertise in Eastern Europe (e.g., the Agency for International Development [AID], through which all US assistance is administered), or little experience working in foreign aid (e.g., other US agencies such as the Departments of Energy and Labor, and the Environmental Protection Agency).

3. Average disbursement rates for nine G-24 countries and the EC were 11% for total committed assistance to Central and Eastern Europe. Cf. Raymond Barre, William H. Luers, Anthony Solomon and Krzysztof J. Ners, *Moving Beyond Assistance* (New York: Institute for East-West Studies, 1992).

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Agency for International Development (AID) often prevent the donors from providing what East Europeans have requested. 4) What effects does the absence of recipient participation have on public opinion and on the recipient's ability to participate persuasively in operating an aid program? In the case of Western aid to Eastern Europe, especially US assistance, aid recipients are seldom allowed to participate in the process in a way that would make a difference. The procedures through which Washington chose three jumbo consortia to assist in privatization efforts in Eastern Europe have baffled many East European officials. The Polish government, for example, was not consulted about the structure or strategy of this assistance or the particular firms chosen, and was not informed even after the decision was made. Stefan Kawalec, Poland's Vice Minister of Finance, says he found out about these contracts after the selection process was completed, and then only by accident. As a result: "A number of consultants are looking for profitable assignments that may be completely unnecessary. . . . The US government is paying them to provide advice to us without asking us, even without informing us." The one time the Ministry of Finance itself tried to use the contracts, it was turned down by Washington.[4] Despite numerous fact-finding missions from Washington and the presence of well staffed AID bureaus in Warsaw, Budapest and Prague, local officials complain that their suggestions are systematically ignored. US aid programs in Eastern Europe have the worst reputation and have been the least effective because, in comparison to their EC and British counterparts, they allow recipients the least input.[5] 5) How does the implementation process serve to reinforce, circumvent, modify, frustrate, work with or otherwise transform institutions and aid objectives? In some cases, US aid works around the institutions it is supposed to help. Although direct aid to the private sector makes sense when promoting private businesses, trying to avoid any dealings with governments is counterproductive when, e.g., privatizing state-owned resources. 6) Has there been a discernible and coherent overall policy and strategy within a given national or international initiative among the various parties involved? The organizations and consultants carrying out grant aid projects, which are administered through AID, do not

4. Janine R. Wedel, "Beware Western Governments Bearing Gifts," In *The Wall Street Journal Europe* (January 14, 1992).

5. See Janine R. Wedel, Congressional Testimony (Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives), April 7, 1992; and *Poland and Hungary: Economic Transition and US Assistance* (General Accounting Office, May 1, 1992).

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follow any coherent, overall strategy. Even though, in order to have an impact on the region, the US had to make a long-term commitment from the outset, its approach has been short term.

Conditions in recipient countries, such as fragmentation in public administration and the fact that East European ministries often lack familiarity with the protocol and politics of donor organizations, contribute to frustrating the practical implementation and monitoring of aid. Assistance is arriving amid considerable confusion in policy, public administration, economic processes, the rule of law, and private-institution evolution. There are frequent changes of leadership, rapid employee turnover, and the elimination and transformation of government agencies. In Poland, which has had four post-Communist governments, an official who has kept his job for more than six months is often considered a true veteran. Usually little distinction is made between civil service and politics.

Moreover, forty years of government from above have debilitated feedback mechanisms and weakened intra-organizational communication and institutional flexibility. There are few adequate formal information channels within and among agencies — even among those engaged in overlapping activities. Different officials in a government or even in the same ministry may work on the same aid project without even knowing it. With the rules vulnerable to manipulation, the identity of the players often unclear, and governments beset by instability, a government's ability to be an effective policymaker and public administrator is further weakened. Given these conditions, it follows that aid programs might work more to reinforce confusion and crisis in governance than to stimulate political and economic institutions. By examining some areas that donors have targeted as priorities, it is possible to observe how the interplay between donor prerogatives and local conditions might prevent aid efforts from having their intended effects.

Privatization in Eastern Europe has come to be seen by many in the West as the measure of progress. Major donors have made privatization a priority on the assumption that, if the West helps with privatization of their economies, everything else will fall into place. Consequently, many progress reports circulated by the donor community emphasize privatization. Yet, without institutional infrastructures such as banking and taxation, privatization and even thriving private enterprise cannot rebuild post-communist Europe.

How have East European managers and other recipients of "techniques" adapted them to their situations and how do they maximize or subvert such assistance? The recipients' perceptions of the limitations

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and possibilities of technical assistance operate to circumvent, facilitate, or otherwise alter donor policies and priorities. For instance, East European officials and managers have raised the following criticisms of the use of foreign aid funds to further privatization: 1) Western consultants tend to be ill-equipped to handle questions arising in the legal jungle of East European property ownership; 2) they tend to undervalue national properties, especially with regard to the skill and experience of employees, the importance of trademarks, and the value of land;[6] 3) the relation between Western consultants' valuation of properties and their clients' investment interests is suspect; and 4) well-conceived consultants' reports have only the most tenuous links to the practicalities of implementation. Plans for the privatization of a particular factory are useless if they are ill-informed, if changed conditions make these plans obsolete, or if the resources or political will to implement them are lacking. Some Polish and Czechoslovak officials say that most sectoral plans have been useless because they have not been funded. As Jiri Hodik, coordinator of the PHARE privatization program in the Czech Ministry of the Economy, put it: "No enterprise wants to receive technical assistance without investment. . . . There were many studies without useful results because there were no investments."

All this is taking place in an environment ill-equipped to monitor such activities. Regardless of whether these criticisms are valid, they contribute to a popular perception that "foreigners are here to rip us off," and that "assistance money is not used to help us" but to line the foreigners' pockets. This implies that cultural and political responses in Eastern Europe to the "objective" approach to technical assistance

6. Asset valuations are extremely difficult even in stable, well-functioning market economies. Given the uncertainties of East European economies and the fact that their markets have not and do not function well yet, their asset valuation methods are far less reliable. To exacerbate this problem, East European countries have failed so far to come up with coherent standards for conducting valuations. Moreover, in this "paradise for spies," much sensitive information, such as trade secrets of state-owned companies, is available on request to foreign consultants who may use it for whatever purposes they wish, including selling it to competitors. Foreign consultants and aid agencies can — and do — obtain the kind of sensitive information that in their home countries would be considered industrial espionage. For example, an East European executive of a steel company managed to obtain some information about his country's steel industry from a foreign consultant — information he had been unable to obtain on his own. There is a potential conflict of interest in the fact that Western consulting firms doing asset valuations of East European companies often have clients who are potential buyers for those companies at the prices the Western consultants have set. A classified report put out by NIK, the Polish government's chief auditing agency, concluded that accepting the recommendations of consulting firms with respect to asset valuations has sometimes resulted in significant losses for Polish enterprises and has harmed the national treasury.

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have contributed to reaction against foreign investment and the pursuit of a more comprehensive market system.

The US and the EC have put especially high priority on supporting East European nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) founded for a variety of purposes ranging from training to community and political organizing. Although donors have envisioned such NGOs as essential building blocks of democracy, the role played by NGOs of all kinds in political, economic end social change in Eastern Europe is confused. The context under which NGOs have arisen in Eastern Europe is fundamentally different from the institutional environment in which they operate in the West and with which Western donors are familiar. For example, the organizing principle of many NGOs still favors longterm friendship or kinship networks over common interest. Many volunteer and philanthropic NGOs have been put to use to help their leaders avoid personal taxes and regulations. According to incomplete Polish government's statistics, 183 "foundations" in Poland had profit-making enterprises attached to them at the end of 1991.

These differences have consequences not only for the nature of East European NGOs, but also for donors, who might be funding something quite different from what they intended. In this context, the following questions should be asked: To what extent are the NGOs in Eastern Europe capable of achieving the objectives the donors expected or, to what extent has funding from outside intensified long-standing patterns of patronage and secret dealings that an open society was to modify? To what extent are profits being applied outside the formal missions of the NGOs, thereby subverting the donor's intentions? Once NGOs are funded, what is the trade-off between the services they provide to the public and the personal and political agendas of their members?

Donors have tended to see NGOs with an environmental focus through the rose-tinted lenses of environmental advocacy coupled with anti-communism. They have invested great hope in these NGOs because they played an important role in the political transformation of Eastern Europe. NGO leaders stepped into key government posts in Budapest, Warsaw, Prague and Sofia. Some environmental groups, such as Romania's MER, transformed themselves into political parties. Instead of promoting an environmental agenda, however, for the most part the leaders found themselves endorsing the programs of their respective post-communist governments for which budget cuts and austerity are high priorities. Hungarian environmental activist Gyongyi Mangel has lamented that: "Although all political leaders promised an ecological platform, most of them quickly forgot about it." Indeed, as

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these leaders moved to the capitals, some into cabinet posts, the environmental movement lost its steam. Memberships dropped and activism fell. A few chose to remain active, but without a common threat there were few incentives to keep these groups together. Consequently, the various movements split into cliques.

Simultaneously, Western donors targeted the environment as a top funding priority not only for the well-being of Eastern Europe but also for that of Western Europe, which is near enough to be damaged by its neighbors' acid rain and polluted waterways. Western funding underwrites the scattering of effort among small institutions that were fragmented under communism but which, if they are to encourage democracy and "civil society," should probably give way to an integrated movement in an open society.

Although the food, medicine and clothing provided by humanitarian aid are almost always seen as helpful by the donors, some East European and Russian recipients are questioning this premise. A US diplomat accompanying the aid shipments to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Moscow reported that people had little use for the cherry pie filling (without the crusts) and chili. Ironically, even in cases when goods shipped as humanitarian aid are clearly useful and wanted, they can threaten local markets by competing with domestically produced goods.

Furthermore, there are the usual problems with distribution. During the shortages of the 1980s in Poland, medical workers sometimes took medicines from relief supplies meant by Western donors for needy hospital patients and used them to treat their own patients for profit or sold them in the informal economy. So long as survival continues to depend on participation in informal distribution networks, humanitarian aid will follow such channels. In a situation in which many basic economic and legal institutions are in flux and where informal distribution channels are long-standing and sophisticated, as in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, it is nearly impossible to ensure the use of formal distribution channels based on "bureaucratic rationality." More important, if the apparent problems that raise the issue of humanitarian aid are indeed distributional ones, are the US and other Western nations better prepared to solve them than the citizens and government institutions of the recipient country? While there may be cases in the world in which social breakdown has proceeded so far that outsiders must also assume responsibility for deciding who receives aid, this is clearly not the case in Eastern Europe or Russia. Aid may serve to distract a given government from the most critical goal — the development of domestic institutions that can survive and thrive in a post-communist word.

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*Polish Labor in Transition (1990-1992)**

Kazimierz Kloc

The economic system in Poland is undergoing major changes. Its social costs are enormous. At the end of 1989 most people in Poland, while skeptical about the economic situation, were politically willing to accept quick and radical changes in the economy — even at the price of significant sacrifices and a temporary lowering of living standards. Now, however, public opinion is concerned with the deterioration of living standards and an uncertain future. According to various recent surveys, social attitudes have changed drastically and now from 70% to 90% of respondents expect an increase in social tensions.

1990 was probably the quietest of the last five years. Considering the enormous changes which had taken place, the number of strikes and other conflicts in the first 12 months of reform was relatively small. According to GUS (the central state bureau of statistics), there were 900 strikes in 1989 but only 250 in 1990. There were other labor conflicts, but not every one of them mushroomed into a strike.[1] Almost half of the 1990 strikes occurred during May and December in one enterprise: PKP (the Polish state railways). The second most strike-ridden sector was the mining industry, with about 40 strikes in November and December. Local and intercity surface transit accounted for the third highest number of strikes, about 30. Finally, there were nearly 20 strikes in the trade sector, while the other 40 or so were evenly dispersed in other sectors.

The top three strike-ridden sectors had three things in common. First, each continued to receive subsidies and had its prices regulated

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1. It is estimated that there are ten times as many labor conflicts as strikes.

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by the state. Second, these were privileged or monopolistic sectors, and thus in a position to exert strong pressure on the government. Third, each sector had been adversely affected by the government's decision to use September 1989 wage levels as the basis for determining the January 1990 pre-tax wage limits.[2] Wage increases at PKP, for example, took effect only at the *end* of 1989. Using September as the norm thus meant that PKP was burdened with a crippling "excess wage tax" as soon as the new year got underway. Together with miners, railway workers thus demanded the enforcement of previous sectoral agreements, according to which their wages had been set in precise percentage terms above the national average. We can say, therefore, that most strikes in 1990 occurred in sectors attempting to defend their privileged positions within a context of changing economic conditions.

Most strike demands concerned wages. In some sectors, workers and trade unions invoked prior agreements that the government, in present conditions, could not or would not honor. Demands also included tax breaks and tax exemptions for bonuses. Other recurring demands included the payment of past bonuses, profit sharing and the retention of particular sectoral privileges. The majority of these demands could not be met by management, to which they were formally directed. In the first half of 1990, management was afraid of wage increases, which meant a payroll tax increase and the consequent possibility of insolvency. The government, for its part, had no intention of yielding to particular sectoral demands. In May 1990 it did, however, acknowledge that some subsidized sectors (affecting transport, service and municipal workers) had been unfairly affected by the setting of September 1989 as the basis for calculating pre-tax wage levels. In those enterprises, therefore, tax levels were modified so that wages could be raised without bringing a concomitant increase in the excess wage tax.

Predictions that the new economic program would change the nature of labor conflicts and that the government would no longer intervene turned out to be wrong. Strike demands were still addressed primarily to the government and aimed at loosening the tough austerity measures that the government forced on state firms. The government's intention was to force management, in cooperation with workers' councils and trade unions, to lower production costs, alter product profile and

2. In January 1990, Poland introduced the anti-inflationary "excess wage tax" (*popiwek*). In an attempt to keep wages down, enterprises with a payroll exceeding a certain limit, calculated for each sector according to September 1989 pay levels, were required to pay a steep fine to the state treasury, sometimes up to 100% of the "excess" wages.

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cut personnel. The inevitable conflicts resulting from such policies were to be resolved at the plant level. In practice, however, in the overwhelming majority of cases, either trade unions and management paralyzed each other or they banded together against the government.

Anticipated conflicts over mass layoffs failed to materialize, as management generally avoided this strategy. It turned out to be easier to make gradual reductions through early retirement, the elimination of part-time work, and the dismissal of "peasant" workers who also worked their own farms — policies that did not provoke conflict with the workforce and unions. Employees were so frightened by the prospect of mass unemployment due to bankruptcy that they were willing to accept such gradual reductions. And yet, contrary to general expectations, there was no rash of bankruptcies of large and medium-sized firms.

Although inflation and recession caused demand to plummet, firms compensated for production declines in a number of ways, such as raising prices, locating new domestic markets (e.g., opening factory outlets and selling directly to private traders), finding suppliers with cheaper labor costs, or seeking foreign markets and foreign capital investments. If the firm's health continued to deteriorate, cost-of-living rises might be be reduced and workers might be placed on involuntary leave. But aside from the last two measures, most restructuring activities were directed outside the plant, thus guaranteeing peace between labor and management. Such internal restructuring was expected to bring tax relief and debt reduction. When management proposed radical internal changes, such as ownership changes, it often clashed with the trade unions, which called for a change of management.[3] Such conflicts, therefore, were usually resolved in favor of the workforce.

Toward the end of 1990, the condition of many enterprises deteriorated. Reduced demand and increased foreign competition limited the effectiveness of price hikes as a way to postpone internal firm reorganization. With the stabilization of the *zloty*, Polish exports became less competitive in the West. Firms producing primarily for export to the tottering USSR, meanwhile, found themselves in an even more critical situation. All this led inexorably to the great shock of 1991.

The Bielecki government[4] maintained the anti-inflationary hard money

3. According to the 1981 self-management law, which became fully binding only in 1989 when the communists lost power, employee councils were empowered to choose management in all state-owned firms.

4. Jan Krzysztof Bielecki replaced Tadeusz Mazowiecki as prime minister in December 1990, after Mazowiecki was defeated by Lech Walesa in the presidential elections of November 1990.

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policy while seeking to accelerate internal enterprise restructuring. One clever move was to retain the excess wage tax on state firms, exempting both private firms and firms in the process of being privatized. This was meant to encourage privatization and to weaken labor's resistance to it by creating the impression that privatization would mean higher wages. It was also intended as a way to strengthen managerial power and to weaken or eliminate the employee councils (according to Polish law, employee councils were automatically dissolved in any state firm that embarked on the process of privatization).[5]

According to GUS, there were 305 strikes in 1991, not significantly higher than in the previous year. Of these, 271 occurred in the first half of the year, 34 in the second half. Yet the decrease of strikes did not mean declining dissatisfaction, but only a shift in the mode of protest. The first quarter of 1991 was clearly a period of transition. Conflicts in the transport sector (PKS and MZK, with a total of 23 strikes in February 1991) took the same previous conflicts. The demands remained the same: wage increases, state subsidies, a redefinition of the enterprises' status (as public utilities), and the allocation of funds for modernization.

A new group of enterprises now undergoing a series of sit-in strikes were the PGRs (state collective farms). These firms felt doubly threatened — as agricultural enterprises and as state enterprises. In 1990 individual farmers blockaded dairies, roads, public buildings and wholesale purchase centers to which they sold their produce, etc. They demanded tariffs, the rationalization of the Agricultural Marketing Agency, and special credits for agriculture. The PGR itself advanced similar claims. Previously funded by the state, the loss of these subsidies left them in a critical financial situation. They were required to pay excess wage taxes as well as dividends on capital ostensibly owned by the state, in a context where new ownership arrangements still remain to be defined. PGR strikes focused around these three issues. There were strikes in 22 PGRs, each lasting an average of 22 days.

At the beginning of 1992, a wave of strikes (more than 20) demanded the elimination of the excess wage tax, which was considered the major obstacle to wage increases. Following negotiation, the government reduced the tax. On the whole there were strikes in 60 firms during

5. Most large-scale privatization in Poland takes place as a result of state firms themselves asking to be privatized. Once a firm prepares a privatization package, which is approved by the employee council, the firm is taken over by the central Ministry of Property Transformation. The road to privatization thus first means re-nationalization. The employee council is dissolved and the Ministry appoints a supervisory board that governs as authority of last resort until the Ministry finds an appropriate private buyer.

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February, which, along with 70 other strikes in the whole quarter, created the impression of a strike wave. The strikes against the excess wage tax were organized separately by the two main unions. The OPZZ (the union originally established by the communists) had long been demanding the revocation of the tax. Following the change in leadership (when Walesa became president), Solidarity also became more critical of the government, beginning to speak about "closing the umbrella" with which the union protected the government.

In the second quarter, the struggle against the excess wage tax gradually faded into the background. That struggle had been an expression of hope for economic improvement. Yet in early 1991 production declined sharply as a result of the collapse of exports to both the USSR and the West. A rapidly growing number of plants, unable to compete with cheaper imports or overly dependent on Soviet trade, found themselves on the verge of bankruptcy. Committed to its anti-inflationary policy, the government refused to intervene beyond devaluing the *zloty*, which encouraged exports to the West. The inevitable result of such a situation was a significant rise in the number of strikes and conflicts. After two months of quiet in March and April, a wave of protests erupted in May and June with nearly 100 strikes and a number of tough proclamations by national and regional authorities of Solidarity. A two-hour warning strike in May, in over 80 workplaces, protested the deepening recession, rising unemployment, a "pathological" privatization strategy, and other "mistakes in government policy." Each enterprise also formulated its own demands, such as for wage increases, back payment of bonuses, elimination of the excess wage tax, etc. Plant-level demands were partially accepted by management, though the latter generally rejected wage increases by pointing to the enterprise's poor financial situation caused by government policies.

Strikes in May occurred primarily in the mining industry in Silesia, Cracow, Breslau and Bielsko. In addition to the usual demands, miners called for the retention of retirement privileges and continuation of the coal allowance. A novelty of the May strikes was that demands were made directly against the government. A similar strike wave in June was caused by a new price hike for electricity and natural gas, this one affecting mainly private households. Solidarity announced another two-hour warning strike in the Cracow and Lodz regions, where the situation was particularly tense. The dominant light industries of these regions had already experienced a 40% decline in production in 1990. Further declines were now being caused by the collapse of Soviet exports, which had been the primary market for Lodz industry, and new

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domestic competition caused by a wave of imports. Unemployment rose faster here than elsewhere in the country.

In addition to the postponement of energy price hikes, the June strikes sought to force the government to agree to negotiate with the trade unions over any proposed price increases. Workers criticized the rising unemployment, said they would not accept further cuts in real wages, and denounced the phenomenon of ex-communist bosses becoming capitalists. The educational sector also went on strike. Because of a shortfall in incoming tax revenues, the state budget had to be cut. Public schools were also affected by these measures, resulting in a significant number of layoffs. Already teachers were often paid late, and there were rumors that there would be no upward adjustment of wages for the second quarter. In this context, 24 schools went on strike, mainly in Bydgoszcz. Demands included that the government guarantee the payment of wages and their upward adjustment for inflation, while cancelling the planned cuts in the education budget. Negotiations with the Ministry of Education ended with the government guaranteeing the payment of wages and bonuses, and pledging not to impose cost-cutting measures from above. Also in June, in Warsaw and other cities transport enterprises and municipal workers paralyzed public transit and trash removal for a few days. Striking workers demanded considerable wage increases and a privileged legal status for their firms providing significant financial benefits and tax breaks.

1991 also saw the first strikes in private or privatized plants. Though infrequent, they demolished the myth among state sector workers that privatization would cure a firm's problems and make wages rise. Bankruptcies of private firms, including those with foreign capital, prefigured future problems. Sometimes these firms did not even have enough funds to pay workers their wages. Interestingly, striking workers in these enterprises demanded guarantees from the state that they would be paid the wages owed them by the company.

In the second half of 1991 there were only 34 strikes, but other forms of protest intensified. Health workers, firefighters, educational employees, private farmers and miners staged hunger-strikes, sit-ins, protest marches and letter-writing campaigns. The few strikes which did occur took on a different configuration. They were long-term strikes seeking guarantees for the continued existence of a firm or of an entire industrial sector (for example, truck manufacturing in Starachowice, municipal transit in Bialystok and the aerospace industry in general). These strikes involved an increasingly large number of workers and were the result of the impact of government economic policy on industry. The

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The threat of unemployment resulting from the elimination of individual plants or entire industrial branches removed a psychological barrier blocking workers from striking. This time they were fighting not merely for higher wages but for their jobs.

During the first seven months of 1992 there were strikes similar to those of the previous year, but within a changed social and political context. At the beginning, the main issues were decreases in real wages or the rise of fixed costs for individual households. The first affected particularly state workers who had not had upward wage-adjustments since the middle of 1991. The largest professional group protesting encroaching pauperization were teachers. In January, 824 schools held a warning strike lasting 6 to 10 hours, demanding wage increases for teachers and the retention of rights of the Teachers' Charter. The second significantly larger warning strike took place February 28 and was supported by over 70% of teachers in 4400 schools. Teachers repeated the demands of January and asked for additional state funds for education. Also in January, two nationwide protests were organized separately by Solidarity and the OPZZ. These were warning strikes in 479 industrial enterprises, lasting from 1 to 2 hours and protesting price increases for electricity and natural gas. Union leaders asked for cancellation of the increases and for a pledge that any future price increases would be negotiated with workers' representatives. The new government of Jan Olszewski countered that its budget was limited, and that the budget in question had been drafted by its predecessors. It argued that increases in natural gas and electricity prices had been incorporated into budget plans with the approval of the International Monetary Fund, which demanded bringing energy costs up to world levels. On the other hand, the matter of wage increases for teachers was made conditional on parliamentary approval of the new government's budget and educational reform proposals.

On February 19, 1992, there was yet another warning strike in the PKP by Solidarity. It lasted two hours, encompassed 195 units, and paralyzed about 70% of the country's railroads. The strikers' demanded wage increases and the cancellation of a proposed plan to restructure the enterprise by laying off 20,000 workers. The remaining labor conflicts arose mainly out of the deterioration or collapse of individual industrial branches such as the aerospace industry (where the strike lasted almost two months in plants in Mielec, Swidnik, Rzeszow and Breslau) and heavy military industries. Both branches demanded that the government pay for equipment already ordered and guarantee future orders. The government, for its part, postponed dealing with

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these issues while tackling only immediate problems such as wages.

The next four months were quiet. From March to June 1992 there were only 23 strikes. This calm can be attributed to the country's political situation. The Olszewski government had come to power with a mandate of containing the recession and modifying the economic program. Failure to do so and the intensification of the crisis gradually resulted in a deteriation of social attitudes. In July a series of strikes pointed to the frustrations of various professional groups. Their indirect cause was the wage increase given to teachers and ministerial personnel. This increase only compensated these groups for earlier losses due to the suspension of their cost-of-living adjustments. Nevertheless, they also served to arouse wage demands in industry. Workers in the copper industry first began demanding wage increases, leading to a virtual general strike in this sector. Coal miners also joined the fray, and management in 28 striking mines granted pay raises without taking the firm's financial situation into account. Concessions here soon sparked protests in other sectors such as steel and auto, as well as at the Ursus tractor plant and once again at the aerospace industry in Mielec. The leading role here was played by "Solidarity '80."[6] Solidarity, meanwhile, paid for its moderate position in these strikes by having one of its local leaders carted away from the mine in a wheelbarrow.

The July events were different in two respects. First, the wage demands and agreements reached by workers with mine management were not in line with the financial situation of individual enterprises. They could be implemented only if management ignored the excess wage and lowered its dividend payments, i.e., only by measures which would have decreased the tax revenues of the already approved state budget. As a result, the government refused to accept them. Secondly, different trade unions approached the strikes differently. Solidarity continued to play the role of a buffer between workers and authorities, Solidarity 80 stood at the opposite extreme, and in the middle stood the OPZZ.

The strike wave now seems to be over. The government has agreed to deal with industrial restructuring and unemployment. Because of its overall financial situation, however, it does not have much space to maneuver. Planned price increases in energy and gas will not help. When approved, the long-term program of reducinbg the firms' debt load led

6. "Solidarity '80" is a militant off-shoot of Solidarity under the leadership of Marian Jurczyk from Szczecin. It broke with Solidarity in 1989, accusing the union of betraying its original principles by negotiating with the communists and accepting painful market reform. For a discussion of the origins of this group, see David Ost, "The Transformation of Solidarity and the Future of Central Europe," in *Telos* 79 (Spring 1989).

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to the shut-down of many firms and a host of other problems.

It has been widely assumed that recent developments would bring about a shift from a model of industrial conflict typical of the previous era to one applicable to a market economy. Political strikes were to be replaced by economic ones. This, however, was an over-simplification or simply wishful thinking. Today's conflicts in Poland cannot be explained in terms of the old categories or in terms of a neoliberal model. The most accurate characterization may be in terms of a model dealing with the transition between two different economic models. The main issues of conflict in this period, both connected with the specific problems of transition, concern: (a) the allocation of the costs of economic restructuring; and (b) the distribution of resources left over from the old system.

During the transition labor conflicts take place in several stages. The first is characterized by people's belief in the effectiveness of the proposed new market model and their willingness to make sacrifices. The second by increasing disenchantment caused by the costs of the shift and by increased social disintegration. Next, various social groups are likely to become aware of their particular interests and to begin organizing for their satisfaction. Poland today is between the second and third phases. The period of illusions about systemic transformation, when most people accepted costly economic reforms (Winter 1989-Spring 1990), is over. At that time most economists tied to the old opposition went for neoliberalism. The "market" united almost everyone. Liberal economic views assumed a quick dismantling of the old system and the immediate creation of conditions for a free market. Programs based on these premises promised a quick solution to the problem of galloping inflation.

The first steps of the stabilization program could be easily carried out thanks to widespread public support. Under different political conditions, sharp price increases, decline in consumption, and threat of unemployment would have triggered unrest, strikes and mass demonstrations. Nothing of the kind took place in Poland. Solidarity actively supported market reform and even OPZZ accepted the general idea, while stressing its role as defender of workers' interests. It is hard to imagine a more favorable situation.

Things began to deteriorate in the second half of 1990. But the second phase of increasing disenchantment began only in 1991, with a growing number of conflicts and strikes connected with the costs of the new policies. The threat of unemployment affected ever larger numbers of workers. Higher wages thus became an issue less important than keeping one's job and one's workplace functioning. People employed in state industry, agriculture or administration, i.e., most of the population, felt

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threatened particularly since privatization begun at the time tended to neglect workers' concerns. This second phase of the transition is characterized not only by rising social frustration but by an energetic search by state sector workers for new forms of action and resistance. It is not accidental that the number of strikes declined dramatically, for these had not yielded positive results. Similarly, many workers became discouraged with trade unions, though this disillusionment was accompanied, paradoxically, by high expectations for their efficacy in the future.

Further developments depend on the behavior of the main actors. Prospects are not good. Government officials still seem unaware of the social consequences of change. They continue to assume that it is possible and necessary to implement a program transplanted directly from advanced market economies, where "economic rationality" is the only sound guide. Their main response to increased social unrest is to propose *limiting* the influence of labor's representatives, as they try to persuade the public that the only alternative to their program is a state run by trade unions. Meanwhile, many workers react to the impasse by reverting to old ways, demanding government guarantees of work and pay.

The least clearly defined role today is played by the unions, of which Solidarity is still the most important. But Solidarity has suffered considerably for the protective umbrella it extended over the reform program. It created favorable conditions for the authorities but lost touch with its rank-and-file. It held months-long negotiations with the government that resulted only in the disillusionment of millions of workers hoping to improve their lot or at least secure protection from impending dangers. As a result, Solidarity not only became weaker, but also, as one of the forces supporting increasingly unpopular reforms, found itself being eased out of the state's decision-making processes.

Today Solidarity stands at a crossroads. For its own short-term interests, the government would like the union to continue its equivocal strategy of providing a working class cover for radical market reform. The danger, of course, is that this could lead to Solidarity's disintegration. The resulting vacuum would no doubt be filled by organizations with a more populist program, which might then push the country in a more authoritarian direction. Solidarity's chance lies in advocating a new social contract that lowers transformation costs (by distributing them over time) and ensures workers a greater stake in the privatization process (through employee stock ownership and other forms of participation in management). Revising policy in these two key areas — regarding the burdens and benefits of transition — is indispensable if society is to avoid extreme and extremist shocks.

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*Polish Labor Unions: Can They Find a Way Out?**

Piotr Marciniak

The crisis of labor unions in post-Communist countries is growing worse. Faced with the *leap into capitalism*, they seem helpless and defensive. This is true even in Poland, where the new elite and the new system arose out of the activity of a powerful social movement that had the form and structure of a labor union. Despite their union roots, many politicians are calling for further restrictions on the already weak powers of institutions representing working people. It comes as no news that an unprecedented dismantling of the political and economic institutions of *really existing socialism* is underway in Eastern Europe, replacing them with market and parliamentary-democratic ones. Much less of a commonplace is to draw the obvious conclusion: this unprecedented situation requires innovative, independent strategies.

We are all, however, witnessing something quite different: the intellectual terror of *obviously unique solutions* which are paralyzing creative thought and the will to think pragmatically. Such arrogance on the part of political elites, which comes from their programmatic impotence, winds up repeating the old ways of the communists — the building of a *brave new world*. Instead of solving the real problems of post-communist society, instead of setting into motion the resources this society possesses, there is a mechanistic transfer of institutions and blueprints invented and tested elsewhere. Laziness is taken for virtue, and ignorance for professionalism.

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Universal acceptance of the idea that entering the new order would be simple and obvious has also painfully afflicted trade unions. It was said: in *the brave new world* unions have a clear and definite status, they are universally respected and unerringly effective, because everyone, or almost everyone, has attained the good life. All that is necessary is to make the leap into capitalism and unions will become real unions, securing a partner for negotiations, and gaining an impressive pie to divide. Underlying this way of thinking was an offer and a threat. If unions will consent to taking this *leap*, then instantly everything will become normal, and soon unions will achieve their proper place — according to the imported plan — in the country and the enterprise. But if the unions refuse, they will assume the complete burden for the failure of reform.

At present we are parting company with the idea of the leap. Before us looms the grim reality of thousands of unsolved problems, rising social impatience, the necessity for a painstaking working out of realistic answers to concrete problems. It will not be *normal* any time soon. Neither will unions be soon *normal*, i.e., like the ones in the West. They will have to act in a unique set of circumstances and will have to work out a program accordingly. That means a program which breaks with misplaced illusions, with banalities, with "obvious solutions." To do this requires work and discussion. It cannot be concocted while-you-wait; it needs to be worked out in dialogue and in confrontation with employers and with the post-communist state. The point must be a rethinking of what has happened so far, and an attempt to overcome certain traps.

The Co-management Trap

A few months ago in the trade unions, especially in Solidarity, there was a lively discussion of options: a participatory or grievance-seeking model of action. Participation, co-management or co-responsibility was the natural attitude of a labor union regarding itself — justifiably — as the initiator and motor of the transformation. The only reasonable relation between the government which came out of the Solidarity movement and Solidarity itself seemed to be to work together to start and protect the process of systemic change. In practice, the strategy of spreading a *protective umbrella over the government* meant adopting the model of participatory unionism.

The option chosen by Solidarity proved a mistake both for the people being represented and for the union itself. In reality, co-management

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meant shielding government policies over which the union had little or no influence. Instead of participating in shaping the changes, Solidarity only took responsibility for them. Co-participation turned out to be a trap for which the union is still paying a heavy price.

Does this mean that the option itself was wrong, that the other alternative should have been chosen? Of course, it was not possible to refuse working on systemic change with the state bureacracy, even if with a certain amount of opposition. What, then, is responsible for the costly error? Without doubt, much of the blame belongs to the political elite that came from Solidarity and took on the responsibility for governing. They adopted a model of reform which had no place for unconstrained action by social actors. Reforms were to be implemented according to rules set at the top and by means of a bureaucracy directed by government reformers. Every attempt to break out of this canonic model, of opposing independent visions of reform to the one chosen by the government, led to direct confrontation. That was made obvious by the railroad strikes and the way the Mazowiecki government reacted to them.

However, considerable responsibility also falls on the Solidarity leadership, which did not see the need for making a creative effort to reform economic relations from the bottom up. They did not take up the task of transforming scattered, but often effective, efforts by activists in Solidarity factory commissions and workers' councils into forms more suitable for inclusion in a broader union-based reform program. The leadership refused any initiative in setting the direction and pace of reforms to the government. Furthermore, it gave tacit consent to the government's systematic attack on the workers' councils movement — the best point from which to begin a bottom up reform movement. Naively, the union placed its faith in the fantasy of "universal property," thereby agreeing with the governmen that a syetem based on workers' councils is an obstacle to its implementation. By doing so, the union lost a very valuable ally.

The Trap of Grievances

The opposite strategy — a confrontational demand to redress grievances — also turned out to be ineffective. This was the strategy that the OPZZ unions tried to follow. Of course, they had their own political reasons for doing so. They felt no connection to the new government which, in many ways, was a threat to them. As disillusion with the results of reform began to spread, a willingness to make demands also appeared within Solidarity.

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A consistent policy of demanding satisfaction of grievances in a time of deep systemic and structural change (and a drastic economic crisis) must obviously be very conservative in nature, demanding that everything be allowed to remain as it was in the past. The sterility of such an attitude means that it cannot count on any significant social support, nor even on understanding and approval from many union activists or the general membership. The grievance trap consists in its complete ineffectiveness in a period of chronic deep econonic crisis. The fall in production, bankruptcies, unemployment, a crisis in the *budgetary sector* [includes social services such as health care and pensions, postal service, radio and TV, subsidies to industry — the vast expenditures in what is still *de facto* a socialized system — the collapse of the health and social services — a grievance-seeking union cannot do anything about any of these. Local or "branch" strikes do not have much of an effect; demonstrations or increasing public criticism will not be effective either. The only remaining option is a general strike. But to organize something of that kind, one must ask: against whom and on what issue? The only successful outcome can be a change in public authority, which makes sense if another one can be produced which would guarantee a change in social-economic policy. At the moment there is no such political alternative in Poland.

The Professional Trap

Pushed into a defensive posture, labor unions try to save themselves by adopting a model of professional unionism. The objective here is to force on the government — at the national level — a partnership in solving the most vital problems of working people. Well-prepared union delegations, supported by expert commissions, would accordingly re-work government policy, comma by comma. Examples of this strategy are the talks currently being held between the union and the government, along with the more or less successful proposals competing with official ones, to solve specific problems (the *popiwek*, electrical power rates, etc.). Appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, this strategy will not succeed either. It is based on two completely mistaken, or perhaps unrealistic, premises. First is the expectation that unions are capable of opposing government policies with their own comprehensive, competent, and realistic solutions to all social-economic problems. If this expectation were real, then the best solution would be to change places at the negotiating table, and have the union take over. Experience shows that this is not about to happen. Not even

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the entry into parliament of a substantial number of union delegates has initiated any legislative offensive on behalf of working people.

More important, however, is the mistake in the second premise which holds that, by negotiating solutions to particular problems it will be possible to resolve any of Poland's substantive problems. This works in a prosperous country, where one or two painful problems can become the focus of government, employers, labor unions, and public opinion. In such a context, a narrowly-conceived professional union has tremendous value. If we only had to restructure the steel industry, a professional union would be the ideal solution. But Poland's situation is completely differernt. A thoroughgoing systemic change is underway, in the wake of which a pitched battle is being waged over the division of national property, the economic and political status of particular social groups, and the effectiveness of democratic institutions. What will decide whether a particular problem of wages or benefits will be solved is not its entry onto the agenda of a union-government negotiation, but the condition of national industries, the tax system and the privatization procedures. Today only the major battles are important: the small skirmishes are nothing more than camouflage. A professional union makes this diversion easier. Its achievements are therefore the exact opposite of its intentions.

The trap of the professional union is especially dangerous because it requires scores of activists and large amounts of money. The human and material energies consumed far outweigh the results. The situation remains as bad as ever. This inevitably discourages and confuses activists and union staff, as well the membership. While the participation strategy could be rejected as a political mistake, and the grievance strategy kept at arm's length, the vision of a professional union appears realistic. This will make it harder to understand why a union following this model will also be ineffective.

The Last-ditch Defense Trap

Despite being snared by a series of traps, unions are not in a hopeless situation. The very fact that they have been able to extract themselves from these predicaments with only minor damage is a hopeful sign. It is now increasingly possible to escape the professional trap. But of the two paths open, one of them — the defensive one —appears to be another trap.

Some of its elements have already appeared. In Solidarity circles it was often said that the union ought to set limits that the government

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should not cross, e.g., in unemployment. It is possible to go further and say that crossing a particular point would provoke a substantial social conflict. This is in effect a soft version of the grievance strategy. It leaves the initiative with the government and the employers, while only limiting its range. But how effective is it? One should not discount the power of magic barriers in public life, especially when they are backed by powerful social forces. On the other hand, does it make sense to stake out such limits and to mobilize people in their defense?

Even if the answer were "yes," problems arise concerning the effectiveness of this strategy and the desirability of possible outcomes. Can this approach really reverse the impoverishment of important social groups, recessionary trends, and associated unemployment? It is highly unlikely that the ruling political parties — even under threat of open social conflict — can modify their policies sufficiently to readily reverse negative social and econonic trends. Even if they made the effort, will checking the fall in living standards be enough in today's situation? Is it not necessary to point to new hope on the horizon?

While necessary as a means of mobilizing social resistance, a defensive strategy seems to be simply one more trap. Labor unions, if they want to maintain their position, must go on the offensive.

Other Ends, Other Means

A labor union offensive must begin with a response to the direction taken by the reforms of the Mazowiecki and Bielecki governments, and the social order which is arising out of them. It is not enough to use clichés such as "the market" and "democracy," "well-tested models" or "capitalism." They are meaningless. The market and capitalism exist both in Bangladesh and in Switzerland, in Brazil as well as in Sweden. What is important is to correctly diagnose the system which is being born in Poland out of the ruins of Communism. Next, there must be a clear answer to whether or not this is exactly what the labor unions want, whether they only want some of it, or whether this is a system they do not want at all. Only the first of these answers supports a continuation of the present "professional union" strategy. The other two answers require a reformulation of the reform program. Poland's future is still open. Nothing has yet been irreversibly decided. Therefore, there is still room for offensive action from working people and their representatives.

The starting point of any offensive strategy is a shift of emphasis from discussing how to modify government policies to a struggle for a

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fundamental reformulation of the reform program. Poland's future social order and how it can be brought about should be the main focus so that the intended goal will be actually attained. The discussion has to be broadened, which does not mean that it has to lose touch with reality. Quite the opposite. Only a comprehensive view of what is being negotiated, including the various economic processes, makes a step-by-step approach to the problem possible. For only in this context is it possible to address concrete demands, possible choices, and to make particular concessions.

The future of the social-economic order, involves three important issues: how to divide national property among particular social groups, the social consequences of privatization, and the modernization of the econony. Today, no labor union has definite positions on these crucial questions which, obviously, precludes all offensives or even full participation in the negotiations.

The conflict over national income concerns tax policy, which by and large in Poland is regarded as a *non-union* topic. It also concerns the state's redistributive functions. Finally, it concerns the union topic of tariff and wage policies. In a transition period this issue is extremely complicated because there is no way to avoid a significant accumulation of private capital. How fast this process should be, how much of society it should involve in order that wealth be used productively (creating new jobs), and not for conspicuous consumption — none of these questions have easy answers. They are easier to answer, however, than, e.g., the question of how to prevent the government from lowering wages in the state sector despite a constantly shrinking budget. Labor unions should have a clear idea concerning the degree of social differentiation they are willing to accept, in return for what sort of investment effort by private capital. What proportion of the national income are they prepared to redistribute through the budget, etc. It is here that the fate of teachers' and nurses' wages are really decided.

Just as important and neglected is the matter of the unions' attitude to privatization. In post-communist countries there is a huge amount of property to be distributed. The future of these societies depends largely on how this distribution takes place. Privatization might result in an extremely polarized society, separated into the wealthy and the poor; or it might result in a society dominated by the *middle classes*. If labor unions do not take part in determining what form privatization takes, it will almost certainly mean the victory of the former scenario. This is not only a problem of *enfranchising the nomenklatura*. It concerns

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the creation of the legal framework defining privatization in such a way that it will guarantee as much as possible workers' interests. This requires condiderable knowledge and vision, for often the most equitable proposals (e.g., Walesa's famous "give everyone a 100 million zlotys") lead directly to a stripping of Polish society of its wealth.

The third aspect of socio-economic policy affecting working people has to do with proposals for modernizing the economy. Its starting point is checking the recession, but it also involves a comprehensive program concerning the restructuring of antiquated branches of industry, and the development of science and technology. The world has seen various models of social organization which allow for the expansion of technology and industry in Japan, Southeast Asia and Western Europe. All of them involve an active state role, a conscious organization of scientific efforts, and educational policy, and a consciously accepted model of the organization of work. A labor union should not avoid these issues. It should not stand helplessly by in the face of proposals in Poland for an anachronistic, autocratically-managed (Fordist) enterprise, and the disciplining of working people with the whip of unemployment. Likewise, it should not be indifferent to the flight of educated people or the collapse of the education system. In a few years time all these issues will determine Poland's standard of living.

Contrary to popular opinion, the contest in Poland has been joined not only concerning the methods of change, but also their goals. Usually, however, conflicts are reduced exclusively to the technical-economic level. People are able to choose between recession and inflation, between anti-inflation and anti-recessionary policies. Of course, the dilemmas here are very important, and should not be dismissed lightly. But choices made at this level are part of a larger whole and should be assessed in this wider context.

Labor unions should develop positions on the extent of government intervention, the scope and methods of anti-recessionary policies, and acceptable approaches to anti-inflation policy. Basic to these views is the fact that they are clearly different from those of the state or of employers. This different standpoint can be developed not just by becoming aware of the variance (or, indeed, the contradiction) of day-to-day interests, but above all thanks to the ability to distinguish basic differences in the vision of the future social order — within an overall agreement on market principles. Day-to-day economic policy should not be seen as an abstraction, but always in the context of what it means for working people today, tomorrow and, most importantly, the day after tomorrow.

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Towards an Alternative

In order for unions to influence the direction of reforms they must redirect their activity. They will have to device a way for prefiguring programs, planning, nationwide action — all in long-term perspective. A union that wants to build an alternative to the predominant vision must go beyond day-to-day issues. Macro-economic issues and alternative systemic models have to become equal in importance to issues currently being negotiated with the government or employers. Such topics cannot be definitively solved by this or that position paper. They require public discussion within the union. For this to happen it is necessary to have publications, research centers, seminars. Intellectuals and politicians concerned with working people's interests have to be drawn into these union debates. Not satisfied merely with specific technical assistance, unions the world over have established these kind of relations with scientific and political circles.

Obviously, the problem is not just to work out one's own viewpoint on systemic reforms. Equally important is the ability to implement it. The precondition for this is a capable leadership able to carry out the union program — a leadership free from ideological influence from *the other side*. It is also easy to see that this strategy requires that labor unions return to politics. This time, however, unions cannot be a shield for any political arrangement, but have to build their own bridge to the political world. Influence over the legislative branch is especially important, and can be achieved in various ways. In Europe this was accomplished either by building a political party (e.g., the Labour Party in Great Britain), or by establishing close ties with one or several parties formed indepenently of unions.

So far the situation has been different. The strength of labor unions and the weakness of political parties has led the former to form their own parliamentary representation. But this solution is flawed in that it is merely defensive. Out of necessity, the union parliamentary group ends up in perpetual opposition without being able to advocate its own vision of a future Poland. What this has meant is the rule of political forces opposed to unions and working people. Having one's own parliamentary representation facilitates resistance, but it provides no opportunity to take the initiative — especially one which would exploit the means available to state authority. There have been many cases in Europe where governments have been formed by parties closely tied to labor unions and implementing programs advancing the material and social cause of working people. Why should Polish labor unions reject this approach?

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

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The Capitalists Among Us

Teresa Kuczyńska

Capitalists enjoy an excellent reputation with the Polish media. Journalists seem to have fallen for them head over heels. They stare awe-struck into the capitalists' eyes while singing their praises with such eagerness that they often embarrass them since, as is well known, these praises are not disinterested. The greater the number of supporting advertisements, the deeper the paper's uncritical affection for them. Still, Polish capitalists do not feel sufficiently pampered. They complain about being unappreciated, neglected and hindered in their work. Nevertheless, their dynamism is undeniable. A significant number of personal fortunes have been made during the short existence of a free market economy in Poland.

Seventy percent of the Polish economy is still state-owned. Yet over 100,000 new private companies have come into being, employing some 2.5 million workers. These last two figures testify both to the dynamism and the weakness of Polish capital. Its basis is mainly small, family-owned enterprises. Few privately-owned companies employ more than 1000 workers; a few hundred have over 200 employees. The rest are small and medium-sized operations.

This should come as no surprise. Although some have been in business much longer, most entrepreneurs began their careers only a few years ago, in the late 1980s, when joint ventures were first given the green light. Most of them, such as Kazimierz Grabek (according to the weekly magazine *Wprost,* the second wealthiest Polish businessman),

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started out as owners of poultry farms or greenhouses and owe their present status to those early years. The most controversial are those whose fortunes grew more rapidly. Businessmen such as Gawronik or Mikuśkiewicz have acknowledged that they made expert use of personal connections and inside information (perhaps even credits) unavailable to most other people. They had ties to Polish or Soviet security agents, which may have allowed them into places where others could not go, learn what others could not know. Others have made fortunes by using loopholes in existing regulations, or simply by bypassing them altogether. Large amounts of money are rumored to have been laundered, although there is no evidence to that effect. There are also those who have patiently built their ventures from scratch, struggling for credits and slowly accumulating their capital; and those whose talent and hard work allowed them to succeed in the West.

According to a survey by the Social Research Workshop (*Pracownia Badań Spolecznych*), less than two-thirds of Polish entrepreneurs are college educated. Studies indicate a direct correlation between company size and education levels. The larger the enterprise, the more highly educated its owner. But there are significant exceptions of individuals with little formal schooling who have built large fortunes. Private businessmen tend to be less educated than their counterparts in state-owned enterprises, 82% of whom have college degrees. Of course, in a managerial career, general education may play a less useful role than a strictly professional training. But here things get worse: 83% of private people in business have had no managerial training, either in Poland or abroad, and among the 17% of those who do, many did not go beyond a one-month crash course. Their knowledge of foreign languages is also poor: only 19% of those surveyed could speak English, 17% German. Foreign language proficiency is more common among former employees of state enterprises which transacted business abroad, and among those who used to live and work in the West. In fact, these two groups feel particularly at ease in private business, since they have acquired hands-on knowledge of its workings in capitalist countries.

While the market impact of Polish enterpreneurs should be appreciated, they have yet to become major agents of economic growth. This is due both to subjective and objective reasons. Polish entrepreneurs are not well prepared for the role they want to play; they do not have enough training and experience; they are not professionals. In addition, they lack access to capital and operate within an unstable and muddled legal system. Poor professional background often results in underestimating

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the importance of marketing in making investment decisions. They are not made according to comprehensive analyses of demand, but are influenced instead by fashionable trends. An example of this is the large number of gas stations mushrooming along Polish roads, completely out of proportion to actual needs.

New trade enterprises are constantly being created, most popular among them being wholesale warehouses specializing in clothing and groceries, although the market has clearly become saturated with those products (particularly in view of the dwindling purchasing power of Polish consumers). This emphasis on trade and brokerage, the result of the desire to make big money fast, is one of Polish business' major weaknesses. Lack of investment in manufacturing is the reason the growing private sector in the Polish economy does not create the large number of new jobs needed to absorb workers laid off from the state sector. In addition, new private enterprises do not sufficiently counterbalance the shortcomings in various state sectors.

The predilection of Polish businessmen for trade is also influenced by the fact that more of them began in state trade enterprises than in manufacturing and that they tend to gravitate in that direction. As professionals, they do not feel confident enough to invest in production. "And besides," they ask, "while attempting to invest in manufacturing, will we be able to withstand the competition from foreign goods flooding our markets (unprotected by any trade barriers)? In order to compete with those products, often sold at dumping prices, we would have to manufacture goods of at least equal quality and with lower prices, since Polish market psychology still cherishes the dogma of the superiority of foreign products compared to local ones." As the Dutch economist and Nobel prize winner Jan Tinbergen put it in his report on the Polish economy: "The former governments' greatest mistake was the lack of adequate protection for local industry. That is why production should be modernized by importing new technology, but at the same time protected from Western competition."

Despite their growing strength, Polish capitalists do not feel they collectively exert much influence on the Polish economy. They would like to make the economic system conform to their interests, assuming that what is good for them is good for Poland. Consequently, they have attempted to create a business lobby capable of defining, expressing and fostering their interests politically. They see existing trade associations as inadequate to the task: they have become fancy clubs, offering prestige and glitzy media exposure. Last May, eighteen

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CEOs of the largest private companies established the Polish Business Council (*Polska Rada Biznesu*) to elaborate and implement an economic program. They claimed they were frustrated with their limited role within the Polish economy — something incommensurate with the importance of their economic activity. Thus they sought to engage different committees of the Council in plotting economic strategies which politicians were unable to develop.

Even before this plan could be carried out, in July, these capitalists convened a Forum of Economic Organizations (*Forum Organizacji Gospodarczych*) hosted by one of the leading business associations, the Polish Capital Club. The Forum sought to determine whether Polish business should create its own political party to promote its interests or continue its present strategy of supporting friendly parties and politicians. The latter alternative was not too popular since, to quote Marek Mikuśkiewicz, the owner of MarcPol, "politicians and parties take our money, and then screw us." The project of forming a new party was eventually dropped after realizing that, even if they managed to reach an agreement among themselves, their party would be unlikely to gain any significant number of seats in parliament. In the words of Danuta Piontek, the head of the Convention of Entrepreneurs (*Konweneja Przedsiebiorców*), they adopted a minimalist agenda of "supporting those political programs favorably disposed toward us, while promoting our own politicians who can sponsor the legislation we will formulate."

One of the Polish entrepreneurs' constant demands is lower taxes (to be achieved by increasing the number of taxpayers), since high taxes inhibit investments. Here, however, some caution is in order. Low taxes do stimulate investment and boost the economy. Yet the budget cannot be funded out of thin air, and Polish society is already in bad shape without higher personal taxes. Capitalists do not want to hear this, but politicians must. In addition, without adequate income the people will not be able to purchase what the capitalists produce. The often-mentioned postwar German economic miracle was predicated on the creation of an internal market. If the national budget is to be financed only by Polish workers, then the Polish economy is doomed to stagnation.

According to the founder and president of Prosper Bank, Martyna Lisiecka-Kienz, the Polish legal system offers ample opportunities to entrepreneurs. She also dismisses Western businessmen's complaints about the difficulties they encounter in Poland, since she claims that doing business in the West is even more difficult. The economist Waclaw Wilczyński also dismisses capitalist complaints. As he put it, the world's

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entire economic history is a series of struggles by various groups for privileged social positions. As for Polish and Western capitalists' complaints about unfavorable investment policies and unstable laws and regulations, he reminds them that in a market economy only the most general rules can remain constant. Prices, wages, interest rates and taxes change along with the world economy.

Polish capitalists often accuse politicians of being unresponsive to their needs, and Polish society of maintaining a mentality deformed by socialism. But these capitalists could also be accused of the same thing. Their expectations of quick and easy profits, the way profits used to be when competition was nonexistent and supply was scarce, also betrays a "socialist" way of thinking. The same can be said of their call for government intervention to make their lives easier and of their fear of obstacles, despite the fact that overcoming these obstacles is part and parcel of functioning within a free market.

The press likes to reproach the Polish *nouveau riche* for ostentatious displays of affluence. Its image of Western capitalists is entirely different: they are supposedly appreciated in their respective countries for the socially valuable role they play as taxpayers and employers. But this is a simplification. In the first place, the rich in the West are not uncritically cherished. Since flaunting one's fortune does not win one affection, Western capitalists tend to be discreet and treat the less affluent with respect. At the same time, people in the West are more appreciative of the capitalists' role in society for a simple reason: a personal fortune usually means more tax revenues to be spent on common objectives and, most importantly, the creation of new jobs. It results in an improvement of everyone's standard of living. In Poland, the opposite is the case: capitalists get richer while society becomes poorer. At any rate, Polish people are able of thinking ahead and, in general, tend to accept capitalists. Their social status is growing, especially compared to the lowly position assigned them under the previous system. The clearer the connection between capitalists getting richer and improving everyone's standard of living, the greater the social prestige they will enjoy.

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Reviews:

Federalism and Regionalism in Europe

Detlef Merten, ed., *Föderalismus und Europäische Gemeinschaften unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Umwelt und Gesundheit, Kultur und Bildung* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1990), pp. 367.

Doris Fuhrmann-Mittlmeier, *Die deutschen Länder im Prozess der Europäischen Einigung: Eine Analyse der Europapolitik unter intergrationspolitischen Gesichtspunkten* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991), 399 pp.

Hermann-Josef Blanke, *Föderalismus und Integrationsgewalt: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Spanien, Italien und Belgien als dezentralisierte Staaten in der EG*, Schriften zum Europäischen Recht, Vol. 7 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991), pp. 447.

Joachim Bauer, ed., *Europa der Regionen: Aktuelle Dokumente zur Rolle und Zukunft der deutschen Länder im europäischen Integrationsprozess* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991), pp. 131.

In recent years the European Community (EC) has been confronted with an unexpected resurgence of regionalism, which has resulted in a renewed interest in theories of federalism. Reasons for this situation are the growing apprehension regarding the bureaucratic centralism already evident in Brussels, the dissolution of nation-states and the transfer of sovereignty. Since federalism and regionalism have been central to German history for centuries, Germany is central not only in the books under review but also in the debates concerning European integration. As Detlef Merten points out in *Föderalismus und Europäische Gemeinschaften*, although a "hard core of state structure" was suspended above the *Länder* for more than a century, only during Germany's darkest hours — under Nazism and Communism — has it been governed as a centralized state. The present German Constitution declares that the German people not only accepted federalism by constituent assembly but also as part of their historical

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heritage. This is why Doris Fuhrmann-Mittlmeier begins her book on the German *Länder* with an analysis of federalism. Shortly after the establishment of the Federal Republic in 1949, discussions began on the future role of Germany within a United States of Europe. Already in 1951 the president of the *Land* of North Rhine-Westphalia warned that the *Länder* might be excluded from European affairs and become purely administrative entities. Whereas a decade ago this still was primarily a German problem, as Hermann-Josef Blanke points out in his book on regionalism as the motor of European federalism, today it is also a European one in view of various regionalist tendencies in Spain, Italy and Belgium. At any rate, as *Europa der Regionen* shows, the German *Länder* are the primary movers of regionalism in the EC.

The German Paradigm

Given that West Germany was the only federal state among the EC's founding members, the question of the compatibility of federalism on the national level and integration on the supra-national level was crucial for the German *Länder*. The uniqueness of Germany lies in that the federal *Länder* retain original tasks and sovereign rights, whereas in the EC these belong to the member states. Fuhrmann-Mittlmeier analyzes the European politics of the German *Länder* in order to develop strategies of decentralization within a unified Europe. She emphasizes the relevance of the principles of a federal state like Germany for European Union (EU) and how such a state provides the model for Europe. This proposal is not new,[1] but the concept of a "Europe of regions" is, and it has raised the question of whether German *Länder* should be considered regions. This question blurs the distinction between federalism and regionalism, which demonstrates why it is becoming increasingly difficult to separate the two.

The blending of federalism and regionalism revolves around strengthening a "European consciousness," whereby a "Europe of citizens" will create a "Europe of regions." At least this is Fuhrmann-Mittlmeier's view. She leaves open whether EU is a process, a transitional construction, or a goal. However, as she indicates, although the Treaty of Rome created only the Common Market, the Single European Act projects political unification as the ultimate goal. In view of the growing difficulties with the Maastricht Treaty, it is to her credit that she questions the possibility of achieving political union through economic union. She sees European integration first and foremost as a *political* process. As such, what is needed is a European Constitution able to overcome the negative consequences of relying on national decision-making, especially since the Brussels bureaucracy already exhibits all the defects of centralized institutions.

1. Cf. Rüdiger Voigt, "Föderalismus-Modell für ein vereintes Europa?" in *Europas unruhige Regionen: Geschichtsbewusstsein und europäischer Regionalismus*, ed. by Rainer S. Elkar (Stuttgart: E. Klett Verlag, 1981), pp. 249-261; "Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik: Modell für Europa?" in Ulrich von Alemann et al. eds., *Die Kraft der Region: Nordrhein-Westfalen in Europa* (Düsseldorf: J.H.W. Dietz Verlag, 1990), pp. 92-104.

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The main impetus to this centralization is socialization, which she suggests could better be carried out within regions. Were the principle of subsidiarity implemented on the regional level, with the transfer of jurisdictions, Brussels would have to accept the primacy of regional decision-making.

A consensus of opinion as a prelude to "European consciousness" should go beyond bureaucratic centralism to promote the identification of people with their immediate economic and social environment. Since federalism promotes such an identification, while helping to reduce tensions resulting from economic disparity and strengthening tendencies toward pluralism, it is the necessary counterpart of regionalism. While the federation tackles transnational problems, regions remain the locus of direct experience. They offset the primacy of economics with cultural, linguistic, historical and other considerations. From this perspective it is understandable why Fuhrmann-Mittlmeier is concerned with cultural particularity and social plurality, separation and decentralization of power, accountability, political openness, balanced regional economic development and citizen participation on all levels. She refers to the "10 Munich Theses" issued by the *Länder* governments in October 1987 to promote a permanent European order based on federal principles.[2] There the significance of regions for the EC is seen above all in that they preserve and develop the historical heritage and cultural variety of Europe; allow the possibility of closer cooperation and identification in a democratically organized "Europe of citizens"; participate in balancing economic development in Europe (because they can respond better to diverse conditions and make more precise adjustments); and act as a counterweight to the national and European levels of the EC.[3] Most important among the specific points mentioned are the creation of a special regional chamber — a kind of European *Bundesrat* — and the option of *Länder* and regions to air grievances before the European Supreme Court.

Despite the wealth of documentation she provides,[4] Fuhrmann-Mittlmeier is understandably confused by the variety of opinions regarding a federal model for Europe. Although she finds much to admire in an "integral federalism"

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2. These theses are reprinted as Document 1 in *Europa der Regionen*. In June 1989 the *Bundesrat* formally advocated a "true federalism" as "the best form of regionalization." Document 2 is the February 1990 *Bundesrat* resolution on the European Parliament's November 1989 "Community Charter of Regionalization" (included as Document 3). While in April 1990 the Munich theses were clarified and concretized in a follow-up conference, in May a report of the working group on federalization (included as Document 4) stressed the preference for regional, decentralized structures of decision-making in a united Europe.

3. In Document 5, dated June 7, 1990, the working group report demanded the institutionalization and legal guarantee of the participation of *Länder* and regions on the European level.

4. Cf. Konrad Reuter, *Föderalismus: Grundlagen und Wirkungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschlands*, Second Edition (Heidelberg: R. V. Decker, 1985); Georg Fess, "Die Europäischen Gemeinschaften und der deutsche Föderalismus," in *Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift*, 13 (1986), pp. 549-558; Hans-Peter Schwarz, "Europa föderieren — aber wie? Eine Methodenkritik der europäischen Integration," in *Demokratisches System und politische*

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prefiguring a "Europe of regions" predicated on the autonomy of separate units,[5] she also looks for an alternative theory of intergovernmental relations in the "new federalism" articulated in the US during the Reagan years.[6] She observes that, when proposals for transforming the EC into a proto-federal entity failed in the 1980s, it was argued that federalism in Europe could not be articulated in terms of classical federal theory. Since even the German federal experience in the 19th century was inspired by the American paradigm, it was only natural to look to developments in the US. While Fuhrmann-Mittlmeier's difficulty in attempting to come to terms with American federalism as a possible model for European integration is understandable, the US experience with federalism should serve as a warning.

There is a potential conflict between a "Europe of citizens" and a "Europe of regions." Of course there is a need to transcend nationalism and recognize a common European heritage, which, as Merten rightly emphasizes, is something different from the anti-American slogan of a "common house of Europe" floated by Gorbachev in the 1980s. But this common cultural heritage presupposes both the heterogeneity and the homogeneity of Europe. Thus there is also a need for Europeans to revitalize common ties and interests on local and regional levels. As Carl Schmitt observed: "Both democracy and federalism presuppose homogeneity. The necessary result of a federation of democratic states is the correspondence of democratic and federal homogeneity. Thus it is only natural in the development of democracy that the homogeneous unity of the people transcends the political boundaries of member states and replaces the equilibrium between the federation and the politically independent member states with a general unity. This explains the development of most federal states of the 19th and 20th centuries, especially the US and Germany."[7] The central idea here is that any political entity predicated only on *one* people, as in "We

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Praxis der Bundesrepublik: Festschrift für Theodor Eschenburg, ed. by Gerhard Lehmbruch et al. (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1971), pp. 377-443; "Föderalismus und Supranationalität," in *Der Staatsbürger: Beilage der Bayerischen Staatszeitung* (January 1986), No. 1, pp. 1-6.

5. She mentions specifically Lutz Roemheld's work on *Integral Federalism: Model for Europe*. See my review, "What is Integral Federalism?" in *Telos* 91 (Spring 1992), pp. 135-149. The emphasis on tensions within federalism is consistent with Carl Schmitt's position, although his notion of federation is strictly jurisprudential — it lacks the philosophical presuppositions of integral federalism. Cf. in the same issue, Carl Schmitt, "The Constitutional Theory of Federation (1928)," and my "Schmitt and Federalism." In a similar vein, Fuhrmann-Mittlmeier quotes Karl Weber: "Federalism means the institutionalization of tensions in a synthesis . . . which, in opposition to the Marxian dialectic, does not suspend the antitheses but arranges them in an open dialectic of continuous dialogue." See Karl Weber, "Föderalismus als Instrument demokratischer Konfliktregelung," in Fried Esterbauer, Guy Héraud and Peter Dernthaler, eds., *Föderalismus als Mittel permanenter Konfliktregelung* (Vienna: W. Bräumüller Verlag, 1977), p. 65.

6 Cf. Michael Reagen and John G. Sanzone, *The New Federalism*, Second Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); Lewis G. Bender and James A. Stever, eds., *Administering the New Federalism* (Boulder, CO and London: Westview Press, 1986).

7. Schmitt, "The Constitutional Theory of Federation (1928)," *op. cit.*, p. 54.

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the people of the United States," leads organizationally "to a distinctive type of state — a *federal state without a federal foundation*."[8] In order to guarantee that a federal state retains a federal foundation, it is necessary to base it on the federated units — states, regions, etc. — rather than on "the people." Democracy within individual units may be guaranteed constitutionally, but the federal constitution must have a federal rather than a democratic foundation.

Blanke identifies similar problems in postwar Germany — especially tendencies toward centralization and the transition from "dual federalism" to "cooperative federalism." The term "cooperative federalism" was coined in the US during the New Deal to describe the increasing overlap in state and federal functions, the sharing of responsibilities in major policy areas, i.e., intergovernmental relations, and the rejection of earlier axioms concerning "separate spheres."[9] It paralleled the Supreme Court's extension of national powers under the Commerce Clause, which by 1942 had eliminated any meaningful limitations on national police powers. After WWII the Supreme Court continued to uphold and expand national regulatory powers as well as welfare programs, the constitutionality of grant-in-aid "strings" which effectively constrain state discretion, and the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporation" which applied the Bill of Rights and due process to state action. In Germany the transition to "cooperative federalism" was facilitated primarily by the financial fusion of various state agencies, which in turn led to jurisdictional fusion, i. e. centralization. While this increased the power of the executive *vis-à-vis* the legislature, it decreased the horizontal separation of powers, resulting in a loss of transparency, measurability and accountability. Although Blanke points out that there was a positive reaction to this development in that it strengthened the power of *Länder* governments (as opposed to legislatures) as well as the role of the *Bundesrat* as a medium for *Länder* participation, this is no argument for "cooperative federalism."

President Reagan's "new federalism" began as a strategy to reduce the role of the central government as formulator, administrator and financier of domestic programs. But this "revolution" was over almost before it began.[10]

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8. *Ibid*., p. 55.

9. Cf. Harry N. Scrubber, "Federalism, Intergovernmental Relations and the American Constitutional System," in Harry N. Scrubber, ed., *Perspectives on Federalism: Papers from the First Berkeley Seminar on Federalism* (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California Press, 1987), pp. 3-9.

10. Cf. Fred Siegel, "The Reagan 'Revolution': 1978-1981, RIP," in *Telos* 60 (Summer 1984), pp. 125-129. Cf. also Paul Piccone's observation that: "It is hardly accidental that the Reagan revolution has turned out to be no more successful than its *bête noire*, the cultural revolution of the 1960s or, for that matter, any other recent self-proclaimed revolution. Gone everywhere but in rhetoric is the traditional defense of power and privilege behind the ideology of competitiveness, *laissez-faire* economics, naked individualism and religious traditionalism. The issue today is not, and has not been for some time, the attempt to return to a minimalist central government overseeing the smooth adherence to constitutional provisions by otherwise autonomously functioning federal units, themselves solidly grounded on a thriving civil society. Rather, the main focus is

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Traditionally the old conservatives have always been against "big government." It was their alliance with the neo-conservatives that subverted the "new federalism."[11] While the managerial expertise, communicative skills and administrative background of the neo-conservatives provided the old conservatives with the organizational infrastructure to gain political power, as disenchanted Left-liberals (but unreconstructed New Dealers) they proceeded to expand the apparatus of the federal government. The fragility of this "new federalism" was revealed in the 1985 decision in *Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority*,[12] when the Supreme Court overruled the celebrated 1976 decision in *National League of Cities v. Usury* which held that Congress lacked power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the wages and hours of all state or municipal employees. In *Usury* the majority ruled that Commerce Clause enactments were unconstitutional if they displaced the individual state's freedom to structure operations in areas of traditional governmental functions. This victory for federalism was short-lived. In a series of subsequent cases the Court gutted the significance of *Usury* and finally overruled it in *Garcia*. Asserting that the *Usury* standard was "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice," the Court reasoned that "state sovereign interests are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power." But these procedural safeguards have not withstood "federal" encroachments, even on the part of the Supreme Court. Given that the Bill of Rights was originally meant to protect particularity, specificity and otherness from federal intrusion, it is not surprising that such "federalist" initiatives often have counterproductive results.[13]

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the management of an expansive welfare apparatus unresponsive to external political steering, difficult to reduce in size or scope, and altogether impossible to dismantle without catastrophic social consequences." See Paul Piccone, "The Crisis of American Conservatism," in *Telos* 74 (Winter 1987-88), p. 4.

11. As Piccone has pointed out, the neo-conservative alliance with the old conservatives "is largely tactical since they are not at all that interested in dismantling the welfare state and are instead firm believers in social progress, the elimination of social inequalities (at least in their ideology), and a cosmopolitanism that rules out any parochial national concerns." See Piccone, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

12. Cf. Jesse H. Choker, "Law before and after *Garcia*" in Scrubber, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-23 and Janice C. Griffith, *Federalism: The Shifting Balance* (Chicago: American Bar Association, 1989), pp. viiff. Cf. in the same volume, Joseph Lesser, "The Course of Federalism in America — An Historical Overview," pp. 1-37; Arnold I. Burns, "The Perspective of Federalism at the United States Department of Justice in 1987," pp. 45-52.

13. As Elazar has written: "In order to understand the more than two hundred years of American federalist experience, we must examine American federalism in the broadest sense of the term — not as intergovernmental relations, as federalism has come to be interpreted from the managerial perspectives of the twentieth century; not as a matter of the constitutional distribution of powers between the general and the state governments, as constitutional lawyers are wont to see; not even as the grand political struggle between the Union and the states, which covers the canvas of nineteenth century historians — but as something close to what the French term 'integral federalism,' that

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Fuhrmann-Mittlmeier claims that "*Federalism* does not represent any one-sided principle of the concentration or decentralization of power but rather circumscribes a whole series of forms extending to the autonomous self-government of various levels of administration and is the expression of the reciprocity of the deregulation and centralization of political action" (353). But this reading of the "new federalism" fails to recognize that both deregulation and centralization presuppose *centralized* political action rather than *diffused* decision-making. In the same way Washington bureaucrats have instrumentalized the "new federalism," Brussels Eurocrats have appropriated intergovernmentalism. Of course, as Peter Pernthaler emphasizes,[14] there is no one established account of federalism directly applicable to the EC, but this does not mean that there are not certain fundamental constitutional principles of federalism that distinguish it from the bureaucratic sham of intergovernmentalism. However defined, federalism should be understood as opposition to bureaucratic centralism.

What then is the German paradigm of European federalism? Since the post-WWII German Constitution prefigured not only German reunification but also European unification, Jacques Delors claimed that German unity is "also a matter of the EC." Merten, however, objects that "German unity and European unification are not equivalent goals" (21-22). What this means is that the future of Europe is no longer tied to the German past. In view of recent developments, however, the future of Europe increasingly seems to be tied to the future of Germany. In any case, EU is something much broader than German unity. Interpreting the call for a united Europe after WWII as part of the effort to overcome nationalism, Merten concludes that a united Europe "no longer needs nationalism as a surrogate" and that a united Germany can find its place within a unified Europe. However, as Heinz Peter Volkert points out in his article in *Föderalismus und Europäische Gemeinschaften*, the German paradigm is not a national trait but a constitutional possibility which, to a lesser extent, has also been institutionalized in Austria.

Recently, EC member governments have echoed the presidents of the German *and* Austrian *Länder* legislatures in proposing federalism as a model for Europe. As Merten notes, in view Austria's geo-political position between Germany and Italy, it is destined to become a member. In this respect, Herbert Schambeck's account of federalism from an Austrian perspective is instructive.

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is to say, as the animating and informing principle of the American political system flowing from a covenantal approach to human relationships." See Daniel J. Elazar, "Our Thoroughly Federal Constitution," in Robert A. Goldwin and William A. Schambra, eds., *How Federal is the Constitution?* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1987), pp. 43f.

14. Cf. Peter Pernthaler, "Föderalismus als moderner Weg interregionaler Aufgabenteilung," in Fried Esterbauer, et. al, *Von der freien Gemeinde zum föderalistischen Europa: Festschrift für Adolf Gasser zum 80. Geburtstag* (Berlin: Duncker & Mumblot, 1983), pp. 505-518; "Föderalismus und Regionalismus: Ein Ansatz zur Überwindung ihrer Gegensätze," in *Föderalismus und Regionalismus in europäischer Perspektive*, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-22.

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Comparing Austria and Switzerland, he spells out how individual federal states in Europe arose out of different geographical and historical conditions, on the basis of diverse legal, cultural, social and economic traditions. While he does not mention the peculiar conditions of the Swiss federal state — there is no discussion of Switzerland in either *Föderalismus und Europäische Gemeinschaften* or *Föderalismus und Integrationsgewalt*[15] — he does outline the defining features of Austrian federalism. The federal character of a given political order can be defined in the constitution, as in the case of Austria, or left unspecified, as in the case of the Weimar Constitution. But this is a dubious distinction, since the

15. On Swiss federalism, see Raimund E. Germann and Ernest Weibel, eds., *Handbuch Politischen System der Schweiz* (Bern and Stuttgart: Verlag Paul Haupt, 1986), 3 Vols. The first volume is a prologue to the discussion of federalism in the third volume. The second volume examines the political institutions, actors and decision-making processes at the federal level and considers citizen participation mainly in relation to federal policy. But the third volume does not attempt to present a uniform concept or theory of Swiss federalism; it only contributes further "components" to complete the picture. According to Blaise Knapp ("Étapes du fédéralisme suisse," pp. 31-51), there has been an erosion of cantonal authority since 1848 in the wake of "cooperative federalism." Since the goals of federalism are centrifugal in nature, they are inconsistent with the search for greater effectiveness through the simplification of complex systems. Thus federalism is always in conflict with rationalization, efficiency and centralization. The creation of a single market, the free movement of peoples, the standardization of law, the increased financial needs of the federation, the granting of federal subsidies, etc. have all led to greater centralization. Gaston Gaudard ("L'interdépendance et les disparités économique entre les cantons," pp. 267-296) shows how economic interdependence between cantons has reached an unprecedented level, while population and economic activity have become concentrated geographically and economic disparity between regions has increased. Ernest A. Brugger ("Föderalismus als Ziel und Voraussetzung für die Regionalpolitik: Eine regionalwissenschaftliche Analyse," pp. 299-320) poses two questions: Are the preconditions for regional policy created by Swiss federalism adequate? To what extent can regionalism make a significant contribution to the further development of federalism? Although he finds the goals of federalism and regionalism compatible, he claims Swiss federalism today is less adequate to the task than earlier and that regional policies in general are neutralized and even reversed by political programs whose territorial impact has been left unexamined. Raimund F. Germann ("Die Beziehungen zwischen Bund und Kantonen in Verwaltungsbereich," pp. 346-366) outlines three important characteristics of Swiss federalism: the extraordinary complexity of the system of legal norms by which jurisdictions are divided between the federation and the cantons: the extent to which the division of labor between both levels is dominated by what has come to be called "implementation federalism" (*Vollzugsföderalismus*); and the impressive heterogeneity of cantonal bureaucracies. As a consequence, there has arisen a multifaceted network of public finance, procedures of consultation, reliance on extra-parliamentary conditions, etc., which effectively has precluded the federation from increasing its power relative to the cantons. In Germann's view, however, the federation-canton relation is no longer the critical dimension. What is crucial is the emergence of a technocratic network linking the federal bureaucracies, the larger cantonal bureaucracies and professional associations in a hegemonic superstructure above the more peripheral cantons. The debate concerning the reform of Swiss federalism has swung between total revision of the federal constitution and a redivision of jurisdictions.

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Weimar Constitution made the remnants of German federalism hostage to the democratic notion of the German "people." If federalism is not fundamental to a constitution, then the federation is always in danger. Since Schambeck considers the most important characteristics of a federal state to be the division of powers with respect to administration, legislation and justice (both on the federal and the *Länder* levels), the participation of the *Länder* in federal legislation, and the division of fiscal matters between the federation and the *Länder*, he in fact presupposes their constitutional articulation.

Schambeck advocates the kind of "cooperative federalism" that has obtained in Austria since 1974, which is something different from the US invention, i.e., an arrangement whereby treaties can be concluded both between member states *of* the federation and between member states *and* the federation. Such cooperation has facilitated dealing with supraregional matters such as water supply, transportation, ecology, etc., while at the same time, at least since 1989, it has led to regional agreements between the federal state and neighboring regions of other states, paving the way for regional cooperation on both private and public levels. In Schambeck's view, the significance of federalism for European integration lies in that it incorporates the fundamental principles of *participation* and *subsidiarity*, which can accommodate both modern regionalism and a united Europe. At the same time, he cautions that federalism should not be confused with *particularism* or *separatism*. Whereas participation and subsidiarity presuppose a view of the whole as well as the parts, particularism and separatism prefigure self-concern and the loss of unity.

The European Project

The EC has subscribed explicitly to the principle of subsidiarity.[16] Not only does the Single European Act advocate "the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity," but Delors has made it clear that this principle should be followed on the communal, national and regional levels as a "constant counterweight to the natural tendency of the concentration of power at the executive center." The European Parliament also has recognized the principle that "every decision . . . [must] be made on the level best qualified for such," consistent with the European Commission's "Action Program on the Social Charter." Nevertheless, as Georg-Berndt Oschatz points out in his article on European lawmaking and German federalism, these assurances have not kept the *Bundesrat* from recognizing the danger of a "European surplus value."[17] With legality as the "functional mode of a modern industrial or state bureaucracy," "super-legality" refers to the strengthened validity of legislative norms, established by a simple majority,

16. Cf. Ludger Kühnhardt, "Federalism and Subsidiarity," in *Telos* 91 (Spring 1992).

17. The allusion is clearly to Carl Schmitt's concept of "political surplus value," which he defines as the political premiums accruing to the legal holding of state power. Cf. Carl Schmitt, "The Legal World Revolution," in *Telos* 72 (Summer 1987), pp. 74ff. Cf. also G. L. Ulmen, *Politischer Mehrwert: Eine Studie über Max Weber und Carl Schmitt* (Weinheim, VCH/Acta humanoria, 1991).

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which in Europe after WWI forced a modification or abolition of constitutional norms usually requiring not only greater majorities but extensive deliberations. Clearly, on the supranational level "super-legality" would create a European "political surplus value" which would turn subsidiarity into a purely administrative matter. As Fuhrmann-Mittlmeier notes, while Eurocrats continue to emphasize the significance of subsidiarity in connection with regions, the latter remain a "constitutional no-man's-land."

The apprehensions of the German *Länder* in this "constitutional no-man's-land" are justified in view of Oschatz's analysis of the division of jurisdictions in Germany. Emphasizing that the legal function of the EC is a political matter "broader" than German constitutional law, he attempts to clarify the differences. Although at present the Europeanization of law is limited to matters concerning the Common Market — the elimination of trade barriers, the guarantee of free access, etc. — potentially every legal regulation can be justified in terms of competition, meaning that European "federal" law could become a reflection of American "federal" law in penetrating almost every aspect of life. As with socialization in Germany, the EC social charter is the basis for harmonizing law throughout Europe. The EC also has considerable latitude with respect to natural disasters, the environment, atomic energy and the like. The Europeanization of law is thus something quite different from a return to the common heritage of European jurisprudence.[18]

Reviewing the scholastic foundation of the principle of subsidiarity in Thomas Aquinas and in the 1931 Vatican social encyclical which stated that "it is unjust for the wider and superordinate community to annul that which can be well administered by the smaller and subordinate community," Oschatz argues that in practice the subsidiarity principle could become an opportunistic device and, in fact, has become a very "elastic principle" which does not guarantee the *Länder*'s autonomy with respect to lawmaking. Moreover, in practice it is not possible to contain the EC's unforeseen legal acts. Given this predicament, he argues that the *Länder* should continue to strengthen their position in the *Bundesrat*, even though the expanded participation of the *Bundesrat* in the process of European integration has led to numerous technical and organizational problems. Would the process of decision-making in Brussels be paralyzed if the *Bundesrat* were part of it? According to Oschatz, this is highly unlikely, although the more fundamental issue in terms of German constitutional law is that the *Länder*'s rights in the *Bundesrat* are the result of the fact that Germany is not a centralized but a federal state and that the possibility of the *Bundesrat* influencing policy is the *result* of their power and not their *cause*. For this reason, the *Länder* will remain crucial for European integration as the *Bundesrat* insists on participating in European decisions.

18. Cf. Carl Schmitt, "The Plight of European Jurisprudence," in *Telos* 83 (Spring 1990), pp. 35-70. Cf. also in the same issue, Paul Piccone and G. L. Ulmen, "Schmitt's 'Testament' and the Future of Europe," pp. 3-34.

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Discussing Spanish membership in the EC and the place of "autonomous communities," Alegría Borrás questions whether the German model can be generalized, no matter how well it has functioned so far, because the "federal essence" has been diminished and the EC's particular demands are pretexts for centralization. Whereas the *Bundesrat* guarantees the *Länder* their voice and power, the role of the senate in Spain is limited with respect to the "autonomous communities." Although the 1978 Spanish Constitution mentions integration in the EC, it includes statutes guaranteeing "autonomous communities." In Borrás' view, the apprehension of the "autonomous communities" is justified only if European integration serves as an alibi for the state to reclaim jurisdictions. However, so far the "autonomous communities" have not participated in the process of integration and there is no constitutional means for them to influence the common will. Although an agreement has been proposed to regulate the cooperation of the "autonomous communities" with the state with respect to the EC — something akin to the observer status of the German *Länder* in Brussels — Borrás argues that even this would not be similar to the loyalty to the federation that is the foundation of German law.

Föderalismus und Europäische Gemeinschaften deals with the tensions resulting from the *Länder*'s and the autonomous communities' forfeiture of sovereignty to the EC bureaucracy in Brussels. It was understood that an eventual reform of the EC original treaties could result not only in a "democratic" but also in a "federal deficit." An effective way to strengthen the federalist pillars of EU would be to create a chamber of regions rather than states as a counterpart to the European Parliament. Such a regional chamber could bridge conflicts within member states as well as the federation. Yet regional consciousness, however strong, has not replaced national consciousness. "To speak of the end of the nation-state can only be considered a misunderstanding or a distortion of the signs of the times,"[19] or so says Ralf Dahrendorf. Debatable as this claim may be, it does not necessarily entail a rejection of regionalism but rather a realization of the need of more than two levels of administration. The prospect is then for a federal Europe with three levels: the communal, the regional and the state. This is why Fuhrmann-Mittlmeier opens her book on the *Länder* with an analysis of the problem of a "three-level federal state," which Hans Kelsen called a "hopeless complication" and Theodor Eschenburg rejected out of hand.[20] Generally, a two-level federalism consists of the federation and the member states. But there is also the prospect of a federation of regions, which entails the disappearance of the nation-states.

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19. Quoted in *Föderalismus und Europäische Gemeinschaften*, *op. cit.*, p. 303.

20. Cf. Hans Kelsen, "Staatsrechtliche Durchführung des Anschlusses Österreichs an das Deutsche Reich," in *Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht*, No. 6 (1927), pp. 329-352; Theodor Eschenburg, "Europäische Akte: Bundesstaat im Staatenbund. Bahnt sich ein Verfassungskonflikt an," in *Die Zeit* (October 24, 1986) and "Der dreistufige Bundesstaat," in Hans Maier, Ulrich Matz et al., eds., *Politik, Philosophie, Praxis: Festschrift für Wilhelm Hennis zum 65. Geburtstag* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta Verlag, 1988), pp. 349-359.

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The problems of a three- or two-level federalism notwithstanding, regionalism has become and will remain crucial for European integration. This is why it is important, with Blanke, to explore tendencies towards decentralization and federalization in Spain, Italy and Belgium. Not only did the 1978 Spanish Constitution recognize 17 "autonomous communities" with powers regarding legislation and administration, in Italy the Lombard League (now the Northern League) has become the most powerful expression of efforts to displace the unitary state with a federal one.[21] In three constitutional reforms (1970, 1980 and 1988) Belgium recognized not only linguistic communities but regions like Flanders, Walloon and Brussels. According to Blanke, the complexity of a three-level federation is determined by four levels of interaction — the supranational, the transnational, the national and the subnational. In states like France and England, the latter being the one country that remained apart from the centralized sovereign states of continental Europe and is now ironically the last bastion of centralization,[22] regions are largely administrative entities. However, even here the demand for greater independence by regions such as Scotland and Wales has resulted in a kind of prefederal situation. Since German *Länder* were recreated by the Allies in the West and by the communists in the East after WWII, and since there is something artificial even about such areas as Lombardy, the origin of a region is not so significant as its constitutional status.

Already on January 31, 1986 the *Bundesrat* issued an ultimatum that EU guarantee not only the constitutional status of the *Länder* but also "the rights of regions as constituent parts of a European political order." When the European

21. Cf. Special Section on "The Leagues in Italy," in *Telos* No. 90 (Winter 1991-92).

22. Despite the centralized structure of Great Britain, or rather because of it, Michael Burgess insists that there is a British tradition of federalism, which more than any other informed the constitutional debate about "political" Europe in the 1980's. He is particularly concerned to promote British understanding and appreciation of the significance of federalism to the future of Europe. See Michael Burgess, *Federalism and European Union: Political Ideas, Influences and Strategies in the European Community, 1972-1987* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989). The main purpose of Burgess' book is to demonstrate that "the overloaded concept of intergovernmentalism has a particularly damaging and distorting impact upon the relevance of federalism to the European Community" and, more pointedly, "to challenge the prevailing conventional wisdom of intergovernmentalism by reasserting and reinstating the relevance of federalism in the politics of the European Community," pp. 1-3. Today correspondences between diverse regional entities are not so much diminishing the significance of constitutional statuses as expanding the range of common purposes. For example, the German *Länder* of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, the Saar and North Rhine-Westphalia have joined an organization called Assembly of European Regions and, together with autonomous communities and other regions, have issued joint resolutions irrespective of the differences in their constitutional statuses. Thus regions, however defined, are coming to play an increasingly prominent role in European affairs. As Fuhrmann-Mittlmeier concludes, the German *Länder* are promoting the idea that political union in Europe can only be achieved through the common work of *Länder*, autonomous communities and regions.

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Parliament issued its proclamation on regional politics and the role of regions, new steps were taken toward recognizing regions within member states and the EC itself, which again raised the question of whether regionalization is consistent with integration and to what extent regional affairs and interests already have a legal basis within the EC. While regionalization and Europeanization are not mutually exclusive, as stated in the Preamble to the EC Treaty, nothing further is mentioned about the role of regions in the integration process. According to Blanke, regional "codetermination through participation" would be a step toward the federalization of the EC only if it is recognized as a legal principle, which would require an EC constitutional amendment.

This is not outside the realm of possibility, given the growing strength of regionalism. Blanke's claim that there is a fundamental similarity between Germany, Spain, Belgium and Italy also is compelling. Even though Germany is the only one of the four that is a textbook "federal state," Blanke considers the classical definition a "terminological occlusion of the problem." In his view, the essential similarities they share are more significant. From a pragmatic historical perspective, he identifies what he considers to be the main characteristics of a federal state: it is composed of separate and relatively autonomous territorial entities which have representation in a constitutionally recognized governmental chamber through which they can participate in determining the will of the federation. Not only is the status of these entities protected against constitutional amendments, judicially they have recourse to conflict resolution. More generally, a federal state has a "dual form of government" embracing federal sovereignty and regional autonomy. In this respect at least, Spain and Belgium are similar to Germany. Italy is a special case.

Having described the degree of regional autonomy in Germany, Spain, Italy and Belgium, Blanke focuses on the second characteristic of any federal structure, namely the degree of participation in constituting the political will of the federal state. In this respect, neither Spain, Italy nor Belgium have as yet any chamber of regional representation similar to the German *Bundesrat*. In any case, as Blanke is forced to admit, the elements of federalism he considers essential are fulfilled very differently in each country. Ultimately, regional and financial autonomy are decisive. Even if in his view a federal constitution is not, it provides a model. He foresees a process of integration on three levels. The constitutional goal of integration is not the liquidation of member states but rather their functional unification. However, the yielding of sovereign rights on both the national and regional levels is presupposed by unification: "Whoever supports the process of unification cannot deny the transfer of jurisdictions."

The option of recognizing regional levels of decision-making within the EC raises the question of whether there should be two or three levels. The regional heads of the German *Länder* have called for the establishment of a European regional chamber, which presumably would recognize regions combining communities beyond state borders. Institutional representation of regions is dependent on a federal model, although not necessarily the model of traditional state

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federalism. In Blanke's view, in order to institutionalize a second chamber of regional representation there must be stronger regionalization within the member states as well as an increase in the number of regions along the lines proposed in the European Parliament's Charter of Regionalization: "The new Europe will be accepted by its citizens only if it does not develop into a bureaucratic centralized entity but takes hold of and stimulates the historically awakened roots of the people in all their variety by taking account of the given regional units within the nation-state" (412). Whatever the ultimate fate of the nation-state, which has already lost the monopoly of politics and is no longer sovereign in the strict sense, the future of Europe belongs to federalism and regionalism.

G. L. Ulmen

Hungarian Intellectuals

Lee Congdon, *Exile and Social Thought: Hungarian Intellectuals in Germany and Austria 1919-1933* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

Along with his other books, this monograph on interwar Hungarian Jewish intellectuals reflects Lee Congdon's extensive knowledge of Hungarian as well as German sources — a fact all the more remarkable since he only learned Hungarian while in the Army. Like his biography of Lukács, *Exile and Social Thought* combines intellectual history with a polished narrative and unabashed moral judgments. Congdon treats most statesmen with unexpected generosity. Though he points out missed opportunities, both by conservatives and radicals, he rarely fulminates against heads of government. He even manages to conceal his personal dislike for Woodrow Wilson and presents Hungarian admirers of Wilson, even those willing to surrender Hungarian territory to unfriendly Allied nations, as mistaken but highminded idealists.

Congdon reserves his strongest judgments for intellectuals — especially Georg Lukács whom he both admires and loathes. Thus he praises *History and Class Consciousness*, stressing both the originality and eclecticism of Lukács thought. According to Congdon, Lukács developed a penetrating approach to

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literature and society. Yet he also used high culture to justify a brutal regime and, in his study of modern European thought, *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft*, produced deliberately warped cultural judgments in the hope of presenting Stalin with an ideologically correct account of European fascism. Despite his dislike for Lukács' Stalinism and his comments on the failure of others to avoid the Stalinist temptation, Congdon refuses to go after Communists. He does not criticize those associated with the short-lived Hungarian Communist regime of Bela Kun in 1919, and he even depicts Lukács as an heroic follower of Kun, rallying peasants to fight for a Communist government struggling against French, Czech, and Rumanian invasions.

What Congdon most deplores about Lukács was his gradual conversion to Stalinism, following his exile in the Soviet Union. This Congdon condemns even more strongly than his Marxist-Leninism. At the same time, we find praise in the book for Oskar Jaszi, Karl Polanyi, Auriel Kolnai, Ilona Duczynska, Paul Szende, Karl Mannheim, and Bela Balasz — all social democrats for most of their careers. These types of judgments have become academically conventional, and the blurb on the cover by Walter Laqueur, a latterday Wilsonian, seems entirely appropriate. Congdon stays away from political criticism, but offers opinions about his subjects that reflect the conventional wisdom of his graduate school days, i.e., the perspective of the anti-Soviet democratic Left.

Despite this at least apparent acceptance of the ideological orthodoxy of the 1960s, there are problems with the way Congdon presents received opinions. He does so almost cryptically in one case by pointing out that though Jaszi "was far from being the greatest thinker of his generation of Hungarians, he was the greatest man." He also praises the Jewish convert to Catholicism Kolnai, who opposed Austrian Catholic conservatives in the 1920s and supported socialism. Congdon, however, may be more genuinely enthusiastic about Karl Mannheim whom he considers a worthy successor to Max Weber. He is also remarkably uncritical of Mannheim's sociological work, not all of which has stood the test of time. Equally striking is his displeasure with the sexual liaisons within the Galileo and Sunday Circles — overlapping coteries in Budapest for the largely Jewish radical intelligentsia discussed in his book. Congdon goes beyond noting cases of marital infidelity; he treats adultery "judgmentally." Though he generally prefers socialist to free-market thinkers, he insists that they pay proper attention to community needs and provide for decentralized economic control.

Congdon apparently agrees with Kolnai's attack on Austrian Chancellor Ignaz Seipel, who as head of the Christian Socialist Party refused to form a coalition with the Socialist Left. Yet he also commends Kolnai for paying attention to the distributist theories of G.K. Chesterton and the "guild socialism" associated with 19th and early 20th century Catholic critics of capitalism. But was Chesterton, whom Congdon recommends as a useful critic of capitalist depersonalization, more progressive than Seipel? A strong internationalist who spent the latter half of WWI trying to negotiate a peace and who, despite

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his antipathy to the anti-clerical Left, favored social legislation for Austrian workers, Seipel was less of a clericalist reactionary than Chesterton, a militantly Counterreformation Catholic convert who made no secret of his attraction to Mussolini's Italy after the Lateran Pact in 1929.

Congdon is well aware of all of this and he is not repelled by Seipel any more than by Chesterton. Similarly, his combination of praise for Chesterton with implicit criticism of Seipel is a coded statement of his own belief. While Central European historians who read his book will know of Kolnai and Seipel, they may in fact have less information about members of the Catholic Right in early 20th century England or about Southern Agrarians at war with urban, industrial society. Congdon tips his hand just enough for those who may care to notice. Perhaps he espouses some established academic views in order to survive as a mainstream scholar, but he also intermittently drops hints to suggest his own convictions. An Anglo-Catholic, but one with Luther's opinion about humanists and rationalists, Congdon is far removed from the Enlightenment project that he attributes to his Hungarian subjects. What may attract him to them are the components of Christian mysticism he locates in the early work of Lukács and Balacz and the unmasking of ideologies undertaken by Szende and Mannheim. It is not the utopianism but the skepticism about universalist politics that he finds most appealing.

One can read this book without running into Congdon's *Weltanschauung*, which remains well hidden behind a cloak of political correctness. His sections on the Hungarian idealists around the *Ma* Circle and the flamboyant figure of Lajos Kassak and those on the contributions of Laszlo Moholy-Nagy and other Hungarians associated with the German Bauhaus movement may be the only treatments of these people in English. More importantly, Congdon sets the Hungarian avant gardes of the 1920s into a specific political and cultural context that helps to relate them to larger German and Central European movements. Contrary to attempts to treat Hungarian currents as merely tributary to German and French cultures, Congdon stresses their original creative force in the early 20th century. Like John Lukacs' book on Budapest in 1900, Congdon's account emphasizes the fertility of Hungarian thinkers in the period he examines. No mere imitators, Hungarians built and enriched the artistic, scientific, and ideological currents that began in larger nations. They also sent their own thinkers elsewhere in Central Europe and, later, to England and the US to make further contributions to music, art, social theory, and other human endeavors. It has often been observed that early 20th century Budapest, though far smaller than Vienna and Paris, had a comparably active intellectual and artistic life, though one circumscribed by a language inaccessible to most foreigners. In this book Congdon has suceeded in making that Magyarophone culture accessible to non-Hungarians.

Paul Gottfried

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Postmodern Biology?

Stephen Jay Gould, *Wonderful Life. The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1989).

Nothing seems to annoy scientists more than the suggestion that their work is dependent on or influenced by something outside of science. The paradigmatic image of a dogmatic Cardinal Bellarmino coercing Galileo into recanting his discovery of Jupiter's moons has terminally discredited any attempt to judge scientific claims within any allegedly higher extra-scientific tribunal, be it theological, metaphysical or political. Yet scientific research remains an entirely *human* undertaking and, as such, subject to the vicissitudes of history and other extra-scientific constraints. As R. G. Collingwood concluded, "Natural science as a form of thought exists and always has existed in a context of history, and depends on historical thought for its existence . . . no one can understand natural science unless he understands history."[1] After all, Newton was not the first unlucky person ever to be hit over the head by over-ripe apples and the excogitation of the concept of gravity was certainly not the mere result of such an unfortunate accident. Clearly, cultural and historical developments such as the rise of capitalism and the discovery of the Americas — developments which contributed to rendering the old Aristotelean worldview untenable — also had something to do with it.

At any rate, historians and philosophers of science, from Alexandre Koyré to N. R. Hanson, have dispelled the Enlightenment myth of scientists struggling singlehandedly against superstition and dogma with no weapons other than their extraordinary power of intellection. Creativity, sheer genius or even unrelenting hard work are necessary, but not sufficient to explain scientific advancements and breakthroughs; cultural conditions are also essential. Thus, as Hanson has shown, Galileo's pioneering efforts in formulating a law of falling bodies would not have succeeded had he not already managed to internalize much of Giordano Bruno's ontology privileging space over time. Had Galileo followed predominant medieval customs and Aristotelean practices he would have attemped to differentiate through space rather than, as he in fact did successfully, through time — something that requires mathematical tools such as calculus, which at that time had not yet been invented — thus heading into a series of blind alleys.[2]

1. R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945), p. 177.
2. Cf. N. R. Hanson, *Patterns of Discovery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), pp. 37-49.

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Although Bellarmino may have been right in smelling something theologically suspect behind Galileo's transformational equations, this does not mean that the autonomy of science is in question. By now even the most entrenched multiculturalists and feminists, who occasionally indict Western science as a "Eurocentric white male ideology," must have learned their lessons from disastrous experiences such as the Soviet sanctioning of Lysenko's genetics as the only "politically correct" approach. Over the centuries modern science has managed to establish a formidable record for self-correction thus discouraging any external interference. However, such a process is neither very rapid nor immediately obvious — at least not to the scientists involved in the particular controversies. As Kuhn has indicated, it usually takes a generation or more before what subsequently appear as immediately obvious refutations become widely acknowledged in the scientific community.[3] Furthermore, for every instance of a successful refutation or self-correction, there are always scores of failures whose just reward is subsequent oblivion. This is why it is useful, while the debate is far from closed, to point out possible hidden cultural interferences contributing to questionable conclusions.

Stephan Jay Gould's reconstruction of evolutionary theory in his worderful book, *Wonderful Life*, suggests interesting analogies to current academic fashions such as postmodernism. In fact, the *cul de sac* that Gould works himself into at the end of the book turns out to be surprisingly reminiscent of similar problems encountered by most versions of postmodernism. More specifically, the problems Gould runs into in postulating radical contingency with his theory of punctuated equilibria are exactly the same problems postmodernity generates with its vindication of a radical relativism against the universalism and one-dimensionality of modernity. Coincidentally, the problem with Gould's book turns out to be exactly the same as Jimmy Stewart's in Frank Capra's 1947 movie *It's a Wonderful Life*, which Gould took as the model for the title. The point is to emphasize, as in the movie, that little things do count and can have surprisingly momentous consequences. Thus, in the reconstruction of human evolution, the survival of an organism as seemingly irrelevant as the *Pikaia* provides a good example of this. Without it evolution, *as it has in fact taken place*, would not have been possible (he is careful enough to point out, however, that the demise of the *Pikaia* would not necessarily have meant that there would have been no chordate future and, consequently, no subsequent evolution). But Gould apparently did not study the film too closely, probably as a result of having seen it as a child and not having paid very careful attention to the actual structure of the plot. While it is true that one of the film's main subplots is to emphasize to what an unexpected extent the hero's actions have important consequences, the drama of *It's a Wonderful Life* is orchestrated from above by a heavenly bureaucracy determined to make sure things ultimately do not

3. Cf. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1964). Even more relevant is the work of Karl Popper and Paul K. Feyerabend.

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stray too far from the pre-ordained plan. In other words, the alternative scenario, constructed as the result of a particularly wrong choice by Clarence, the angel dispached to see that George Bailey does not do anything stupid, such as committing suicide, is presented as ultimately artificial and, when all is said and done, nothing more than a pedagogical device meant to insure that things keep moving along the right predetermined path. The movie's main plot, rather than Gould's unwarranted privileging of one of its main subplots, contradicts precisely what Gould proposes as the main thesis of *Wonderful Life*, i.e., that all we have is "just history" — a process going nowhere and insensitive to whatever catastrophes, ruptures and discontinuities may take place in the process. *It's a Wonderful Life* operates entirely within a heavenly teleological framework all too reminiscent of an interpretation of the New Deal as a benevolent Washington bureaucracy intent on keeping small town America running along its entrepreneurial capitalist tracks.

Wonderful Life seeks to debunk whatever is left in popular consciousness of gradualist and progressivist readings of an evolutionary theory well managed by the hidden hand of natural selection. Worse yet, the arguments presented in Gould's book do not really make a very convincing case for the utterly contingent character of evolution. When all is said and done, its plot is actually much closer to that of *It's a Wonderful Life* than Gould may care to admit. As Robert Wright has pointed out in a careful and detailed review,[4] Gould's theory of punctuated equilibria postulates such a strong concept of contingency and adaptability that, when combined with three other widely accepted features of evolutionary theory Gould never questions (but which are essential to reject if he is to demonstrate his thesis), renders the eventual development of intelligence very likely. The three enthymemes in question are the claim that evolution exhibits a tendency towards 1) growing organic complexity, 2) growing complexity of organic information processing capacity, and 3) that all evolution is characterized by a tremendous inventiveness.

Even if one were to grant that the *Pikaia* did bite the dust during the Burgess upheaval, or that the dinosaurs had not died out to clear the way for mammals to develop, or that several of what have been essential links in the evolution of *Homo Sapiens* never made it, it remains highly probable that some intelligent form of life, not necessarily the one that in fact did develop, would have evolved. After all, it only took a few hundred million years to go from single-cell organisms to us, and *Homo Sapiens* have been around only some 250,000 years — a short span by Gould's own estimate of 5 billion years as the Earth's probable life-span. During all that time other evolutionary routes very likely would have been found in case the actual one had been cut off. Asian *Homo Erectus*, Neanderthals, etc. may very well have made it. After all, extremely complex features such as wings and eyeballs were developed several times independently. Why rule out a similar fate for intelligence?

4. Robert Wright, "The Intelligence Test," in *The New Republic* (January 29, 1990), pp. 28-36.

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Gould's argument that these species were actually cut off and that only *Homo Sapiens* did in fact evolve *only once* also overlooks that the evolution of one species within the same evolutionary niche often entails the demise of competing ones. Thus it may very well be that the reason other evolutionary branches did end up being cut off was precisely that the one that did eventually make it did so at their expense. Here one need not postulate any transcendental force or similarly intractable metaphysical processes to see that intelligent life, while not absolutely inevitable, was at least very likely to develop under the given conditions.

For the purposes of the present discussion, all these considerations concerning possible merits and shortcomings of Gould's account, while interesting, are actually secondary. What is more significant is that Gould has in fact shifted his position from the 1970s when, as a Marxist engaged with groups such as "Science for the People," he deployed his theory of punctuated equilibria to debunk conformist interpretations of evolutionary theory as a gradualist progression to perfection — subtle or not so subtle apologies for the *status quo* characterized by a capitalism predicated on competition as the mechanism paving the way to the perfect society. By vindicating the discontinuous character of evolution, Gould could vindicate the Marxist theory of revolution as qualitative upheavels exploding after relatively unproblematic periods of quantitative development. In *Wonderful Life*, however, the emphasis is now on the radically contingent character of the existing evolutionary result.

Why is this suddenly a significant issue? It is easy to understand a shift away from the need to vindicate evolutionary discontinuities as the functional equivalent of social revolution. In the age of post-communism and of the systematic collapse of revolutionary ideologies, revolution is decidedly out of fashion. But why bother to show the contingency of intelligent life? Although creationism has been making a comeback in some of the more backward states, it does not seem to be having much of an impact anywhere but in some rural high school biology courses in what used to be called the Bible Belt. Questions concerning the status of any possible transcendent Being presumably behind the evolutionary process or as an alternative explanation for the origins of life are similarly no longer considered all that interesting and have not been raised too often in relation to discussions concerning evolutionary theory. The answer lies elsewhere. And here is where an examination of postmodernism may help shed some light on this puzzling new *Fragestellung*. If postmodernism has had an impact in just about every other scholarly field during the last couple of decades, it is not unreasonable to expect that, overtly or covertly, it may also have made some inroads into the seemingly remote disciplines of biology and paleontology.

This suspicion is not entirely unfounded. In fact, one of the main thrusts of postmodernism has been to insist on the *contingency* of Western civilization and its "arbitrary" character in order to challenge not only its implicit claims to universality but its very foundations — "Western metaphysics." The inability of modernist ideologies to deal effectively with what have recently become the most burning social issues of the day (racism, sexism, ecology, etc.) — issues

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which only a couple of decades ago were safely subsumed and exorcised by ideologies such as Marxism under the general rubric of an exploitation readily remediable by means of a particular resolution of the traditional class struggle — has raised doubts concerning the entire edifice of Western civilization now accused of being logocentric, phallocratic, patriarchial, inextricably racist etc.

Historically, of course, many of these ideas are much older, going back to the pre-WWII reflections of thinkers such as Heidegger and Wittgenstein, who sought recourse to Being or the primacy of *Lebensformen* in order to go to the roots of what have only more recently exploded as major social issues. With Heidegger, the main problem was to find a solution to the crisis of Europe which exploded at the turn of the century with the collapse of what Carl Schmitt called the *jus publicum Europæum* and the earlier redefinition of international relations by the American Monroe Doctrine.[5] Rather than analyzing the problem historically, in terms of the displacement of a Eurocentric perspective, Heidegger blamed it all on technology and its roots in Western civilization. He went back to a Being logically and historically prior to Western civilization in order to reground thinking itself on more stable foundations — foundations not susceptible to technological involutions. The resulting relativism, of course, delegitimated all traditional values in favor of an undetermined will whose radical freedom would allow it to go in all possible directions — including Nazism.

Wittgenstein's crisis was a more personal one. His homosexuality could in no way be reconciled with the predominant bourgeois, Judeo-Christian values which he proceeded to relativize in terms of a plurality of qualitatively different *Lebensformen*, all equally valid within their own contexts and irreducible to any hypostatized higher system.[6] The result was roughly equivalent to Heidegger's: all norms are contingent and contextual, and no particular set can be deployed to judge or overshadow another. Once again, seemingly irresolvable problems of Western civilization were solved by throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

This is obviously not the place for any extensive critique of some of the more influential philosophies of the 20th century, especially since the only point here is to trace, *grosso modo*, the shifting character of socio-political agendas in the 1970s and 1980s, in order to offer a possible explanation for both the focus and theoretical quandaries of Gould's book. Yet, it is important to locate the historical and philosophical roots of a postmodernism which, after the demise of the New Left, has become generalized as a major cultural phenomenon affecting almost all scholarly disciplines as well as the latest configuration of "radical chic" politics. Why postmodernism has become so popular may have to do with the problems generated, but not yet resolved, by recent social changes precipitated by advanced industrial societies' rapid pace of rationalization. Only the three

5. Cf. Carl Schmitt, *Der Nomos der rde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europæum* (1950) Second Edition (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1970).

6. See Albert W. Levi, "The Sources of Wittgenstein's Ethics," in *Telos* 38 (Winter 1978-79), pp. 63-76.

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most significant disruptions need be mentioned here, without, however, elaborating on their extensive implications in any great detail: 1) the industrialization of the household and the resulting obsolescence of the primary traditional role of women as housewives; 2) the new negative demographic dynamics in advanced industrial societies, generated in part by the obsolescence of women's traditional roles, the technologization of the reproductive functions by means of new contraceptive technologies, and the integration of women in the previously predominant male workforce; and 3) the ecological crisis brought about by a greatly intensified exploitation of nature without fully knowing or taking accout of its possible consequences.

Clearly, the traditional counterculture of modernism — Marxism — was not up to the new challenges since it tended to reduce all these problems to class conflicts and, consequently, was equally insensitive to the urgency of their solution — at least not sufficiently sensitive for those forced to bear the consequences of these momentous disruptions.[7] Furthermore, given the new demographic dynamics, to the extent that much of the new labor power was now imported, class conflicts tended to translate into minority and racial problems not readily susceptible to traditional Marxist solutions. Thus, like modernity, Marxism had also become terminally obsolete.

Impatience with modernity's seeming inability to even adequately conceptualize these problems paved the way for the postmodernist alternative. But this alternative was peculiarly reminiscent of what it opposed, at least in the sense that it ontologized, in a paradigmatically Western way, the problems of Western civilization, to which it contraposed a radical relativism whose very formulation was possible only from the very same Western perspective it was meant to displace.[8]

Gould's theory of punctuated equilibria suffers a similar fate. Most of its alleged innovative features are not all that new since, as many commentators have repeatedly pointed out, they can be readily found in most of the illustrious predecessors he proceeds to attack and his genuine innovation, the positing of the radical contingency of the evolution of intelligent life is rather questionable. He does, however, manage to write highly entertaining accounts of evolutionary theory which tend to be all the more popular to the extent that they fall fully in step with predominant radical trends.

Moishe Gonzales

7. Cf. Zygmunt Bauman, "The Left as the Counter-Culture of Modernity," in *Telos* 70 (Winter 1986-87), pp. 81-93.

8. Cf. Gérard Raulet, "From Modernity as One-Way Street to Postmodernity as Dead End," in *New German Critique* 33 (Fall 1984), pp. 155-178.

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The Other Poland

Janine R. Wedel, *The Private Poland* (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1988).
Janine R. Wedel, ed., *The Unplanned Society: Poland During and after Communism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).

These are scandalous books — in the best sense of the word. They demystify the heroic Polish self-image of a society led by Nobel prize winners and the Polish pope, a society unified from generation to generation in pursuit of feedom and truth, by exposing far less noble patterns of everyday life. Janine Wedel's work shows that even those Poles who cherish the ideal, who belong actively to the Church, the Opposition, the creative intelligentsia, frequently find themselves forced to employ survival tactics based on "pulling strings," looking the other way, and other similar behavior.

Yet the intention of *The Private Poland* is not unkind. Quite the opposite. Wedel wants to help Western observers bridge the cultural gap separating them from Polish daily life: people in their families and friendship circles, all doing the best they can to get along in an oppressive system. Such an effort is welcome, and well done.

The Private Poland is an ethnographic study conducted mostly during the first three years of martial law (1982-84). Wedel provides "thick" description of diary entries, anecdotes and stories recounting the ordinary commerce of life against the extraordinary background of martial law. A persistently recurring Polish phrase is unpacked in order to reveal the web of social meanings it encapsulates. Morality is an overriding issue. The friendliness and mutual support of small groups affords protection from a harsh political regime, but at what price?

In a particularly revealing passage Wedel tells the story of her confrontation with a ticket controller (Poland's buses run on the honor system, with very infrequent checks by plainclothes agents). While riding the bus one day, she was challenged to produce a ticket. She pretended not to know Polish, and to believe that her monthly pass was good for the requisite fare, though she knew it was not. In what followed, with one bystander translating, and other riders chiming in comments, Wedel found the whole bus supporting her deception against the arrogant authority of the controller. Her fellow busriders began to offer excuses for her, even though it was awkwardly obvious to all that she was wrong. At the next stop she got off the bus, paying the controller the fine she demanded. The bus emptied, even though it was an out of the way stop, presumably because no one else had proper tickets either. The crowning moment came later,

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when she recounted the story to her friends, proud of having mastered the "naive foreigner" strategem. But *you* are naive, her friends responded. If you merely presented your i.d. card instead of paying the fine, it would have been a year and a half before the bureaucracy would have caught up with you by mail. Since you are leaving in six months, her friends told her condescendingly, you would have paid nothing.

Wedel dwells on the slippery moral standards operating in the events she analyzes. In a very Catholic country with a strong moral code, she finds individuals acting on "flexible" ethical norms (she admits, with some alarm, that after a stay in Poland she found herself responding to a wide variety of personal situations with defensive half-truths or outright lies, such as in the confrontation with the ticket-controller.) People invoke the system's pervasive arbitrariness to excuse otherwise indefensible acts. Wedel recounts the story of a worker who took a chair from his enterprise — a state-owned, impersonal institution — intending to sell it. Before he could get it home, however, someone removed it from his truck. "A thief stole my chair!" the man complained, in ingenuous righteous indignation.

By the end of the book English-readers will feel comfortable with a wide range of hitherto untranslatable Polish expressions.[1] Their social referents are clear, despite their idiosyncratic "Polishness." *The Private Poland* thus succeeds admirably, a gem of ethnography belonging on everyone's short list of Poland reading.

The same cannot be said of *The Unplanned Society*. Written after the 1989 revolution, it is a much more ambitious undertaking. Its stated task is to trace the changes in the social networks that allowed Poles to survive communism. Are they a help or a hindrance in building new institutions?

Like *The Private Poland*, this book also debunks the myth of a noble, unified society, showing its fragmented and, at times, corrupt reality. The description is more sociological than anthropological-ethnographic: a collection of essays written by Poles intimately engaged in current events. All of the contributors to this volume take for granted what might be called the Polish micro-culture — the interrelations among families, *środowiska* (the plural form), and economic and political institutions. Yet there is a marked difference in tone between the

1. A key example is the word *środowisko*. It can be rendered as "milieu," "friendship circle," "professional community" and, perhaps, "support group," although it is not reducible to any one of these meanings. A person's *środowisko* is a solidaristic, self-identified group of people who have come to know each other through some activity, usually at the workplace, but also in schools, parishes, in political activities, while pursuing hobbies, etc. The bond uniting the group is a special combination of familiarity and professional respect. A *środowisko* is not the same as one's "friends," "colleagues" or "acquaintances" because relations among these are much more individualized, whereas in the *środowisko* they are collective. It is also different from family membership, which is independent of consent. By contrast, entry into a *środowisko* is through mutual recogniton between individual and group — though this acceptance process is informal, at times even imperceptible.

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two books. *The Private Poland* is more descriptive, less judgmental. *Środowiska*, the petty manipulations of rules, etc. are treated as cultural phenomena to be understood. In *The Unplanned Society* they are symptoms (and causes) of social pathology. By the end of the second book *środowisko*'s connotation of solidarism has turned sour. *Środowiska* become sinister "old boy" networks useful for exploiting unregulated business conditions.

Contradictions between noble image and gritty reality are also explored on the macro-cultural level. The Church's importance in Polish history as the defender of moral values is contrasted with its practices in parishes and schools, e.g., pressuring parents and children to participate in ritualistic observations or face ostracism. The Opposition also comes in for some criticism. Activists in the mid-1980s are quoted expressing contempt for a Polish society made cynical and stupid by sovietization. An anonymous article accuses certain famous oppositionists of blurring the line between personal finances and funds collected for "the cause." Apparently, some of them did very well for themselves materially, while leading the moral crusade for all.

What is the reader to make of the evidence for the "unplanned" society?[2] Despite Wedel's effort to construct a historically-grounded argument about continuity and change in social networks, her book is likely to be read in the West simply as myth-debunking: contrary to what Opposition and *Solidarność* propagandists have been saying, Polish society is not idealistic and dedicated to noble values, but petty and mean-spirited. Therefore, any admiration for Poland's heroic struggle is wasted.

Such a reading is unfortunate. Though critical, the contributors themselves have not altogether given up on noble ideals. While they might agree with Zygmunt Bauman that Poland is in a phase of "liminality"[3] or social indeterminacy, this is diagnosed as an anomic hangover from life under the previous regime. Moreover, it is something that can and should be corrected.

Wedel organizes the essays she has collected as a historical analogy between Poland's emergence from the Nazi occupation and the contemporary situation: beginning with Karimierz Wyka's 1945 article, which argues that during the war Poles lived with an "excluded economy." Their survival tactics and moral practices created an unreal system — a "social fiction" — which operated not only contrary to the rulers' commands, but also contrary to the moral instincts of the population. After liberation, it left Polish society in an anomic state, with deep wounds in its social psyche. Wyka concluded that the long-term effects of those wounds would become apparent only in the years that followed, as society tried to reconstitute itself.

All the contributors to Wedel's book would accept the contemporary relevance

2. The title is consciously ambiguous. Is this a description of a society that developed without a plan, spontaneously? Or did it make a conscious effort to un-plan, as one might fight off an octopus, prying off the tentacles, sucker by sucker?

3. Cf. Zygmunt Bauman, "The Polish Predicament: a Model in Search of Class Interests," in this issue of *Telos*.

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of Wyka's thesis: "the most important lesson of the war [was that] economic processes are woven into a nation's moral fabric. . . [T]his war was won by nations that inculcated a high level of economic morality, the morality of work . . . Poles heard and read [about achievements in production] but did not participate in any comparable effort as conscious actors." Instead, they learned the habits of dodging, sabotage, bribery, and deceit.

As to the question of how to heal these social wounds, opinions differ. Was Wyka referring to a liberal (Protestant) work ethic? One way to overcome anomie is through the bracing materialist individualism preached by Adam Smith and practiced by diligent Puritans. Today this discipline, translated into Polish but otherwise essentially unrevised, is advocated by the shock-therapy liberals.[4] Others would prefer a different sort of work ethic — one based on "sacrifice, exertions, hunger, and foresight" for the common cause. (This is Wyka's characterization of the Allies' will to work). It would resemble Catholic teachings concerning the dignity of labor and social harmony, rather than Protestant competitive asceticism.

This antinomy of two "moralities" of work is a crude oversimplification. Yet it provides a new perspective on continuity and change in Polish microstructures. From the "Protestant ascetic" viewpoint, *środowisko* networks are a hindrance to the development of public institutions built on the maxim "an honest day's work for an honest day's pay," allowing (indeed, *requiring*) individuals to pursue their own material interests independent of the rest of society. However, from the "Catholic dignity-of-labor," *środowiska* even in their familial forms are not inconsistent with a modern institutional order. They soften the impact of the impersonal legal-rationality of the new economic and political institutions. As such they are a condition for their success.

Another way to challenge Wedel's historical analogy is to note its limited temporal scope. In neither book do the survival tactics or micro-cultures described have a genealogy reaching beyond 1939. Yet it is important to understand that Polish society has been alienated from public institutions — economic as well as political — for the last two centuries.[5]

Within such a framework, the micro- and macro-cultural structures of Polish society can be analyzed in terms of "moral economy," i.e., in terms of a value system which defines a community defending itself against incursions by hostile state and economic institutions. Wedel's description of the *środowiska* networks certainly fits here. Her explication of the informal influence that members have on each other and that, as a collectivity, they exercise over public institutions is precisely the sort of analysis relied on by writers who

4. One of the book's contributors, Jacek Kurczewski, is active in the Liberal Party, *Kongres Liberalów*. In the early 1980s he was one of the first sociologists to write about the rise of a new middle class in Poland.

5. Certainly this was true during its period of statelessness, but it can also be argued that the interwar years were marked by a similar alienation.

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have used this term.[6] Even narrowly self-interested actions such as the worker's theft of the chair must be read within the broader context of the dominant "us vs. them" ethic. The worker did not consider it theft because the chair was taken from a hostile institution, not another person.

The concept of "moral economy" has been developed to analyze pre-modern societies and, therefore, it may be inappropriate to use it in a 20th century European context. Yet the very incongruity may prove fruitful in examining a "liminal," indeterminate situation. The social networks Wedel writes about are criticized in *The Unplanned Society* precisely for being traditional, morally primitive (us-them ethic), inadequate to a modem political economy. Yet they persist.

Leaving ethical problems aside (are these moral economy forms vestigial, or will they continue to serve a useful purpose if suitably rehabilitated?), it is still possible to ask about their political meaning. It should be remembered that the predecessors of these social networks — during the partitions, under the German occupation, in People's Poland — were mutualistic, defensive structures against domination of public life by intractable rulers. This is not to say they were political in any grand sense. For example, peasant organization of unsanctioned sale and delivery of their goods during the occupation was not motivated by noble ideals. Yet even these actions, taken as a complex social mechanism of survival, constituted everyday forms of resistance.

Today's public realm is not dominated by hostile rulers. It poses different sorts of threats, some of them indeterminate and amorphous. The persistence of informal social networks and the survival tactics associated with them are perhaps better read as forms of resistance to the pressures they face, rather than as moral failings of individuals who cannot shed their "bad habits."

Andrzej W. Tymowski

6. Cf. E.P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," in *Past and Present*, No. 50 (1971), pp. 76-136. Cf. also James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* (New Haven: Yale Univesity Press, 1976)); and *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

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Beckett Up To Date

Axel Honneth, Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe, and Albrecht Wellmer, eds., *Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment*, translated by William Rehg (Boston: MIT Press, 1992), 351 pp.

Beckett censored Godot when he staged the play in Berlin in the early 80's. Though Pozo, as ever, yanks on the rope around Lucky's neck, exalting: "Think, pig! . . . Think!" and Lucky snaps upright on command, instead of reciting the most famous monologue of twentieth century drama — the erudite scatological "Quaquaquaqua" — the slave glares out at the audience in goggle-eyed silence. Beckett had insisted that the speech be dropped. Once its cunning hilarity pressed deft thumbs on the collective jugular: Isn't collapsing, cornered thought a riot? But the *tour de force*, isolated for decades from the rest of the play, had instead been bringing down the house with the crowd pleasing promise that, ultimately, reflexion could never bother anyone. Lucky would finish, audiences would clap. Beckett's effort to make good on the damage done to the play was needed and compelling, but just as the ingenuity of the *tour de force* prepared its own neutralization as entertainment, the ruse with which Beckett supplanted it was too clever. The trick would not survive repetition. This left Lucky's compromised soliloquy in need of an ersatz, but there was nothing perfectly right until *Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment*. This book's appearance proves that language itself, and on an international scale, had been working at coming to the aid of Beckett's play, for in it Karl-Otto Apel presents an essay every sentence of which is *the* sentence, though it is the concluding passage that fulfills all messianic hopes: "As a metaphysics-free, transcendental-reflexive confirmation of the inescapable presuppositions of philosophical argumentation, the transcendental-pragmatic justification of the standpoint of reason also contains the standards able to unmask cryptometaphysical theorizing, such as that already pointed out in variants of scientistic reductionism."

True, these numb words performed from a stage would be met with so much coughing, noise in the aisles, roughhousing and snoring, that getting through its last syllable would be unlikely. Lucky and Pozo would need to help him fix it up. Lucky: "You left out, 'Don't hit me.'" Apel: "I see. How about, 'Justification-free transcendental pragmatics as even earlier pointed out . . .'?" Pozo: "Approximate, approximate. Don't forget to be funny!" This injunction is unfair, because Apel was working on it. It's just that when he thinks of fun he wags his forefinger, as in the essay's last line, "The barbarity of reflection" may still lead "to a regression of human culture back to primitive conditions." Lucky (distracted): "It's a risk."

Robert Hullot-Kentor

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